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ABSTRACT 
This thesis takes an evolutionary perspective on human psychology. To 
the extent that inherited tendencies shape behaviour, their design will be 
fitted to the social environraents prevailing as Homo sapiens evolved, in 
foraging groups, the nearest modem equivalent being hunter-gatherers. 
From ethnographies of hunter-gatherers, food-sharing and counter- 
dominance were identified as universal. Food-sharing was more thorough 
than is explicable purely by kinship or reciprocation; one functional effect 
was to even out the supply of valuable high-variance food. In contrast with 
the social systems of the other great apes, counter-dominance spread 
influence widely, preventing the emergence of dominant individuals who 
could obtain resources disproportionately. Potential paths for the evolution of 
egalitarian tendencies are discussed. 
Two falsifiable hypotheses were generated from this perspective. First, 
sharing will facilitate risk-taking. The predicted effect was confirmed at high 
risk levels, similar to those faced by hunters. Given that during evolution risk 
was reduced primarily by social means, social as well as rational factors are 
treated by the evolved brain as relevant to risky decisions. It is argued that 
this result may suggest a new perspective on the Group Polarisation 
experiments. 
The second hypothesis tested was that an egalitarian envirorunent will 
produce beneficial effects on individual and social behaviour. The data 
collected were consistent with the hypothesis: a comparison between three 
Italian towns showed that measures of health (including cardiovascular 
mortality), education, social involvement, crime and social perceptions were 
significantly more positive where co-operatives employed a larger percentage 
of the population. 
The evolutionary perspective showed its value as a means of generating 
novel testable hypotheses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical perspective of this thesis is evolutionary. Recognising 
that "Human evolution involved the selection of psychological mechanisms 
that turned out to be general solutions to local adaptive problems" (Tooby 
and DeVore 1987,210) the aim of this work is to identify specific evolved 
predispositions of relevance to group behaviour. Structures of present-day 
living whose design is shaped by an understanding of these predispositions 
may prove more productive than those which ignore them. One objective of 
these studies is to provide information to those who design and run 
organisations which will enable them to do so in ways that are more 
productive and more in tune with the evolved nature of their members. 
The thesis has five chapters. 
Chapter 1 sets out the evolutionary perspective on human psychology 
which provides the theoretical grounding for all the work. 
Chapter 2 reports the results of a literature survey of hunter-gatherer 
ethnographies, designed to give some detailed insight into the social 
environment likely to have characterised the period of evolution of Hoino 
sapiens. 
Chapter 3 reports the results of an experiment designed to test 
predictions regarding risk-taking and sharing of risky resources. These 
predictions are based on the results of the second part of the thesis, in which it 
is established that the sharing of meat, a key and risky resource, appears to 
have been universal among hunter-gatherers. 
Chapter 4 reports the results of a study comparing indices of quality of 
life in a town in which a significant proportion of the population works in co- 
operatives with the same indices in towns where the ownership of businesses 
is more conventional. The prediction is that working in the more egalitarian 
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structure of the co-operatives will be widely beneficial, given the fact that 
egalitarian structures with extensive sharing characterised. the period of 
human evolution. 
Finally Chapter 5 discusses the approach, results and conclusions in the 
light of possible criticisms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
CHAPTER 1: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 
Although Darwin himself was interested in the emotions from an 
evolutionary perspective (1872), the implications for the analysis of human 
psychology of the theory of evolution by natural selection have begun to be 
studied systematically only in the last three decades. Most early attempts (e. g. 
Lorenz 1966; Ardrey 1967; Morris 1967) suffered from simple modelling, 
focusing on single traits or arguing by analogy or simply speculating in ways 
that were little informed by any serious theoretical depth. Lee and DeVore 
(1968) established the importance of hunting in human evolution, Trivers 
(1971) developed the theory of reciprocal altruism as a basis for sociality, 
Hinde (1974) began to apply the concepts of ethology to humans in a rigorous 
way, and Wilson (1975) had a considerable - if controversial - impact in 
opening up the subject to a wider circle of researchers, as well as developing 
the theory of kin selection. But whether in anthropology, sociology or 
psychology, little serious effort was made to incorporate an evolutionary 
theoretical perspective in the design of research projects. 
An important exception was Bowlby, who in 1969 coined the phrase 
"environment of evolutionary adaptedness" (1981,77) and whose work on 
attachment in children adopted an explicitty evolutionary perspective, setting 
out to "understand mares instinctive behaviour" which had been shaped by 
the "relatively stable environment of adaptedness in which they were in all 
likelihood evolved"' (1981,85). He identified this as "mares primeval 
environment", during the approx. 2 million years before the invention of 
agriculture about 10,000 years ago (1981,86) and argued that "For a picture of 
this we need to turn to anthropological studies of human communities living 
in the least modified of human environments, to archaeological studies of 
early man, and to field studies of the higher primates" (1981,88). He gave 
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perhaps the earliest summary of the method of evolutionary psychology: 
"Given constant reference to maWs envirom-nent of evolutionary adaptedness, 
the vagaries to which human behaviour is liable become, it is held, much less 
incomprehensible than they are when the nature of that environment is 
ignored". 
Another early research programme which took an evolutionary 
perspective was Shepher's (1971) work on mating relationsl-dps in kibbutzim, 
which showed that incest avoidance could not be explained as a socialising or 
cultural process: he established that there is an inherited, negative imprinting 
process between children who spend their first six years of life together, 
regardless of kinship and in spite of efforts by seniors to overcome it. This 
worWs theoretical perspective was significant in predicting that there would 
be an identifiable psychological propensity (i. e. a specific developmental 
pattern, at the proximate level) because of its role in bringing about, in 
primordial circumstances, incest avoidance (i. e. behaviour with a material 
effect at the functional level), and recognising that the psychological 
mechanism could be identified precisely because it was not functionally 
effective - or, better, because it was functionally over-effective - in the 
changed environment of the kibbutz. 
Thi- is one of the key insights on wl-dch today's evolutionary 
psychology is based: that there is no direct link - although in the original 
environment there is a correlation over the long term - between on the one 
hand the functional effect of an adaptation, and on the other the content of the 
proximate psychological mechanism. The proximate mechanism drives the 
behaviour pattern, but the same behaviour pattern may have very different, 
and even ne ative, survival or reproductive consequences in particular 
19 
instances, and particularly in environments that are different from that in 
which the organism evolved. But evolved behaviour patterns can have 
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negative outcomes even in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness - 
fitness effects are stochastic outcomes of behaviour that is itself controlled by 
proximate mechanisms. 
For example, Symons argues that male sexual jealousy "'increased the 
probability that men would sire their wives' offspring" (1979: 306) but he 
adds that when a cuckolded husband is furious "it would be inaccurate to 
infer that ... what he is 'really' doing is promoting the survival of his genes. In 
fact, the opposite would be more accurate: sexual jealousy is real; this jealousy 
may or may not affect reproductive success... " (1979: 306-7). Tooby and 
DeVore put the general point as follows: "in the lifetime of any particular 
animal, it is the proximate mechanisms that actually control 
behavior.... Behavior correlates exactly with these proximate mechanisms, but 
only approximately with the fitness strategies that shaped them" (1987: 198). 
The example evident in Shepher's work is that the proximate mechanism 
whose effect is to prevent brothers and sisters mating does not include kin 
recognition - which is intuitively surprising. So although it is true that this 
developmental pattern is gene-controlled, and spread because its functional 
effect in the population of foraging groups in which Hoino sapiens evolved was 
to minimise incest, it is not correct to say that at the proximate level it is an 
incest-avoidance mechanism. At the proximate level it is a mechanism VVhich 
turns off sexual attraction between people who have spent their first six years 
intimately together, regardless of kinship. 
Symons (1979) discussed a wider range of mating behaviour from a 
similar perspective, opening up a rich vein for evolutionary psychologists to 
mine. And again and again the same pattern is observed: that the proximate 
psychological mechanisms, in people removed from the environment in 
which Hoino evolved, have functional consequences which bear no 
relationship with those which resulted in the spread of the genes controlling 
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them. For example, the cross-cultural studies organised by Buss (1994) 
established that there is not a single instance in 37 different cultures where 
men look for material resources to a greater extent than do women, in 
evaluating a potential mate. So it would appear to be reasonable to 
hypothesise that there is an inherited, gender-dependent mechanism to 
ensure that women preferentially mate with men who will be capable of 
useful paternal investment, so that their joint offspring will have adequate 
resources. That this is not a correct formulation is shown by the fact that 
women who are rich and fully capable of supporting cl-dldren on their own 
(which is, of course, not a situation that occurred in the environment in which 
Hoino evolved) emphasise the importance of a potential mate"s having 
resources to a greater extent than women in worse economic circumstances 
(Buss 1994,45-6). In other words, the psychological mechanism is not simply 
about having adequate resources, even though the functional effect in the 
evolutionary environment was to achieve exactly that. The psychological 
mechanism seems to be concerned with resources measured not against what 
will sustain infants (the important functional question), but against the 
resources already available to the individual choosing a mate, or generally 
available to the group of which that person is a member. Such a mechanism 
could engender escalating, inherited propensities towards competition among 
males for resources far more extensive than could possibly be required by any 
family, even though tl-ds was not its functional effect in the evolutionary 
environment, where there was almost certainly no significant amount of 
storable wealth. It must include specific mental algorithms to deal with the 
resource questions, including the evaluation of relative wealth. Exactly this 
characteristic has been analysed by Frank (1985), more from the perspective of 
an economist than from that of an evolutionary psychologist. He found that 
the tendency to evaluate ourselves and others on a relative basis rather than 
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on a basis relative to some objective measure introduces substantial 
inefficiencies into the labour and other markets. 
Tooby and Cosmides (e. g. 1989,1992) grasped the theoretical nettles 
most firmly, beginning to sketch out a wide-ranging theoretical basis for 
evolutionary psychology, and extended the analytical work to controlled 
psychological experiments, particularly in the area of tl-dnking patterns. They 
predicted, for example, that people should be significantly more capable of 
solving complex statistical problems if the problems are posed in terms of 
frequencies rather than probabilities, on the grounds that in the evolutionary 
environment no-one ever met a probability in the flesh, but all individuals 
were surrounded by events of varying frequencies, which were important for 
them to deal with successfully. The resulting experiments confirmed the 
prediction (Gigerenzer 1991, Cosmides and Tooby 1996). 
Additionally, Cosmides' extensive work on the Wason selection task 
has provided accumulating evidence that there is a "'cheater-detection" 
algorithm that overrides both psyd-tologists' instructions and the rules of 
logic. Her method is to use a standard Wason selection task (Wason 1966). 
This involves stating a conditional hypothesis which has the general form "If 
p then q". Examples are: "If a person goes to Boston then he takes the 
subway" or "'If there is an W on one side of a card, then there is a '3' on the 
other side". The subject is then presented with four cards and asked to turn 
over all the cards necessary to test the hypothesis. On each side of each card, 
there is a piece of information relating to the hypothesis: for example, in the 
Boston example the cards will hold a destination on one side and a method of 
transport on the other, and so may read "Boston" (=p) "New York" (= not p), 
""subway" (= 
, q) and 
"bicycle" (= not q). The logically correct cards to turn over 
are the ones inscribed with p and not q, but normal performance rarely 
readies 507o correct, and is of ten less than 25%. However, Cosmides has 
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shown that if the hypothesis implies the possibility that a person is getting 
away with some undeserved benefit, i. e. the danger that there is a "cheater", 
then performance improves dramatically, to a consistent 75%. The reason is 
that our brains, designed by natural selection operating on individuals living 
an intensely social life, home in on the possibility of cheating. She has also 
shown that the cheater detection module will either reinforce or override the 
logically correct response, depending on how the hypothesis is presented: the 
cheater detection algorithm is more powerful than fon-nal logic. Building on 
her work Gigerenzer and Hug, for example, showed that given the identical 
hypothesis, "If an employee gets a pension, then that employee must have 
worked for the firm for at least 10 years", 60% of subjects taking the role of 
workers will choose not p and q, while 75Yo of subjects taking the role of 
employers will choose the opposite cards, p and not q, because cheating means 
the opposite, depending on the perspective (Gigerenzer and Hug, 1995). 
In the evolutionary social environment people equipped with special 
sensitivity to the risk of being cheated fared better than those who were 
purely logical in their approach did, and so the Wason selection task can be 
manipulated by the positioning of suggestions of possible cheating. This work 
is particularly interesting in providing both an explanation for previously 
inexplicable experimental results and also a rich crop of new predictions that 
have been supported by experimental data (Cosmides and Tooby 1989,1992). 
There are many other strands in evolutionary psychology, which all 
share the perspective enunciated above by Bowlby. For example, Daly and 
Wilson (1988) have shown that the single most important demographic 
predictor of homicide is the step-relationship in a family and also that the age 
and sex proftles of murderers in London and Detroit are identical - coinciding 
with the time when young males seek mates - even though the rate of 
murders is radically different. Pinker has explained a wide variety of 
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behaviour in language learning (1994). Thornhill and Thornhill have used the 
same perspective to clarify rape (1993) and its attendant psychological pain 
(1991). 
This thesis examines behaviour that has elements of psychological 
altruism in it: food sharing and counter-dominance. A mechanism is 
suggested below by wl-dch selection at the level of the gene could have given 
rise to the psychological tendencies which support these social behaviours. 
However, the recent re-examination of group selection theory by Sober and 
Wilson (1998) provides an additional selection factor that would clearly have 
supported the evolution of the mechanisms described. They argue that the 
triumph of selfish gene theory against early, poorly formulated expositions of 
group selection theory resulted in the incorrect dismissal of the role of group 
selection as a material factor in shaping traits which contribute to survival. 
Using a trematode parasite as an example of behaviour incontrovertibly 
shaped by group selection, they provide a rigorous exposition of how group 
selection works. In doing so they clarify the boundaries of what constitutes a 
group; how intra-group selection against altruists can be swamped by inter- 
group selection for groups containing altruists; and the population level 
mathematics which has so far disguised the role of group selection by failing 
to separate the within-group and between-group elements sufficiently clearly. 
They suggest as a heuristic device when hypothesising any evolutionary 
model that one should identify what trait would develop given evolution 
purely by individual selection, and what trait would develop given purely 
group selection. One of the factors that they identify as irreducibly shaped by 
group selection is any secondary process that rewards altruistic behaviour. 
This includes the benefits to the effective, sharing hunter identified by 
Hawkes (1993) - the tendency to mate preferentially with hunters whose 
behaviour benefits the whole group could not have evolved simply by 
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individual/ gene selection but only with a strong element of group selection 
(1998,143-146). This gives an additional answer to the puzzle of how these 
altruistic behaviours evolved: they are likely to have been shaped by group 
selection. 
Cosmides and Tooby were early to develop the process of moving 
from the theory of evolutionary psychology to hypotheses to experiments. A 
part of the present work is aimed at using that sequence in a new area: that of 
sharing and risk-taking. The final part of the work is more similar to that of 
Daly and Wilson, in that it moves from theory to prediction to a test of that 
prediction by re-examining publicly available demographic data, 
supplemented by a survey. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EGALITARIANISM IN HUMAN EVOLUTION 
CHAPTER 2: EGALITARIANISM IN HUMAN EVOLUTION 
Key ideas put forward in this chapter were published in Erdal and 
Whiten (1994) (Appendix 1) and a version of this chapter was published as 
Erdal and Whiten (1996) (Appendix 2). 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
2.1.1 Materials for modelling the early human mind 
Modelling the minds of living individuals is hard enough: attempting 
the same for minds long past is daunting indeed, when all that remains of 
those individuals is a patchy assemblage of bones and artefacts. By 
comparison with what we can infer from those remains, the chance to board 
some magical time machine and observe a the richness of the actual 
behaviour of our ancestors would elevate our understanding of their minds 
almost beyond measure. 
Fortunately, direct analysis of living action is still possible for two major 
classes of individuals that for different reasons give pointers to what we 
might have observed from our time machine. The two classes are hunting- 
gathering ? eoples, whose way of life may indicate important features of the 
late evolutionary period of Hoino sapiens, and non-human primates, whose 
conduct may reflect aspects of the behaviour of the common ancestor they 
share with us. In both cases we need to recognise that any parallels are not 
direct, but are distorted in systematic ways. 
We are doubly fortunate in the substantial nature of the material 
available for study, for in recent times there have been many different hunter- 
gatherer societies extant, and dose to two hundred species of non-human 
primate. In both cases these numbers appear destined to suffer drastic 
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reduction even in our lifetime, so we stand at a unique point in the study of 
human origins, and we bear a heavy responsibility in gamering the insights 
fleetingly within our grasp. Happily, the disappearance of many of these 
subjects was preceded - by the narrow squeak of a century - by the insights of 
Darwin (1975) and Wallace, rather than the reverse. 
The value of these sources has been recognised for some time now, as 
exemplified in such classic works as Lee and DeVore (1968) and Washburn 
and DeVore (1961). But there has also been plenty of time for critical analysis 
to highlight the shortcomings and pitfalls to which the inferences drawn may 
be prone. The rationale for valuing observations on a hunting and gathering 
mentality has been, to quote just one of the many appeals to the same statistic, 
that "basic human social forms, language, and human nature itself were 
forged during the 99 percent of human history when people lived in hunting 
and gathering camps" (Lee 1979: 1). But do we really know that? Certainly 
there is good evidence for the beginnings of settled agriculture from only 
about 10-12,000 years BP, and a contrasting dearth of such evidence for any 
periods earlier than this (Hole 1992). The 99yo figure thus rests on hunting 
and gathering being representative of the last million years. On tl-ds there is 
more dispute. Leakey and Lewin, having reviewed the evidence and sceptics' 
doubts about it, conclude that "the earliest Homo were incipient huntecs and 
gatherers, and that way of life would shape the human body and the human 
mind for more than two million years" (1992,141-2). At the other extreme, it 
was possible to argue that what some take for archaeological evidence of 
early Homo hunter-gatherer bases may instead reflect only scavenging and a 
variety of other natural processes (Binford 1981), but Thieme (1997) has now 
described sýarp wooden spears from about 400,000 years BP, balanced for 
throwing like a modern javelin (which implies a long tradition of 
manufacture), and found with horse skeletons. Until this recent discovery, 
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impressive evidence of hunting could be said to arrive only with the clearly 
fashioned arrowheads associated with anatomically modem H. sapiens as 
recently as 100,000 years ago. From the perspective of this paper, whether 
meat came originally from hunting or scavenging is of secondary importance, 
as long as it provided an unpredictable resource suitable for sharing. Direct 
archaeological evidence for the other side of the foraging pattern - gathering - 
is hard to find: but it is reasonable to assume that it took place. 
2.1.2 Constraints on Modelling the Past from the Present 
The chronology of the history of hunting and gathering is not clear, but 
the logic of evolution implies that today's hunter-gatherers offer models more 
likely to be misleading the further into the past we attempt to cast our 
inferences. Even if Leakey and Lewin are correct in identifying a hunting and 
gathering way of life with the emergence of Hoino, we should not expect an 
identity between the mentality of today's foraging peoples and that of H. 
habilis or H. erectus, with their significantly smaller brains. 
There are additional constraints in the modelling process. Many modern 
hunter-gatherers have been relegated by pressure from agricultural and 
industrial societies to marginal areas, whereas before the advent of herding 
and agriculture foragers dominated the land occupied by hominids and could 
choose the most attractive areas. Further, most hunter-gatherers for whom 
there are good ethnographic records have some degree of symbiotic 
relationship with agricultural peoples, which may have influenced their 
behaviour (e. g. Leacock 1954,1980; Hyde 1959,20; Bailey et al. 1989). 
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2.1.3 Strategic Modelling and Hunter-gatherer Core Behaviour 
Patterns 
The constraints reviewed above dearly impose methodological 
limitations. I concur with Tooby and DeVore (1987) that referential modelling 
- in which one particular hunting-gathering society is selected as an optimal 
model for the past - is most likely to be misleading and should be avoided in 
favour of strategic modelling. The rationale of the latter is to use a much 
greater diversity of information to build general models of behavioural 
ecology, into which the known features of ancestral hominids may be fitted in 
order to produce inferences about yet unknown characteristics. The models 
are developed from the "strategic" point of view of the gene, which is 
heuristically seen as having the strategic goal of reproducing itself as 
effectively as possible (cf. Dawkins 1976). A good example of strategic 
modelling is the way in which our knowledge of the relationships between 
sexual dimorphism and mating patterns in primates and other mammals may 
be used to deduce the implications of dimorphism in fossil hominids (e. g. 
Foley 1988,216; Potts 1992). 
A basic methodological rule derived from this approach is to identify 
common patterns in the enormous diversity of cultures and ecologies 
associated with present-day foragers. If such patterns exist, then this suggests 
that they are inherent functional components of human hunting-gathering 
society, as likely to characterise the history we aim to reconstruct as the 
present we can observe. Such configurations do exist, and students of hunter- 
gatherers have discerned a cluster of features which appear to act as the 
functional core of the societies: egalitarianism, co-operation, and sharing, on a 
scale unpreýedented in primate evolution, and sometimes dubbed "primitive 
communism" (Lee 1979,460). 
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Accordingly the present paper focuses on this core. There are additional 
reasons for doing so. First, recent years have seen the accumulation of 
important new data on these behaviours in both human and non-human 
primates, which permit evolutionary modelling (Boesch and Boesch 1989; 
Knauft 1991; Harcourt and de Waal 1992; Sober and Wilson 1994; Boehm 
1997). Second, there have been exciting developments in the theory of 
altruism, from Trivers (1971) to Frank (1988). And finally, insights about the 
evolution of this core have relevance for us today. Associated proximate 
psychological mechanisms are likely to be with us in modem times, and 
although they may not have the reproductive consequences which they did in 
the ancestral environments which moulded their evolution, they are likely to 
have material effects on psychological motivation and well-being. Structures 
of present-day living whose design is shaped by an understanding of these 
predispositions may prove more productive than those which ignore them. 
2.1.4 The Egalitarian Puzzle 
The egalitarianism of modem hunter-gatherers is an apparent anomaly 
in evolutionary terms. The puzzle is that although dominance hierarchies are 
likely to have characterised the ancestor shared by cl-dmpanzees and humans, 
and institutional hierarchies are characteristic of modem humans, the hunter- 
gatherers representing the intervening phase are almost entirely egalitarian in 
social structure and behaviour. 
This anomaly was characterised by Knauft (1991) as a "U" shaped 
curve in evolution: moving down the left arm from ape hierarchies to hunter- 
gatherer egalitarianism, and then up the right arm with agricultural and then 
modem hierarchical societies. 
This curve is a useful way to conceptualise the evolution of social 
behaviour, but it must have been a heavily skewed "U". We do not know 
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when the bottom of the left hand arm was reached - when egalitarian 
behaviour first appeared in evolution - but we do know that the left arm and 
the bottom together covered a period of several million years. We also know 
that the process at work involved biological evolution, associated with an 
enormous increase in brain size. If there are specific inherited predispositions 
for social behaviour, it must have been during this period that they were 
shaped by evolutionary processes. 
On the other hand, the right hand arm turned upwards, into 
hierarchical social organisations, only about 10,000 years ago, with the advent 
of agricultural societies. There were possible precursors in the complex 
hunter-gatherer societies of the Northwest coast of North America, perhaps 
five thousand years earlier, (Kroeber 1939: 29; Suttles 1968: 105) and possibly 
earlier still in Europe (Mellars, 1996). However, until the advent of agriculture 
this social complexity is not characteristic. The evolutionary pressures that 
led to modern levels of encephalisation took effect in the long preceding 
period when humans and their precursors lived in simple foraging societies - 
associated, it is therefore inferred, with egalitarian social behaviour. The 
process that led to hierarchy was not an additional period of biologically 
driven evolution - there was not time for that, and no further significant 
biological changes are apparent. It was rather the result of the already 
evolved human psychology meeting new circumstances. As a result, the "U" 
may look, (perhaps appropriately), more like a question mark lying on its 
side (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1. The U-shaped Curve. 
Hierarchical 
A 
B 
Egalitarian C 
c. 6m BP Time Present 
'A' is the point at which the hominid line split from the chimpanzee line. 'C' is sonte 10- 
15,000 years BP, the beginning of complex societies. 'AC' covers several million years of 
biological evolution. It is not clear when 'B'- the beginning of egalitarian social behaviour, as 
shown by modern hunter-gatherers - occurred. 'BC'nzay have been several millions of years 
or inerely tens of thousands. 
In order better to model the mentality underlying the different parts of 
the curve and to attempt to understand the processes which moulded it, we 
need a deeper appreciation of the nature of the egalitarianism in question. 
This is the task of the next section. 
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2.2 HUNTER-GATHERER EGALITARIANISM 
Hunter-gatherers are characterised by food-sharing and by a virtually 
complete absence of hierarchy or dominance. These two subjects will be 
considered separately, and then their common psychological elements will be 
drawn out. The ethnographic references are tabulated in Table 2.1, copied 
from Erdal and Whiten (1996) wl-dch is attached in Appendix 2. 
2.2.1. FOOD SHARING 
2.2.1.1 Meat is universally shared 
Amongst hunter-gatherers food, and particularly meat, is shared. This 
has been observed by virtually all ethnographers and has been tested quite 
rigorously by modem anthropologists. As the following quotations from 
ethnographies show, the similarities are impressive, across all continents 
(Table 2.1 - column headed "Meat Sharing"). 
In Africa, Huntingford's early work- among the Dorobo established 
that "'A successful hunter also shared his kill with those who went with him 
and were unlucky" (1955,607) . Turnbull observed of the Mbuti that "Each 
band, however, will state certain rules, and will not hesitate to override them 
in order to bring about the recognised goal - equitable distribution of the 
spoils" (1965,158). Bleek among the Naron noted that when a hunter returns 
to camp with meat, "Everybody comes round and has a taste, the hunter 
doling out the meat and of course keeping the skin, sinew, etc., for himself' 
(1928,16). Lee said of the ! Kung that "the day's returns of meat and gathered 
foods are divided in such a way that every member of the camp receives an 
equitable share"' (1979,118). 
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Marshall agrees: "Whoever the hunters are, the meat is shared and everyone 
profits" (1976,357). She also gives a detailed description of the sharing of an 
eland, including instances of sharing that could not conceivably be 
interpreted as being either reciprocal or among kin (1976,362). Tanaka's 
picture of the San is very similar: food sharing is "so thorough as to seem 
almost compulsory"' (1980,95). He interprets the sharing as generalised 
reciprocity (not balanced or negative, using Sahlins' (1965) classification), 
reporting that the San believe "that all will even out over time, and it is with 
this expectation that they give so freely" (1980,99). 
In Australia, among the Walbiri in times of real scarcity the members 
of the band disperse to join neighbouring groups. "Even if the hostsresources 
were also limited, they were shared until all the food was consumed. Then 
hosts and guests alike literally tightened their string-belts and scoured the 
countryside" (Meggitt 1971,52). Among the Tiwi Goodale notes a slightly 
different response to short term relative scarcity, with the same general 
sharing being the normal rule: "If the hunt has been very successful, the food 
will be distributed among all present, regardless of degree of relationship or 
age. However, if there is only a small amount, those not in the preferred 
ranks will not'growl' or be angry if they do not receive any" (1971,172). 
In Asia, Morris reports a similar picture among the Panuaram, 
observing that ""any game captured is shared among all members of the 
encampment"' (1982b, 103), in this case including even small game animals. 
Morris contrasts the norms, which stress autonomy and seff- sufficiency, with 
the fact that they always share their food (1982a, 180). According to Endicott, 
the Batek have a "general obligation to share" (1988,115); again, the sharing 
is egalitariap: "the amounts of food that are received are roughly the same for 
each family" (1988,118); and it applies particularly to the larger game 
animals: "'Ihe sharing of monkeys and gibbons, the largest animals normally 
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obtained, is a strict obligation, and in a non-nal sized camp (between five and 
eight families) the hunter will usually give portions to every family, even 
when his own family's vegetable food supply is inadequate" (1988,117). Like 
the Mung, they believe that the sharing "balances out over the long ruW' 
(1988,118). 
In America, among the Cree, "country game and hides destined for 
domestic use are the main products shared most equitably" (Rogers 1972, 
120); the Dogrib cannot keep even dried meat for long, "for custom cans for 
the hunter to serve cooked meat in his home to those who come and to give 
away portions" (Helm 1972,69); among the Montagnais Naskapi, before the 
advent of the fur trade "'the basic economic unit ... was the lodge group made 
up of several families among whom food was shared on a daily basis" 
(Leacock 1982,160); "the most important economic components of Copper 
Eskimo social organisation involved sharing and commensal practices" 
(Damas 1972,24) and "'the bulk of meat caught was consumed on a village 
wide basis during the winter" (1972,25); in scarcity among the Netsilik 
"caribou meat was more evenly distributed throughout the camp. Any such 
gift giving took place at the hunting site immediately after the kill ... Camp 
commensality was another way to share meat, especially with people outside 
the extended family" and often a feast for all in camp was given after a kill 
(Balikci 1970,117); in winter the seal-sharing partnerships among the Copper 
and Netsilik are the main form of sharing, combined with camp-wide 
commensality, each household entertaining the whole camp (Riches 1982,83); 
the Iglulik "kinship obligations specify sanctionable social responsibilities in 
food sharing" so that a family secures equitable food sharing by joining a 
camp with ýheir kinsmen (Riches 1982,70) (this is perhaps the sharing that is 
least generalised, concentrating solely on kin); among the Alaskan Inuit, 
"What is striking about the Alaskan large camp is that, irrespective of its size, 
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sharing occurs among the various component groups (Riches 1982,79); and 
Briggs reports wide sharing of food among the Utkuhikhalingmiut, especially 
of scarce foods (1970,88). Rasmussen had early noted among the Netsilik that 
"it is expected that owners will share [caches] when they bring them in, so 
that all will have a part" (1931,147) and also that sharing is most regular 
when food is scarce (1931,163). 
In summary, modem hunter-gatherers, as long as they have not been 
drawn into trading relationships or property systems based on other ways of 
life, all share food. They do not share only with kin (except for a rare 
exception among the Inuit); they do not share only with those who 
reciprocate; they share out what they have according to need, even when 
food is scarce. 
2.2.1.2 The predispositions behind food-sharing 
The cross-cultural evidence on food-sharing is so consistent that it 
invites the hypothesis that food-sharing is influenced by evolved, inherited 
predispositions. 
The alternative explanation that sharing is produced by cultural 
processes would be better supported if there were greater cultural variation, 
with at least some pre-contact cultures generating an opposition to sharing. 
The evidence is that the specific ways in which food is shared are influenced 
in their details by the local culture: but the existence of generalised sharing is 
universal. 
The argument that cultural processes explain the very existence of 
food-sharing implies that sharing is not an evolved predisposition: rather, 
that selfishness is the genetically effective "strategy", which is only overcome 
by cultural training or imprinting. Such a model implies that there is a tension 
between on the one hand inherited, adaptive, selfish tendencies and on the 
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other cultural rules favouring sharing. In principle, the likelihood of such a 
tension being always and everywhere resolved in favour of sharing, with 
aberrations being minor and rare, is too low to give support to the cultural 
model. 
Shepher's (1971,1983) work on incest, discussed above, suggests a 
much more plausible model for the relationship between predispositions and 
culture. Shepher showed that there is a basic developmental process which 
leads to negative imprinting among young children brought up together, so 
that the varied and elaborate incest taboos found in different cultures are 
built on an irreversible psychological process. Generalising this model 
suggests that cultural elaborations are likely to be built on a foundation of 
evolved predispositions: they are not determined in detail by them, and the 
refinements may be very varied and complex, but it is only very rarely that 
cultural elaborations systematically contradict the evolved predispositions on 
which they are founded. And when they do, as with the celibacy of priests, 
they are much honoured in the breach. 
This model suggests that sharing is likely to be, or to be based on, an 
evolved, psychological predisposition. The cross-cultural consistency of 
sharing, in an environment which is in important respects likely to be similar 
to the environment in which we evolved, supports this picture of an evolved 
tendency. The various cultural elaborations of sharing may all be founded on 
an evolved predisposition to share, just as the elaborations of the incest taboo 
are founded on the evolved negative imprinting process among children. 
Hawkes has linked the functional benefits of sharing with quite 
separate proximate mechanisms in the individual, concluding that "'the 
incentive for providing widely shared goods is favorable attention from other 
group members" (1993,341), an incentive which has nothing directly to do 
with provisioning. Her work starts from the observation that in hunting, men 
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are targeting "resources that will go mostly to others rather than to their 
spouses and children" (1993,341), which is anomalous in evolutionary terms. 
It follows from Hawkes' hypothesis that men will tend to perform acts aimed 
at gaining public recognition more than will women. The roots of modem 
showmanship may lie in the distribution of game on the ancestral plains. 
Hawkes argues by implication that the decrease in the variance in intake of 
high quality food, which is achieved by food sharing and which has hitherto 
been accepted as a key human motivation, was no more than the unintended 
consequence of male mating display behaviour: that provisioning the family 
was not a significant driver at the proximate level. 
However, provisioning is not so easily dismissed. Hawkes recognises 
that variance in returns of key nutrients may be fatal particularly to children 
(1993,349), from which it follows that a group system of sharing which 
reduces that variance even when the hunter is ill or injured will have 
significant fitness consequences for the individual. Given the singularity and 
finality of death, an inherited psychology that leads to behaviour which 
survives the very occasional life-threatening event could well spread in the 
population against a psychology which leads to behaviour that maximises 
intake under most circumstances, (by pursuing the strategy of "provide for 
my own family rather than pursue big game"), but renders that occasional 
event fatal. 
The evolutionary logic of the occasional life-threatening event is 
interesting in the context of the patterns of risk aversion discussed below. 
Firstly, it may give an explanation of why risk aversion characterises human 
psychology, and why low-frequency, high-consequence events are perceived 
as particulqrly salient (Kahneman and Tversky 1984,345). Secondly, if the 
insurance against such an event was achieved by social relationships and 
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food sharing, then it is logical to seek evolved algorithms in this area which 
are responsive to risk in varying ways depending on the social situation. 
It seems possible that both display and provisioning could be 
independent, complementary motivations. In my view, Hawkes sets up an 
unnecessary dichotomy between the reward of public recognition, which it is 
her particular contribution to have emphasised, and the reduction in variance 
of meat supply, which is well developed in the literature, as is discussed 
below on page 29. But in fact the two are compatible and likely to be 
complementary. The proximate mechanisms could include pleasure at 
receiving favourable attention; satisfaction at reinforcing social relationships; 
gratification at feeding one's family; and risk aversion. The functional effects 
are both reproductive - more and better mating opportunities for successful 
hunters - and provisioning - lower variance in food intake for all, including 
the 4iunters, their relatives and all in the group. The dichotomy seems to me 
to be easily resolved, provided that the difference between proximate 
mechanisms and functional effects is recognised. Motivations for social 
behaviour which leads to improved fitness can logically be additive rather 
than mutually exclusive. 
Frank's (1988) work on the emotions is also suggestive in this context. 
He points to the importance of reputation in allowing socially constructive 
behaviour to flourish. So the male who is known as a talented hunter and also 
a generous distributor of meat is not only gaining in the reproductive stakes 
by becoming more attractive to females; he is setting the scene for wider co- 
operative behaviour. When the emergency arrives, he can be confident that 
others will help him. 
The r9cent re-examination of group selection theory by Sober and 
Wilson (1998) discussed in Chapter 1 gives support to this view. They argue 
Erdal: Ch. 2. Egalitarianism. 25 
that the secondary behaviours which reward sharing could only have 
evolved through group selection. 
2.2.1.3 Conflicts over food sharing 
If there are predispositions at work here, they are not straightforward. 
It is not simply that a human hunter-gatherer, carrying meat and faced with a 
hungry member of his or her band, is predisposed to give some of the meat 
away. Sometimes there are intense arguments and jealousies about the 
sharing of the meat. 
In Africa, Bailey says that "The hunters ... sit around a 
kill during 
butchering and distribution, arguing about their shares" (1991,83) and speaks 
of their "extremely heated vociferous arguments" (1991,94). Turnbull says 
that the Mbuti arguments "are frequently long and loud" (1965,158). Tanaka 
is worth quoting at length on the San, partly because he suggests a different 
emotional tone: "the people sitting and standing around the pile of meat, 
visually measuring the shares that should go to each family, shout out 
directions like: 'you should cut a little off that rib meat over there and add it 
to this pile'. There are often arguments about the amount of meat received; 
these are not usually bad tempered but simply expressions of excitement with 
such a feast lying before their eyes. It might even be said that they enjoy such 
arguments. Amidst the uproar, the man in charge finishes the dividing of the 
meat with dispatch" (1980,95). Among the ! Kung, Marshall observes "self 
interest and much jealous watchfulness" (1976,350) and Thomas similarly 
describes tension in food sharing (1974,116-119). Lee says that "Accusations 
of improper meat distribution ... and stinginess" are common causes of 
disputes leqding to the splitting of groups among the ! Kung (1979,372). 
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In Australia, Meggitt reports that "a man's father- and brothers-in-law 
upbraid and sometimes attack him physically if he refuses to give meat to his 
wife" (1971,252). 
In Asia, Endicott reports occasional conflict among the Batek, 
particularly over the obligation to gather extra food for parents and parents- 
in-law and over whether to save some food for people absent when the 
sharing is carried out (1988,124-5). 
Among the Iglulik, Riches reports that people invoke the lack of a kin 
connection to resist sharing (1982,71). 
Elsewhere, food sharing seems to take place with less tension. Balikd 
speaks of "laughter and merry-making" among the Netsilik (1970,46). Damas' 
(1972) picture of the Copper Eskimo is similar in tone. The ethnograpl-des of 
the other Asian and Australian groups are similarly lacking in reports of 
argument and conflict over food-sharing. However, the existence of conflict 
in these few groups is sufficient to demonstrate that there is no simple 
predisposition to share food. 
2.2.1.4 Cheating and stealing in food-sharing 
A second indication that there is no simple predisposition to share is that 
cheating and stealing sometimes occur. 
Tanaka says of the San, for example, that "the individual has a strong 
sense of possessiveness and usually tends to think egocentrically ... A man 
may sneak a small catch of game into his hut to share only with his family, or 
otherwise fail to share food as he should. " (1980: 122). Turnbull remarks: "It 
would be a rare Mbuti woman who did not conceal a portion of the catch in 
case she wýs forced to share with others" (1965: 198), and when the hunt 
returns to camp "In the confusion, men and women, but particularly women, 
may be seen furtively concealing some of their spoils ... [Flan-dly loyalty is not 
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that subject to band loyalty that there is no cheating" (1965: 120). Turribull 
also tells the interesting story of how a meat thief was humiliated into 
changing his ways by massive gifts of meat, delivered with overt contempt 
(1965,198). Bailey says baldly of the Efe that "they concealed food from 
others" (1991,70). 
In the American groups, Balikci observes theft among the Netsilik, 
"cheerfully practised in relation to strangers" (1970: 178), and the destruction 
of food belonging to someone out of favour (1970: 179). Holmberg describes 
hoarding and unwillingness to share among the Siriono (1950: 36), although 
their candidacy for inclusion in a strategic model is weakened by their history 
as agriculturalists who reverted to foraging (Stearman 1984). 
In Australia, Meggitt mentions a case of a woman being thrashed for 
stealing food from another camp (1971,175). 
In Asia, among the Batek Endicott reports that "The stealing of another 
Bat&s forest produce or personal possessions happens very rarely" (1988, 
125). However, "If someone were hoarding food, it would not be considered 
"stealing' for others to help themselves to it" (1988,117). (That is of course a 
social reinforcement of sharing, which only exists because individuals 
sometimes cheat. ) 
There is thus no doubt that cheating and stealing were vvidely 
practised among egalitarian groups sharing food. 
2.2.1.5 The function of food-sharing 
These instances of conflict over sharing and of stealing or hoarding 
suggest that universal as it is among hunter-gatherers, food sharing must be 
the outcome not of a simple predisposition to share, but of a complex set of 
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behavioural predispositions, in interaction with key features of the hunting- 
gathering environment. The puzzle from an evolutionary view is not that 
there is conflict and stealing, which can easily be incorporated into a "selfish 
gene, selfish persorCmodel, but that these instances are rare, and that sharing 
itself is ubiquitous and normal. 
At the functional level, the main argument is that food sharing reduces 
risk for all individuals, including the hunters. The earliest reference found is 
Damas' observation of the Copper Eskimo that "a nicely meshed system 
existed which ensured a wide passage of food. This operated to adjust for the 
uncertainties of the hunt - the vagaries of individual luck and differences in 
skill" (1972,25). The theory was then fully developed by others (Lovejoy 
1981; Wiessner 1982; Cashdan 1985; Smith 1988), with an additional 
suggestion that the successful hunters' largesse with meat helps them as 
individuals obtain the most capable women as wives (Riches 1984,240) and 
more frequent adulterous mating opportunities (Kaplan and Hill 1985,237; 
Hawkes 1993). 
The risk-reduction model depends on two established facts. Firstly, 
there is a high variance in hunting returns, because game is encountered 
unpredictably and is hard to kill when it is found. And secondly, many game 
animals have much more meat than any single human can consume before it 
rots (with the exception of meat caught in winter by the Inuit). So the 
marginal cost to a successful hunter of giving meat away is low, and the 
benefit to the hungry members of his band is high. Moreover, if he can count 
on receiving meat when he fails but others succeed, then the risk profile over 
time for each individual is significantly improved by sharing: each successful 
hunter is giying away meat which he cannot use, and receiving at a different 
time meat of great value to him. A similar balance of costs and benefits has 
led to blood sharing in vampire bats, purely through the evolution of 
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behavioural dispositions, without any cultural influence whatsoever 
(Wilkinson 1984). The main difference is that the bats tend to reciprocate with 
particular individuals in dyadic reciprocal exchange, whereas humans 
consistently share with all in the band. 
2.2.1.6 The psychology of food-sharing 
Moving from the functional to the proximate psychological level, it is 
still unclear what is going on. A "rational self-interest" model would suggest 
that possibly each individual is making calculations, recognising the 
improvement in his personal situation created by sharing, and so deciding to 
take part. A "reciprocity" model would explain sharing as being in effect an 
exchange, which evens out returns over time (Trivers 1971) -a view 
expressed by some hunters themselves, as noted above. Neither of these 
models is supported, however, by the fact that consistently over time some 
hunters continue to contribute more meat than they and their families 
consume. Kaplan and Hill found that among the Ache not only do the best 
hunters produce more meat per hour hunting, but they also hunt longer 
(1985,234). Bailey, on the contrary, found that the worst hunters hunted 
longest among the Efe, appearing to want to come back to camp with at least 
a respectable catch, but nonetheless the worst third produced virtually no 
meat, and the best third produced over half the meat (1991,89). The support 
of the poor hunters by the good hunters is neither "rationally self-interested" 
nor "reciprocal". 
It is perhaps possible that over the very long term there is rough 
reciprocity: a family with several productive adults makes significant net 
contributioiýs for years, but then becomes a family of old and young, making 
significant net demands of the band. However, if this is the case, it does not 
occur through rational calculations, which take as their horizon time spans far 
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shorter than generations. Hawkes points out: "The hypothesis that delays 
may be longer than those captured ethnographically cannot be falsified. 
Longer time frames might show repayment" (1993,345). It is worth recalling 
Tanaka's report that the San believe "that all will even out over time" (1980, 
99). Hawkes also points out that reciprocity over time spans of generations is 
unenforceable. This is true, unless the "'enforcement" is achieved by a 
proximate mechanism which, like Shepher's anti-incest imprinting discussed 
above, has no overt connection with the functional effect which results from 
it. Such a mechanism, or combination of mechanisms, could sustain sharing 
"irrationally"' provided there was a long-term functional effect which no one 
was aware of (and which evolutionary anthropologists are only now groping 
towards). Candidate mechanisms include the tendency to identify with a 
group, the strength of fellow feeling with people who have shared one's key 
life experiences, the guilt that follows on rejecting one's friends and relatives, 
and so on. 
In short, the fact that food sharing is sustained even when there is 
nothing like a full return of what is given away suggests that at the 
proximate, psychological level there is one or more evolved predisposition at 
work. 
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2.2.2 LEADERSHIP 
The second area which demonstrates egalitarianism in hunter- 
gatherers, and so adds to the evolutionary anomaly, is the process of 
leadership. 
2.2.2.1 Leaders with authority are not created by hunter-gatherers 
There is no dominance hierarchy among hunter-gatherers. No 
individual has priority of access to food, which, as we have seen, is shared. In 
spite of the marginal female preference for the more successful hunters as 
lovers, access to sexual partners is not a right which correlates with rank - 
there is no droit de seignetir. In fact rank in that sense is simply not discernible 
among hunter-gatherers. This is a cross-cultural universal, which rings out 
unmistakably from the ethnographic literature, sometimes in the strongest 
terms: "Individual authority is unthinkable" (Turnbull 1965,181). References 
to some of the many studies wl-dch fill out this picture across all continents 
are given in Table 2.1 (page 19), in the column headed "Absence of 
Authority". 
It is worth giving some brief extracts from the ethnographies to justify 
this strong statement. In Africa, Bleek, among the Bushmen in the early 1920s, 
commented: "Leadership seems to have been an undefined and personal 
thing ... Among Southern Bushmen there were no chiefs and they have no 
name for chieftainship ... There are no class distinctions among Naron and 
Auen" (1928,37). Turnbull observed the limits to situational, skill-based 
leadership among the Mbuti: "'But while these four (great hunters) can be 
singled out as exceptional, they could either separately or together be 
outvoted by the rest of the hunters. On such occasions they were compelled 
either to give their assent to the popular decision or to refrain from joining 
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the hunt that day. None of them had the slightest authority over any others"' 
(1965,180). Bailey mentions one case where older Efe men "could request the 
younger men to perform tasks for them" - but that only applies to fathers and 
sons (1991,59). Lee talks of "the absence of authority figures responsible for 
maintaining order"' among the Kung (1979, xxii) and says that "group 
activities unfold, plans are made, and decisions are arrived at - all apparently 
without a clear focus of authority or influence" (1979,343). Tanaka among the 
San says that there is "no concept of rank or status, no social class structure" 
(1980,93) and that "in no way does anyone function as a "chief" who could 
regulate the whole of society" (1980,108). 
In Australia, Tindale observed among the PitJandjara that "there is no 
accepted leader" (1972,261) and Meggitt says of the Walbiri that since 
kinship roles defined proper behaviour, "Once a person was aware of the 
situation, he knew what to do about it. There was, therefore, little need for 
secular leaders in the community" (1971,247). 
In America, Provinse wrote of the American Plains Indians, already 
much affected by centuries of contact and invasion pressure, that 
"characteristic of these preliterate groups is the absence of any strongly 
centralised authority for the infliction of penalties" with instead "diffuse 
sanctions operating in the ordinary course of social interactiow' (1970,344). 
Holmberg's observations of the position of 'chief' among the Siriono in South 
America are similar: "'Although his authority theoretically extends 
throughout the band, in actual practice its exercise depends almost entirely 
upon his personal qualities as a leader. In any case, there is no obligation to 
obey the orders of a chief, no punishment for non-fulfilment. Indeed, little 
attention is, paid to what is said by a chief unless he is a member of one's 
immediate family" (1950,59). In a strikingly similar phrase, Rogers among 
the Cree states that "the leader has little real authority except over his 
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immediate family" (1972,121). Helm reports of the Dogrib, that "Direct 
coercive powers were vested in no persons or institutions" (1972,79). Balikci 
says similarly of the Netsilik that there exist "no institutionalised chiefs or 
formal government" (1970, xv). That the position of "inhumataq"' ("'thinker") 
is not equivalent to "leader" is shown by the fact that in the larger winter 
camps there were several "'inhumataq" (1970,116). Riches observes among 
the Copper and the Netsilik the lack of sanctions and the fact that leaders are 
not obeyed but listened to (1982,74). And Damas says of the Copper that 
"Persistent questioning of older informants failed to reveal any structurally 
defined institutions of leadership. All informants stressed egalitarianism! ' 
(1972,32). Briggs makes similar observations among the Utkuhikhalingmiut 
(1970,112). 
In Asia, among the Batek, Endicott reports of the more influential 
individuals that "they could not impose their will on others even if they 
wanted to" (1988,123). 
Contact with agricultural or colonial societies frequently led to the 
creation of leaders - or at least to the adoption of leadership titles. In 1921 
Bleek noted an example of the contact effect among the Naron: "whenever 
(he) is speaking Dutch, which the others do not understand, he asserts that he 
is now cl-def, but when speaking Bushman tie never ventures to claim this, but 
chimes in with the rest, that there are no chiefs ... Certainly he had no 
authority now save among his own family" (1928,36). The titles remain 
empty in some cases, including: the Hill Pandaram. where the headman role 
and title was introduced by outside administrators and "plays no part in their 
normal social life" and where two elderly men with the title "have absolutely 
no control over the lives or movements of other members of the settlements" 
(Morris 1982b, 158-9); the Paliyan, who are similarly disrespectful of 
appointed headmen (Gardner 1972,425-6); the Batek, where Endicott says 
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that the appointed leader "should derive some authority from his role as 
intermediary with government agencies, but since the Batek do not 
necessarily follow what the government orders them to do, any such derived 
authority is negligible" (1988,124); the Mbuti, where Turnbull observes that 
"there is no chieftainship, no council of elders, but sometimes an individual 
who assumes the villager title of sultani or capita" (1965,27) which carries a 
little weight in the village of the agriculturalists who use the title, but even 
there "if he is heeded it is with notably bad grace, and only because those 
concerned deem it expedient" (1965,45) and when one man with the title 
"was unwise enough to try and assert the same authority in the forest ... he 
and his sister's son ... were ostracised" (1965,103); and the San where 
Lee 
reports that "the institution of the headman was absent among the pre- 
contact ! Kung" (1979,346), the idea of headman having come from the 
Tswana, who were hierarchically organised as part of the British 
administration, those appointed having ""no equivalent standing among the 
! Kung themselves" (1979,348-9). 
Among other hunter-gatherers real leadership positions developed in 
response to the pressures from invading peoples, as amongst some San where 
"At first they were easily overcome by the Dutch, but later they began to 
restructuie their groups to make them more effective militarily. A system of 
war leaders called capitaans evolved to organise resistance" (Lee 1979: 32); 
the Plains Indians, where the horse and the pressures of invasion led to the 
development of leaders (Hyde 1959,20; Provinse 1970,344); and some Hadza, 
reported by Woodburn as having managed to dominate others with help 
from outside influences (1982,436). 
Finally, elsewhere real authority is to some extent created by external 
government authorities, as among the Walbiri, where the Europeans delegate 
authority to those with new skills and the ability to speak English (Meggitt 
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1971,250); and Leacock notes the early seventeenth century Jesuit Father 
Lejeune's resolve in "'civilising" the Naskapi to "give authority to one of them 
to rule the others" (1980,27). Lejeune reported to his superiors the reproaches 
of the Naskapi at the uncivilised behaviour of the French, who "fear our 
captains, while they laugh at and make sport of theirs ... [and] ... only obey 
their c1iief through goodwill towards him" (Leacock 1980,29). 
The consistent picture is that there is no permanent role of "leader- 
with-authority" created by hunter-gatherers for themselves. 
2.2.2.2 Leadership consists in others listening with respect 
Without authoritative leaders, the process of group decision-making is 
universally consensual. Discussions develop naturally and informally. 
Everyone generally has the right to speak, and it is characteristic that people 
are always ready to make suggestions and to listen to others. These 
conferences can therefore be lengthy. Tanaka's comments on the San are 
typical "'The San respect the aged, experienced and able and turn to them for 
social leadership, but decisions and solutions to problems are always based 
on discussion among the whole group"' (1980,123). 
There is a pattern to the outcome of these discussions: ertective 
individuals - the best hunters when hunting is the subject, the most 
knowledgeable person in a conference about ritual - are generally paid more 
attention than others who are seen to be less skilled. And frequently these 
experts gain agreement to what they propose. 
However, this is not always the case. Great hunters can be over-ruled 
,p even in 
hunting matters (Turnbull 1965,180). And when a by the grou 
consensus has been reached, no one has to follow it against his or her will - 
there is no enforcement mechanism. 
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In some cases there are named leadership roles - e. g. the Netsilik 
"inhumataq' or "thinker" - but even where there are named roles, the leaders 
are not "obeyed", but rather "listened to" (Riches 1982: 74) - and sometimes 
not listened to. References filling out this picture are also given in Table 2.1 
(page 19), in the column headed "Informal Leadership". 
In Africa, Turnbull describes the informal division of responsibilities 
among the different age groups: "it is the hunters who ultimately make the 
decisions concerning camp life, and about the hunt ... Non-physical dangers 
and problems - that is to say moral, psychological and spiritual issues ... often 
before the band - these are more the concern of the elders ... [Youths] are not 
readily listened to unless it is a matter pertaining to their age group. Then 
they are required to be able to voice their opinions and cite precedents" (1965, 
126), and again "leadership is minimal in the economic realm. All major 
decisions are taken by common consent, as in other realms of Mbuti life. Men 
and women have equal say, hunting and gathering being equally important 
to the economy. Young married couples and youths have the most to say, 
being the most active hunters and gatherers ... " (1965,178) and "'each field of 
activity has its own leaders, drawn from a particular section of the 
community. It is in this way that authority is dispersed throughout the band; 
every adult is accorded special respect in one field or another, but none can 
claim respect in all fields ... Such adults as have respect in any particular field 
at any particular moment do not even have any authority; they can merely 
claim to be heard. Their decision is likely to be given general assent. " (1965, 
181), and finally "Nowhere does [authority] have any validity unless backed 
by common assent. Yet it is more than mere influence, for in each field certain 
classes of ýndividuals are recognised as having the right and ability to 
interpret the pleasure of the forest" (1965,182). While much of that is phrased 
negatively it is clear that some individuals are listened to more than others. 
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Lee observes of the ! Kung that "patterns of leadership do exist" (1979,343), 
but that it is hard to define them: "In group discussions these people may 
speak out more than others, may be deferred to by others, and one gets the 
feeling that their opinions hold a bit more weight than the opinions of the 
other discussants. Whatever their skills, ! Kung leaders have no formal 
authority. They can only persuade, but never enforce their will on others" 
(1979,343-4). A strong personality is not a necessity: "No single personality 
type or personality trait dominates the ranks of leaders. If anything, the 
leaders share an absence of traits in common. None is overbearing, boastful 
or aloof. In ! Kung terms these traits absolutely disqualify a person as a leader 
and may engender even stronger forms of ostracism" (1979,345). Marshall's 
description of the San is similar: "No one is formally in command of a party ... 
but often an informal kind of leadership develops out of skill and judgement. 
The men fall in with the plans and suggestions of the best hunter or reach 
agreement among themselves somehow" (1976,358). Tanaka, already quoted 
above, reinforces this picture: "Old people, especially the very old, are 
respected and may exercise leadership through their words and actions ... A 
great bowman who is young and sturdy may become respected as a famous 
hunter, and his opinion in hunting matters will carry much weight. There are 
also people skilled at incantations to cure illnesses, or at making tools, or at 
storytelling, and while they do not become specialists, they do take a leading 
position in activities in their sphere of ability and receive prestige ... [T]hey 
become leaders, however, only in ... particular situations or contexts" 
(1980,108). 
In Australia, Tindale describes what seems to be a more consciously 
planned foým of leadership among the PitJandjara, but still one which 
depends entirely on the individual's ability to gain assent through his 
performance in the immediate situation: "As he grows older, his ageing 
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father, father's brother and father's father will entrust greater secrets to him, 
so that in the course of time he becomes the fount of knowledge of his own 
country and its lore. With this knowledge, if he is an astute individual, will 
come influence which will enable him to bend others to his wishes, even 
though, in his society, there is no accepted leader ... [H]is influence will tend 
to remain so long as he is active in mind and clear in his thoughts and keen of 
tongue" (1972,261-2). Among the Tiofi, Goodale lists various ways in which 
leaders influence others: "Outside of ritual a male may excel in leadership 
and skill in fights and battles or in political manipulation in the marriage 
contract game. These variable avenues to male success require somewhat 
different qualities of personality; some men achieve in many or all of these 
fields, others in only one or two, and some either do not desire or lack the 
ability to excel in any of these activities ... Older women can gain a certain 
amount of prestige politically by expressing a dominant and forceful 
personality. Within a domestic group such women can control the fives of 
their sons-in-law, and to some extent those of their husbands through extra- 
marital affairs" (1971,338). Among the Walbiri, Meggitt describes the 
attributes necessary in the woman who supervises the painting of ritual 
designs on bodies: "'the moiety "boss-woman" is chosen on the basis of her 
maturity, knowledge of the designs, songs and dances, her organising ability 
and her forceful personality" (1971,190). The limits of informal leadersl-dp are 
shown by Meggites comment that even quarrels with, and raids on, other 
tribes "did not involve concerted tribal action" and "The tribe as a whole did 
not function as a political or administrative entity" (1971,242). Instead 
"Although some men were respected as capable and courageous fighters and 
their advicp was valued, other men did not necessarily follow them. 
Moreover, the range of circumstances in which fights occurred was in effect 
so limited that men knew and could employ the most effective techniques 
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without hesitation" (1971,245). And regarding the older men, "Whatever de 
facto control they had over the actions of others simply derived from their 
ability to make suggestions based on first hand knowledge of commonly 
recurring situations; people were bound to follow this advice only when it 
was couched as a statement of dreamtime rules"' (1971,250). 
In the American groups, among the Cree "'a leader, to maintain a 
group, has to prove himself constantly as the senior religious expert and most 
competent hunter and provider" (Rogers 1972,122). The Dogrib are similar: 
"The "authority" of the councillors and head chief rests solely in the respect 
and deference granted by their followers. A councillor can be thrown out 
upon the consensual decision of his people, as could the regional headman of 
pre-treaty times"' (Helm 1972,77). Further north, among the Copper the same 
theme is repeated: "certain men were more respected than others on the basis 
of personal qualities" (Damas 1972,32). The Netsilik also respected age and 
experience: "The say of the elderly hunters naturally carried greater weight, 
although the younger men freely expressed their views. Each winter camp 
had a leader, usually the eldest of the capable hunters, and it was up to him 
finally to decide when and where to hunt" (Balikci 1970,72). Rasmussen had 
earlier described "Orpingalik, a shaman in high esteem,... well at home in the 
traditions of his tribe, not only intelligent but having a fertile wit. As a hunter 
he stood high, and from the respect shown him I could see that he was a big 
man among his people ... [H]e was a strong and deadly archer and the 
quickest kayakman of them all" (1931,13). With suitable adjustments of 
detail, the description could apply to many hunter gatherer leaders: attracting 
respect because of their skill and character, and so gaining influence, but not 
authority. Týhe Netsilik "thinkers" played the key role in decisions on starting 
fishing and caribou hunting, and migration and camp selection. "Yet all these 
decisions were taken informally and gently, in consultation with the other 
Erdal: Ch. 2. Egalitarianism. 40 
adult hunters of the extended family, a headman having greater influence 
over the younger men of his kinship group than over the older ones" (Balikci 
1970,116). Balikci testifies to the importance of personality as well as skill, in 
obtaining agreement among the Netsilik: "'in exceptional situations the 
strongest personality in the household asserted itself. And this was not 
necessarily the father or the best hunter. Frequently an old woman spoke 
with conviction, and people listened to her. She might be the one to decide on 
the fate of a new-born infant" (1970,149). A corollary of giving assent to the 
skilled is that the situation must be one where skin can be demonstrated. 
Riches notes that among the Copper Eskimo there are no named leaders, 
"because when uncertainty is high, even skilful hunters find it hard to offer 
sustained evidence for economic prowess" (1982,82). Riches' summary for 
the northern nomadic hunter-gatherers is that "Leaders secured their position 
largely through their superior abilities in effecting nomadic and productive 
decisions" (1982,19). He confirms that leadership is created by others' 
assenting in the decisions of the competent, whether or not they are formally 
named as leader (1982,72), and that sustained competence attracts followers 
(1982,77). 
In South America, Holmberg describes leadership among the Siriono: 
"In short, chiefs know more about things and are able to do them better than 
anyone else. Consequently, they command more respect than the average 
man"' (1950,60). Similar respect is given to the most competent hunters (1950, 
25) and Holmberg also observes that the lead in dancing is given to those 
known to be skilful at composing impromptu songs (1950,46). 
In Asia, among the Batek "leadership is informal and based on 
personal influence alone"' (Endicott 1988,112). "People may well defer to 
someone who has special knowledge or skills relating to the task at hand, but 
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such acquiescence is strictly voluntary and limited to that particular activity" 
(1988,123). 
In general, expertise and personal characteristics lead to the granting 
of respect in particular circumstances. There is nothing permanent about that 
respect- in a different situation a different person will be given respect, and 
even in an identical situation the next day the same expert may not be 
heeded. Leadership is ultimately created by others' listening. Even combining 
expertise with a forceful personality is not enough to raise anyone into a 
permanently dominant position, however much individuals may try to 
achieve such a position. 
2.2.2.3 Leaders are prevented from achieving dominance 
It is characteristic of hunter-gatherers that they bring back to earth, often 
with a bump, anyone who tries to achieve dominance - no matter how well 
respected he or she may be for particular skills. Ambitions for status and 
domination are simply not tolerated. The various manoeuvres used to bring 
leaders back into line have been catalogued by Boehm (1993), across a broad 
range of societies. He calls this phenomenon a "reverse dominance hierarchy". 
However, since respect is still given to leaders in particular situations, the 
incipient hierarchy is not really reversed but rather prevented from 
developing beyond those particular situations where leadership is required. 
The terrn "counter-dominance" is more appropriate (see Erdal and Whiten 
1994, Boehm 1994 for discussion [Appendix 1]). References to studies 
documenting counter-dominance are included in Table 2.1, (Page 19) in the 
column with that heading. 
In Africa, among the Mbuti, Turnbull reported that "while ability as a 
hunter carries some weight, too much ability may lead to ridicule. That is, a 
man who displays himself as a great hunter, and boasts of his achievements 
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too loudly, is somewhat distrusted, and any attempt on his part to use his 
reputation to gain more say than others will lead immediately to ridicule" 
(1965,178). Further, "Some men, because of exceptional hunting skill, may 
come to resent it when their views are disregarded, but if they try to force 
these views they are very promptly subjected to ridicule" (1965,183). This is a 
particularly important observation, making clear that the skilled habitually 
are heeded, and that this gives them pleasure. The taking of pleasure in 
gaining the respect of others in the group implies a psychological 
predisposition at work. The others seem to be aware of the pleasure, and 
beyond a certain point resist. 
Elsewhere in Africa, Lee summarises: "The ! Kung are a fiercely 
egalitarian people ... cutting down to size the arrogant and the boastful" 
(1979,244). A healer explained to him that "When a young man kills much 
meat, he comes to think of himself as a chief or a big man, and he thinks of 
the rest of us as his servants or inferiors. We can't accept this. We refuse one 
who boasts, for some day his pride will make him kill somebody. So we 
always speak of his meat as worthless. In this way we cool his heart and 
make him gentle" (1979,246). Lee describes amusingly how this approach 
was turned on him when he provided an ox for a feast, and instead of 
receiving 6ratitude was subjected, along vvith the dead ox, to ridicule (1979, 
24). He also gives an instance where one man who put on airs was given a 
joking name, "Big Chief" (1979,344). Tanaka gives a vivid statement on 
counter-don-dnance: "The person who stands out becomes a target of envy 
and jealousy, of almost unbearable hostility" (1980,113). Bailey gives an 
interesting picture of how, when a powerful Efe hunter took a second wife, 
the group su ported his first wife against his attempted self-aggrandisement, Ip 
and reduced his share of meat dramatically. In response, he went through a 
transformation in his behaviour, changing from being highly assertive to 
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being positively retiring, giving up any semblance of dominance (1991,93). 
Clearly, his previously leading position depended entirely on the assent of 
others. 
In America, Balikci describes how the recognised Netsilik "tliirýers", 
"Inhumataq", play a key role in decisions on when to start fishing and caribou 
hunting, and on migration and camp selection. "Yet all these decisions were 
taken informally and gently, in consultation with the other adult hunters of 
the extended family" and the target was "to achieve consensus without 
hurting the feelings of the other hunters, whose autonomy he respected" 
(1970,116). This appears to be partly for fear of jealousy and hostility, which 
can be intense and dangerous (1970,130,137,170,173-5). Service, among the 
Algonkian and Athabascans, established that contact had led to the trade in 
furs which had created individual leaders. "Nevertheless, the leader could 
not subjugate his people at will. There seemed to be an active aversion 
toward any kind of authority that moved beyond influence toward 
subjugation" (1979,82). The Dogrib also react against unsatisfactory leaders: 
"'The 'authority' of the councillors and head chief rests solely in the respect 
and deference granted by their followers. A councillor can be thrown out 
upon the consensual decision of his people, as could the regional headman of 
pre-treaty times" (Helm 1972,77). Among the Copper Eskimo, Damao gives 
an example of the community reacting against the abuse by powerful 
personalities: "Another sort of menace to the community was the aggressive, 
strong man who often took what he liked (including women) by force. Such 
men often met with violent ends" (Damas 1972,33). This could include 
homicide and execution by his own relatives. Riches lists among the northern 
nomads' incentives for setting up a new camp the desire to get away from a 
hunter who is too successful, a form of counter-dominance (1982,27). 
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In Asia, Gardner describes among the gentle, anti-competitive Paliyans 
the resentful "criticism of his assertiveness and ... questioning of his stature" 
against polygynous "headmen" (1972,426). 
Among the Australians, Boehm found only two categories of counter- 
dominance - ridicule and execution (1993,232, Table 1). Reports are hard to 
find. One reason may be that there are automatic social mechanisms at work. 
Meggitt describes how among the Walbiri, kin relationships mean that an 
individual with a considerable role to play one day might only have a minor 
role the next, and adds: "this frequent variation in the extent of authority that 
an individual exercised from one situation to another militated against the 
emergence of a class of permanent leaders" (1971,249). Because this is a 
feature of the kin system, egalitarianism does not here depend on reactions by 
individuals, as it does elsewhere. However, male authority is challenged if it 
is abused: "the husband who habitually consumes food intended for the 
children can expect a salvo of abuse, an attack with a digging stick, or even, 
as I have seen, his bough-shade to be bumed down about his ears" (1971,88). 
In summary, if individuals attempt to build on the respect that they are 
granted in situations where they have expertise, so as to become more 
permanent leaders, then in various ways the others around them put them 
back in their place - as respected equals, but nothing more. 
2.2.2.4 The predisposition towards counter-dominance 
Those who attempt dominance can be ignored, criticised, ridiculed, 
overruled, abandoned, ostracised, attacked or killed. Boehm (1993) explains 
this as a conscious, intentional, joint response by followers operating as a 
group, empýasising the role of conscious decision-making in the process. 
In the discussion of food-sharing in the previous section the argument 
has been made that food-sharing is better explained as a culturally influenced 
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activity founded on an evolved disposition to share, rather than being a 
culturally created process in contradiction with purely selfish evolved 
predispositions. Exactly the same argument applies to counter-dominance. 
Counter-dominance and egalitarian behaviour depend on psychological 
dispositions which create and support them. If the dominance hierarchy had 
remained functionally effective in evolution, then the, possibility of creating 
egalitarianism in hunter-gatherer bands simply would not have arisen. The 
psychological predispositions which underlie counter-dominance - for 
example, resentment at aggressive behaviour, discomfort or anger at being 
dominated, satisfaction when consensus is reached, respect for others' 
feelings - form part of our psychology because they were more effective 
functionally than the dominance/ submission psychology out of which they 
must have evolved. There would be no ability to take conscious decisions to 
counteract dominant individuals - certainly not as a characteristic behaviour - 
if we did not have the underlying psychological disposition to do so. 
2.2.2.5 The evolution of counter-dominance 
Although it is correct to describe the social relations of the anthropoid 
primates as characterised by dominance, there is a substantial and growing 
body of evidence that "Machiavellian intelligencd' (Byrne and Whiten 1988) 
plays a very significant role in dominance competition: sheer physical 
strength is by no means sufficient to attain or maintain an alpha role. Skills 
such as tactical deception (Whiten and Byme 1988; Byrne and Whiten 1992) 
effectively cheat the dominant individuals of the rewards which their social 
pre-eminence normally provides for them. In addition, alliances between 
individuals, enable them to achieve levels of dominance which neither could 
hope for acting individually (Harcourt 1988; Harcourt and de Waal 1992). De 
Waal's detailed studies of captive groups (1982; 1992) have shown these 
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political skills to be particularly refined among chimpanzees, something 
which is confirmed by observational and experimental work showing mind- 
reading abilities useful and used in social manipulation (Whiten 1991; 1993). 
De Waal (1982) showed in detail how coalitions between the second and third 
ranked males against the alpha led to frequent political upheaval: "the 
strongest of the three competing parties almost automatically elicits co- 
operation against himself, because the weaker parties gain more by joining 
together and sharing the payoffs than by joining the strongest party, who will 
monopolize the payoffs" (de Waal cited in Leakey and Lewin 1992,290). 
Since no currently existing primate is an ancestor of humans, we must 
be cautious in making inferences from their behaviour to the process of 
human evolution. Nonetheless, the sophisticated skills of mind-reading and 
social manipulation among some non-human primates suggest how 
hominids could have been pre-adapted for counter-dominance. Providing a 
necessarily speculative scenario, Erdal and Whiten (1994) (Appendix 1) have 
suggested that a small increase in encephalisation would permit a refinement 
in counter-dominance, which could set in train a spiralling selection pressure 
for further political skills. Robert Frank has suggested in a personal comment 
that among the new skills a greater emphasis on attractive as against coercive 
tactics would be predicted -a strategy of "dominance through char&'. Such 
an evolutionary spiral could eventually reach a ceiling where the 
Machiavellian skills of the population at large were so refined that it would 
no longer be strategically practicable to expend energy in an effort to 
dominate other individuals physically. 
At this point different behaviour would have become functionally 
viable - more viable than attempted dominance. Instead of wasting time and 
energy in a futile effort to dominate others, individuals would prosper who 
devoted enough of their personal resources to counteracting others' 
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dominance to prevent their being dominated, but did not waste time and 
energy by themselves trying to achieve dominance. Compared to would-be 
dominants, they would be able to devote much more energy to productive 
foraging and social behaviour. Those who remained trapped in the old 
dominance/ submission patterns would be wasting their time by comparison. 
This logic is parallel to that of Trivers (1971), who proposed that an 
arms race of subtle cheating in a population of reciprocal altruists could 
escalate to a ceiling where the only viable strategy is generalised altruism. 
In particular, at the functional level the ability of a group of 
individuals arranged in a dominance hierarchy to exploit resources with the 
unpredictably scattered, large-package characteristics of the hunter-gatherer 
environment is severely limited. The successful strategy in that environment 
includes the daily dispersion of the hunters and gatherers, the return to a 
home base and the sharing of food (Isaac 1978,92). At the proximate level this 
implies a complex set of social skills involved in making trustworthy 
commitments. The underlying psychological predispositions are quite 
different from those of the old dominance/ submissign spectrum. In 
particular, a switch is required from an individual "scare off the others and 
get what I can" strategy, to one of fair play, of identification with the others in 
the group, of pleasure in relationsl-dps of equality rather than dominance, of 
emotional commitment to share and to help others in need, of confidence that 
others will help. These positive feelings are seen, for example, in Rasmussen's 
observation among the Netsilik that "People living together in a hunting 
camp feel closely attached to one another in many ways" (1931,147), and in 
Tanaka's report that after a night of dancing "Feelings of peace and security 
flood the San camp" (1980,115). 
An important element in this fair-play complex is the inclination in 
each individual to resist being dominated or taken advantage of, either in 
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food sharing or in leadership: hence the vigilance seen among hunter- 
gatherers in sharing, and in bringing leaders to heel when they step out of 
line. 
Sober and Wilson"s (1998) re-affirmation of group selection suggests a 
further reinforcing selection process for sharing and counter-dominant 
behaviour. Those who lived in groups where food and influence were shared, 
and no individual was allowed to obtain too dominant a share of either, out- 
reproduced those in less egalitarian groups. 
2.2.2.6 The psychology of egalitarianism 
ff something like this evolutionary process occurred, then the resulting 
psychology would be expected to be very complex. Each individual must still 
retain the disposition to "look out for number one", at least on an 
opportunistic basis. In the case of sharing, this will include the inclination to 
hoard and perhaps even to steal, as well as supporting the vigilance noted 
above. But it must not be strong enough to make sharing break down. And it 
must be combined with a willingness to punish cheating in others - 
something which no "rational self-interest" model can predict or explain, 
because the process of punishing others is costly to the one who punishes 
(Frank 1988). In the case of leadership, the earlier predisposition to "dominate 
if possible" has not been eradicated; but it has been coupled with the desire 
and commitment to resist domination too, and to accept an equal relationship 
as a good outcome. In addition, there must be a willingness to take the 
initiative, particularly where one is confident of one's knowledge or expertise 
- but one must also be prepared to listen, and to follow a different line if the 
group goes, that way, or to defer if someone else clearly has superior skill or 
knowledge. Boehm (1989) similarly models a complex psychology 
incorporating contradictory elements. 
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An important psychological element underpinning both food-sharing 
and egalitarian leadership is the process of weighing up one's own position 
vis-h-vis that of others. If a carcass is being divided up, each individual is 
extremely sensitive to anything which suggests that he or she is not getting a 
fair share relative to each other participant. And if one is listening to an 
expert hunter's proposal on how to get hold of the next carcass, each person is 
very aware of his own position relative to that of the would-be leader. 
It is interesting that apparently the predisposition is not generally to 
achieve superiority: not to get more meat than anyone else, nor to dominate 
the expert. But if anyone else seems to be getting more meat, or becoming too 
self-assertive, then a mechanism is triggered, and someone steps in, to ensure 
a fair distribution, or to bring the leader bark into line. This is not so much 
keeping up with the joneses, as making sure that none of the Joneses gets 
ahead in the first place. Frank (1985) examines a multitude of economic and 
political effects of this predisposition to measure ourselves against those with 
whom we feel some affinity. 
This tendency could be the outcome of combinations of contradictory 
dispositions: to get more and at the same time to stop others from getting 
more; to dominate, and to stop others from dominating. If this is so, the 
conflict is deeply integrated in our psyý_nology. Among hunter-gatherer 
groups it surfaces as conflict between individuals, but by comparison with 
chimpanzees the level of overt conflict cannot be ranked as high. In a sense it 
looks as if through evolution what was previously expressed as overt conflict 
between individuals may have been internalised to an extent, allowing "self 
control" as the basis for more co-operative social relations. 
As these contradictory predispositions evolved, one result must have 
been that behaviour became more and more flexible: there are many different 
possible responses to any social situation. And here there is a likely role for 
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the ability to pass on and absorb a culture in virtually an imprinting process. 
Culturally defined ways to behave limit the choices that have to be made, 
helping to resolve what would otherwise be constant psychological and social 
dilemmas. 
Additionally, with this varied psychology, there is an important role 
for the ability to think. With so many contradictory options there would be a 
clear adaptive advantage in the ability to hold in mind important features of 
the environment, particularly the social environment, for long enough to 
allow one's reactions to resolve themselves into a decision to take the best 
option. 
One key question which this analysis raises is why, given this evolved 
psychology, the development of herding and agriculture about 10,000 years 
ago triggered the creation of big-men, of chiefs, of classes and ultimately of 
multi-level institutionalised hierarchies. As has been said, there was not time 
for significant biological evolution to take place, making the reasonable 
assumption that these complex behavioural tendencies are not controlled by 
single genes, strongly selected. (The latter could conceivably produce 
significant biological change in human populations in 100 generations (say 
2,000 years), but according to E. 0. Wilson "The hereditary factors of human 
success ar, strongly polygenic" (1975,555) which makes evolution very much 
slower). So these hierarchical developments must depend on the same 
psychology as hunter-gatherer egalitarianism - an apparent contradiction. 
The answer must lie in the fit between the evolved psychological 
predispositions and the new environment. Since this is no longer the 
environment in which humans evolved, the evolved predispositions need not 
in principle, lead to behaviour which is functionally effective. Key aspects of 
the environment which are different include the availability of stored 
surpluses; the existence of highly productive assets; the ability of individuals 
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or small groups to control the surpluses and assets; and the planning time 
horizon Gohnson and Earle 1987). Somehow, the counter-dominant tendency 
became ineffective, although it recurs throughout all social systems and all 
periods in history (Boehm 1993). The question of how the same psychological 
dispositions produce egalitarianism in foraging societies and hierarchy in 
others is left open in this work. 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
The early human mind is likely to have been characterised by 
psychological dispositions supporting egalitarianism: vigilant food-sharing, 
informal leadership and counter-dominant behaviour. To the extent that 
human social behaviour is influenced by adaptations for social life, it is to this 
social environment that it is adapted. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RISK TAKING AND SHARING 
CHAPTER I RISK TAKING AND SHARING 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1 Risk-taking from an evolutionary perspective 
Given the perspective of this thesis, the generation of a hypothesis 
concerning risk-taking should start with the evolutionary context likely to have 
shaped risk-taking over evolutionary time - for Hoino sapiens, the hunting and 
gathering way of life. 
In principle, any hunting organism should be prepared to take risks. This 
thesis suggests that human risk-taking algorithms should be expected to include 
the social situation. Hoino sapiens evolved facing many risky decisions in small 
foraging groups (e. g. Foley 1988). In such groups, it seems likely that decision- 
making on how to handle the risks faced together was a key, daily process in 
every band. The success and failure of the decisions taken will often have had 
material consequences affecting every individual in the group. This alone is 
sufficient reason to hypothesise that an adaptation relating risk and the 
behaviour of individuals in groups should exist: adaptations evolve to solve 
those frequently-faced problems which have significant functional consequences 
(Tooby and Cosmides, 1992, especially pp 73-77). These functional consequences 
will have operated at the level of the individual - within the group effective 
individuals will have had more status (Hawkes 1993) - and at the level of the 
group - reducing the variance in food supply for all members of sharing groups 
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(Smith 1988, Sober and Wilson 1998). Any algorithm can be expected therefore to 
respond both to within-group competition and to sharing. 
As demonstrated in earlier sections, ethnographies show that meat was a 
particularly risky resource to capture. The nutritional risk was handled 
essentially through consensus decision-making and informal sharing of 
resources, without social structures involving authority or permanent status 
differentials. The response to the uncertainty in the meat supply was to share, 
and to share among all group members. 
In summary, faced with the higl-dy variable returns from hunting, foragers 
shared meat, and this enabled them to face the risks with equanimity. Given that 
this pattern probably characterised the evolutionary path of Hoino sapiens we can 
expect to find evolved algorithms to deal with variable (i. e. risky) returns to 
small groups. It is likely that any such algorithm will produce responses which 
vary according to the social situation, and are particularly sensitive to sharing. 
3.1.2 Group Polarisation and the "Risky Shift". 
One characteristic response of people in groups to risky decisions was first 
called the "risky shift" and has been much studied by experimental social 
psychologists. The effect was originally observed by Stoner (1961,1968) and 
subsequently replicated hundreds of times, with many different experimental 
paradigms (e. g. Wallach, Kogan and Bem 1962 replicating the effect with the 
same questionnaire; Ferguson and Vidmar 1971 with an overlapping set of 
similarly hypothetical problems; Blascovich, Grisbey and Howe 1975 using true 
risk-taking situations involving blackjack). 
I 
Erdal: Ch. 3. Risk and Sharing 54 
The original view of the this shift was that people accept higher levels of 
risk in groups than they do as individuals. It was later established that no such 
effect is observed where the situation does not typically elicit a willingness to 
accept risk in the first place; and where a particular situation normally elicits a 
cautious approach, group discussion typically produces a shift towards caution, 
rather than towards risk (Ferguson and Vidmar 1971). In addition, similar shifts 
were found in opinion formation which had nothing to do with risk (e. g. Myers 
and Bishop 1970 on racial prejudice; Myers 1982 on ratings of facial attractiveness 
and polarisation of opinions in church groups; Baron, Roper and Baron 1974 
producing a "stingy" shift in charitable giving). This whole phenomenon came to 
be characterised correctly as group polarisation, rather than as a risky shift. It has 
been rather easier, in hypothetical situations, in the laboratory and at gambling 
tables, to design situations which elicit risky decisions and shifts, rather than 
cautious ones. Isenberg (1986) provides a meta-analysis. 
This phenomenon seems to be characterised by greater risk sensitivity on 
the choices made after discussion, producing a steeper risk-averse curve: Le. 
individuals take less risk on riskier decisions and more risk on safer decisions 
than they did before discussion (see diagram in Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1. The Risk-Averse Curve , Polarisation, and Risk Sensitivity. 
1.01 
Frequency 
of gamble 
choice 
0.01 
1.0 Risk of getting nothing 0.0 
All t1iree lines slwuy risk aversion (a tendeiwy to avoid risk) and risk sensitivity (a tendency 
to avoid high risk gambles more titan lower risk gambles). 'cd' shows an absolutely greater degree of 
risk aversion titan 'ab' - it is lower at evenj point. First choices represented by 'cd' and choices after 
discussion represented Inj 'ab' would show group polarisation with an increase in risk. 'ce' shows 
greater risk sensitivity titan 'ab': greater aversion at high risk levels and less at low risk levels. A move 
from 'ab' to 'ce' Would produce group polarisation but no overall shift, andftoin 'cd' to 'ce' both an 
overall risky shift and group polarisation. 
High-risk gambles typically elicit a cautious shift - less risk is taken on 
them after discussion - and it is generally only relatively safe gambles that 
produce a shift towards risk- more risk being taken on them after discussion. The 
overall main effect of increasing the mean risk taken needs to be recognised as 
collapsing a steeper risk-averse curve, with greater caution at the risky end of the 
spectrum, but a greater preparedness to take risk when the gamble is relatively 
safe (i. e. a move from 'ab' to 'ce' in Fig. 3.1). The literature shows that group 
discussion steepens the risk-averse curve for the decision making of individuals, 
and generally increases the mean risk taken by them, rather than showing 
anything about group decision making per se. The group polarisation literature 
deserves a critique that in turn provides the context for the design of the present 
experiment from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. 
I 
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3.1.3 Problems in the Group Polarisation Literature. 
3.1.3.1. There is no generaRy accepted theory. 
A first observation on the group polarisation literature is that no 
explanatory hypothesis has been shown to be clearly superior. Isenberg (1986) 
reviewed two of the three main theories still holding the ring: "'social 
comparison and "persuasive arguments". Zuber, Crott and Wemer (1992) 
looked also at the third: Social Decision Scheme theory. Some of these theories 
deal with decisions and choices that cover a much wider range than simply risk. 
This study, however, is concerned only with choices that differ according to risk, 
and not with wider issues of group polarisation. 
The social comparison theory states that the shift is caused by a process of 
comparison: it holds that risk-taking is valued, and that when people take more 
risk on their second choices, they are doing so because they have compared their 
own position with those of the others, and found that they need to take more risk 
in order to be closer to the socially valued risk-taking position. 
The persuasive arguments hypothesis explains the shift by a process of 
argumentation: the shift towards greater risk is due to each person hearing, in 
the discussion, novel and cogent arguments in favour of risk taking. 
The social decision scheme theory is based on proposed systems of 
aggregation: individuals with divergent positions reach a common decision by 
following decision rules to aggregate their individual positions. 
This categorisation of the three types of theory was developed in Zuber, 
Crott and Wemer (1992). 
I 
Erdal: Ch. 3. Risk and Sharing 57 
One unstated assumption in the social comparison and persuasive 
arguments theories appears to be that there should be only one normal response 
to any particular risky decision. In the case of the social comparison theory, this 
is the response made by single subjects, and the assumption is that tWs "correct" 
response is then distorted by group dynamics; in the case of the persuasive 
arguments theory it is the response after discussion which is "'correct", since it 
has been improved by exposure to the arguments. The social decision scheme 
theory is neutral as to what constitutes an appropriate response to risk. 
The evolutionary point of view may provide an explanation of why 
neither of the two main competing explanations have succeeded in replacing the 
other: if over evolutionary time sharing has been the main means of handling 
risk, then it is appropriate to accept different levels of risk depending on whether 
one is alone or in a group of non-sharers or in a sharing group. The social 
situation will be irreducibly relevant. The social comparison theorists have thus 
identified an important process - the fact that the presence of others is relevant to 
risky decision-making - which is illuminated by the evolutionary perspective. 
Likewise, when taking risks it will be essential to take account of the 
specific probabilities and consequences of the situation facing the decision 
maker: so information about the specific characteristics of the decision will 
always be relevant. Properly developed, an evolutionary theory would have the 
merit of explaining not only the shift, but the level of risk-taking too. This study 
is intended to be a step in that direction. 
These observations are not intended to be dismissive about the quality of 
the research programs that have been carried out. It is impressive that empirical 
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investigation, from a theoretical base that is not highly developed, has identified 
the interaction of two key factors: information and the social situation. Likewise, 
the social decision scheme approach may have identified and described validly 
aspects of the psychological mechanisms - aggregation rules which take account 
of the distribution of initial positions - which operate. It may be that the 
evolutionary perspective can indicate why these mechanisms take the form and 
have the results that they do, and thus can give a sure basis for prediction. 
3.1.3.2. The social comparison hypothesis is circular. 
The social comparison theory holds that individuals observe others in the 
group adopting positions which are at least as risky as theirs, and since accepting 
risk is socially valued, they wish to exhibit that respected behaviour, and so they 
all shift towards greater risk. This hypothesis has driven some successful 
experimental work, establishing, for example, that groups make a weak shift 
even when there is no discussion, with each persoWs position simply displayed 
on a card for the others to see (Baron and Roper 1976). But the problem at the 
core of this theory is shown by the explanation of why some situations typically 
elicit cautious initial choices and cautious shifts: the theory states that in these 
situations caution is valued. However, since we only know that caution is valued 
because in those instances cautious shifts take place, this is a perfect circle with 
no predictive power. It says nothing about why risk or caution should be valued, 
nor about the circumstances which should elicit these different responses. 
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3.1.3.3. Risk taking is seen as being under purely cultural control. 
One important element in the social comparison theory is the assumption 
that risk-taking is under purely cultural control (discussed in Isenberg 1986, 
1143). This implies that the mind is essentially a dean slate which then is 
imprinted by the prevalent cultural values, so that in some cases risk is valued 
(but by implication need not be) and in others caution. There are powerful 
arguments in principle against that position, given the evolutionary importance 
of risk-taking behaviour (e. g. Tooby and Cosmides 1992,76). Social learning can 
be expected to have a strong influence on risk-taking, but the importance of its 
functional consequences suggest the likelihood that risk-taking behaviour may 
be generated and constrained by evolved predispositions. In the case of other 
primates, evolved mechanisms have been shown to exist which are highly 
specific for the avoidance of crucial risks. There is still an element of learning, but 
with clear preferences: a monkey, for example, can very easily learn by 
observation to avoid snakes, but will only with the greatest difficulty be trained 
to avoid flowers (Mineka et. al. 1984). 
3.1.3.4. The persuasiveness of arguments is not usefully defined. 
The persuasive arguments theory holds that what causes the greatest part 
of the shift is the number of persuasive arguments available to each individual. 
Group discussion makes available a greater number of novel persuasive 
arguments to each individual, and so the shift occurs. This theory has also led to 
successful experimental programmes (e. g. Vinokur and Burnstein 1978). It states 
that the persuasiveness of an argument depends on its validity, redundancy and 
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familiarity (Zuber, Crott and Werner 1992), but using the word "valid" is close to 
using the word "'persuasive" in a different form. 
In general the persuasiveness of arguments is less a property of the 
arguments than of the fit between the arguments and the cognitive apparatus of 
the individual hearing them. Where an argument is dealing with a subject of 
material evolutionary impact some arguments will only very rarely be 
persuasive. Taking an example from another area in evolutionary psychology, a 
20 year old woman will more easily be convinced to marry a socially successful 
40 year old man, than will a 20 year old man to marry a 40 year old woman, no 
matter how successful (Buss 1994). The question of what makes an argument 
persuasive has not been satisfactorily answered by the theory of persuasive 
arguments in group polarisation. The current work suggests that different social 
situations may "retune" the receiver, so that the same argument will be more 
persuasive in some social situations than in others. 
3.1.3.5. The confusion of the individual and group conditions. 
From the perspective of this paper, it is important to recognise that the 
great majority of group polarisation experiments do not concern risk-taking in 
groups at all. 
Firstly, in terms of what the subjects discuss, they most frequently 
exchange views on the advice to give to hypothetical individuals who face risky 
decisions - the "'choice dilemma questionnaire" of Stoner (1961, set out in Kogan 
and Wallach 1967, appendix 2). This paradigm is unlikely to elicit differences 
between group and individual risk-taking, since the two are confounded in terms 
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of the content of the discussion. From an evolutionary perspective, group 
discussion on what to advise hypothetical individuals - the typical group 
polarisation experiment - cannot be judged as likely to have been the 
fundamental group risk-taking scenario. It is much more likely that any group- 
sensitive algorithm is tuned to a situation where a small group faces a decision 
which has real outcomes for the group as a whole and for some or all of its 
members. To the extent that the experimental paradigm is different from that 
situation it is testing something wl-dcli misses the target. 
A second way in which the two conditions are confounded is that in the 
great majority of experiments, no subjects act purely in the group condition. First 
they make a set of choices as individuals, then they have a discussion, and then 
they make the same set of choices again in a group, usually, but not always, 
being required to reach an agreement with the others in the group. Where there 
are controls, they are usually required to make the decisions twice, with no 
intermediate discussion. Subjects are very rarely placed in a group the first time 
they are required to make a decision. One exception is the blackjack experiments 
of Blascovich and his colleagues (Blascovich et al. 1975), which showed a 
between-subjects group effect. The present experiment is designed to compare 
both conditions: for the individuals the group condition is on the second choices, 
and for the groups both first and second. Given that virtually all previous 
experiments have found that there is no significant change in risk-taking for 
individuals who simply make the same set of choices twice, that control is 
omitted from this experiment. 
Erdal: Ch. 3. Risk and Sharing 62 
A further confusion in previous experiments is created in that although 
the decisions are made through group discussion, where there are real rewards 
they are almost never group rewards: each subject is rewarded individually (e. g. 
Blascovich et al. 1975). 
Turning to genuinely group decision making, in a procedure requiring 
groups to guess which of two lights would flash next, with the less frequently 
flashing bringing a higher payment for a correct forecast, Zajonc et al (1968,1969, 
1972) did not find a significant difference between groups and individuals. 
However using the same paradigm Johnson and Davis (1972) found that "The 
average number of risky decisions ... was significantly higher 
for groups than 
individuals" and Davis interprets this result as "replicating the risky shift" 
(Davis 1973,107). This paradigm has only two levels of risk, giving insufficient 
data to examine polatisation. In addition, Yinon et al (1975) found that groups 
take significantly greater risks than individuals in a different paradigm, 
involving noxious consequences. 
3.1.3.6. Rewards are rarely real. 
A final point is that the risks and rewards in most of the group 
polarisation experiments were hypothetical. Slovic (1969) showed that playing 
for real rather than hypothetical rewards tends to encourage caution and 
consistency. 
Some of the group polarisation experiments did face subjects with 
decisions involving real rewards. For example, Blascovich et al (1975) placed 
subjects in games of blackjack, risking their own money, and confirmed the 
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existence of a group-induced shift towards greater risk-taking, even though each 
subject was always betting as an individual, with no opportunity for the subjects 
to share their rewards. 
The experiment reported here was designed to address all these points, 
from the evolutionary perspective described in the introduction. 
3.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN. 
3.2.1 Introduction. 
The basic task set for subjects was to choose between a fixed amount of 
resource (money, for example 0) and a gamble (for example a 0.67 chance of 
getting nothing and a 0.33 chance of getting E15). 
The experiment had a mixed design, making comparisons both within and 
between subjects. The dependent variable was whether the fixed altemative or 
the gamble was chosen. The independent variables were: 
1. Risk Level. The probability of receiving nothing if the gamble was 
chosen. In the example given immediately above, this would be 0.67. In the 
experiment this varied between 0.13 and 0.67. 
2. Reward Probability. The probability, if the gamble was chosen, of 
receiving more than the fixed alternative, 0.33 in the example above. This varied 
from 0.23 to 0.87. 
3. Group vs. Individual. Whether the subjects were making their choices 
in groups or alone (a between-subjects design). All choices were made in both 
conditions. 
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4. Time. Whether the subjects were making their choices for the first time 
or the second time (a within-subjects design). The second time was after 
discussion. 
3.2.2 Hypotheses. 
Based on the evolutionary perspective outlined above, the experimental 
hypothesis of this study predicted that social circumstances would affect risk- 
taking; that when faced with a choice between a fixed amount of money and a 
gamble, people in sharing groups would take more risk. 
It is argued from the data reported below that group polarisation, 
including the increased risk-taking by groups in Johnson and Davis (1972) and 
Yinon et al (1975), may be caused by the triggering of an algorithm which 
evolved to deal with the balance of co-operation and competition which appears 
when people are taking risks in groups. 
The foHowing specific hypotheses were derived from the foregoing 
analysis. 
1. Risk Acceptance. People who face as members of small groups choices 
between fixed amounts and gambles will tend to accept a higher level of risk 
than those who do so as individuals. Briefly, groups will take more risk than 
individuals. 
2. Risk Aversion. On the more risky decisions where individuals show 
cautious shifts with discussion, sharing groups will still accept higher risk. The 
risk-averse curve will not steepen for sharing groups, who wiU never be more 
cautious than individuals. 
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3. Sharing. Groups taking gambles will tend to share what they gain. 
4. Sharing and risk. Those in sharing groups will accept higher levels of 
risk than those in non-sharing groups. 
5. Control: Polarisation. Individuals will show polarisation with 
discussion - increased risk-taking on safer gambles and decreased risk-taking on 
risky gambles - and this pattern will be different from that of sharing groups. 
6. Control: Rational Optimisation. The difference between risk taking by 
sharing groups and by individuals will be greater than can be accounted for by 
the change in risk profile brought about by sharing, i. e. by a process of rational 
optimisation. 
Although the literature shows that it is consistent, the group polarisation 
effect is not powerful, and between-subjects experimental designs, with more 
noise and stricter statistical tests, have generally failed to confirm it (e. g. Carlson 
and Davis 1971). The current experiment was unavoidably in part a between- 
subjects design, with similar potential problems. 
3.2.3 Subjects. 
The 42 subjects, 34 female and 8 male, were undergraduates at St 
Andrews University, in the schools of psychology (24), anthropology (9) and 
medieval history (9). They were recruited in groups with the help of lecturers 
who allowed the experimenter to speak to their students en masse. They were 
paid E3 for attending. It was explained to them at the time of recruiting that the 
experiment was designed to explore preferences in choices between fixed 
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amounts of money and variable amounts of money, and that there was a 
possibility of getting further cash, depending on their choices. 
After the data had been gathered, examination of risk taking by gender 
showed that the males in the individual condition took significantly more risk 
than the females on their first choices. For this reason all males and all groups 
which included any male subjects were excluded from the analysis. This left 5 
groups of three female subjects in the group condition, and 7 female individuals 
in the individual condition. 
3.2.4 Materials. 
In the course of the procedures described below, subjects were given A4 
booklets with 26 pages to complete. On each page they were offered a choice 
between a fixed sum and a gamble (Figure 3.2). The choice was made by marking 
a single cross against either the gamble or the fixed sum. The 13 different 
gambles are listed in Table 3.1. 
These gambles resemble the decisions made by hunters and gatherers 
only in a relatively abstract way. The choice to accept a gamble rather than a 
smaller fixed sum is similar to the choice to go hunting for prized meat, with an 
uncertain outcome, rather than gathering, with a relatively certain outcome. The 
amounts involved can pay for a student-type meal, but not for a giraffe-sized 
bounty. Any evolved algorithm ought to be triggered by situations which have a 
relatively abstract similarity. Hunting outcomes are most like the more risky 
gambles. 
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In each booklet each gamble was presented twice: once against a fixed 
sum of F3 and once against a fixed sum of : E4. The range of the gambles' expected 
monetary values (i. e. the mean receipt if each gamble were played many times) 
was E4.95p to : E5.005 (Table 1), with a mean of E4.985 (66.2% more than F-3 and 
24.6% more than E4) and a standard deviation of 1.9p, (less than 0.4%). There was 
thus a substantial incentive to take the gamble. The choices were in random 
order in each booklet, and counterbalanced right and left. 
This set of stimuli has one unhelpful pattern: the level of risk is broadly 
correlated with the number of dependent rewards in the gamble. Thus the 
riskiest gamble is also the simplest, having only two rewards (Table 3.1), while 
the safest is also the most complex, having five possible reward levels. Thus the 
complexity of the information processing task rises as the risk falls. 
The gambles were presented in a format that facilitated comprehension, 
since the "zero" reward was always shown in white and the top reward in black, 
with the intermediate rewards graded by shade. Nonetheless this pattern creates 
a possible confound in this data set. 
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Table 3.1. The Gambles. 
No. 
- 
P: O P:; C15 P>AIt P: Sum EMV 
1. . 67 . 33 . 33 - E4.95 
2. . 60 . 32 . 32 . 08: E2.50 E5.00 
3. . 55 . 30 . 375 . 15: F-3.33 0.00 
4. . 50 . 30 . 30 . 20: E2.50 F-5.00 
5. . 50 . 28 . 39 . 22: F-3.50 &. 97 
6. . 45 . 11 . 55 . 44: E7.50 E4.95 
7, . 33 . 23 . 45 . 44: E3.50 E4.99 
S. . 30 . 04 . 70 . 22: 00,44: E5 F-5.0 0 
9. . 30 . 26 . 26 . 44: E2.50 ; E5.00 
10. . 26 . 08 . 525 . 23: El 0, . 43: 0.50 E5.005 
11. . 22 . 11 . 33 . 22: LE10,45: E2.50 E4.975 
12. . 20 . 01 . 605 . 10: E11.25,30: E7.50,39: E3.75. E4.988 
13. . 13 . 00 . 705 . 04: 02,17: 0,33: E6,33: 0 E4.98 
The column headings have thefollowing meanings: "P: O" = lite probabilitit of receiving nothing; "P. L-15" 
the probabilihj of receiving the top rewa rd of D5, "P>Alt" = the mean probabilihj of receiving more than 
the fixed alternative; "P: Sum "= the re7vards other Own 0 or D5 and the probabilities of receiving them; 
"EMV" = expected monetanj value, i. e. the stan of the products of each reivard and its probabilihj. 
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3.2.5 Procedure. 
The subjects were assigned to one of two conditions: "group" and 
"individual". 
For those in the group condition, (N =5 sets of 3 subjects each), the 
procedure was as follows: 
a) Initial priming. Most of the subjects were strangers to each other at the 
beginning of the experiment, when they were allocated to three-person groups. 
To trigger cohesive group functioning their first task was to brainstorm in ten 
minutes the longest possible list of things they had in common, a prize being 
awarded for the group which produced the longest list. Stressing compatibility 
and common talents, having a common task, and intergroup competition have 
all been shown to produce group cohesion rapidly (Back 1951). 
b) First set of choices. After the initial brainstorming, each subject was 
then presented with a booklet. The contents of the booklet were explained by 
means of written instructions and an example. The subjects were instructed to 
discuss each choice and to make any arrangement between them that they 
wished. They were specifically released from any requirement to reach 
unanimity, or to make a uniform decision. They were told that one of their 
choices, chosen at random, would be played "for real". They were then left alone 
together in a small room to make their choices, which took from 20 to 40 minutes. 
c) Intermediate Discussion. The third task was to review together in 
discussion the choices made in the booklet, considering each choice again from 
the point of view of the risk taken and the rewards obtainable. They were also 
asked to U-dl* about whether sharing the rewards would make any difference. 
d) Second set of choices. Following this discussion, they were each asked 
to complete a second booklet, which contained the same choices as the first 
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booklet, also in random order. Again, subjects were asked to discuss the choices 
together. It was emphasised that the decisions were entirely up to them, and that 
they were not required to share. 
e) Feedback. After the completion of the tasks, each subject was asked to 
complete a feedback form, which was designed to establish whether the 
instructions and materials had been properly understood. 
f) Payout. Finally one of the pages in one of the two booklets completed by 
each subject was selected at random and the appropriate payment made 
depending on the choice they had made on that page, using random numbers to 
allocate "'winnings" if the gamble had been chosen. 
For the subjects in the Individual condition (N =7; one set of 4 and one set 
of 3), the basic steps were similar to those in the group condition: an initial 
priming, completion of the first booklet, an intermediate discussion, completion 
of the second booklet, completion of the feedback form and finally payment. 
The differences for those in the individual condition were as follows: 
1. Initial priming. Instead of brainstorming with others, they were 
instructed not to talk to the others in their set (who were seated in the same 
room, as in the group condition), but to list for themselves things they associated 
with being alone and to imagine themselves making decisions alone. 
2. First booklet. Instead of being a group exercise, the completion of the 
first booklet was done by each subject as an individual, without talking to the 
others. 
3. Intermediate discussion. Subjects were asked to disclose the decisions 
they had made to the others in their set, and to discuss them, particularly the 
question of how much risk it makes sense to accept, given the rewards available. 
There was no mention of sharing. I 
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4. Second booklet. This was again completed by each individual for her 
self, with no further discussion allowed. 
3.2.6 Scoring. 
Each subject scored 1 if they chose the gamble, and 0 if they chose the 
fixed altemative. The scores for each choice against the two alternatives (E3 and 
EQ were averaged. 
In the group condition there were thus 5 data points (1 for each set of 3 
subjects); at 13 risk/reward levels (gambles, Table 1); and each choice was made 
2 times (first and second), i. e. 5x 13 x2= 130 data points for analysis. Each of the 
130 data points is the mean score against the two alternatives of a set of 3 subjects 
for a particular gamble on a specific time. 
In the individual condition there were 7 subjects x 13 choices x2 times 
182 data points, each of which could be 0 or 0.5 or 1. 
Mean scores were calculated by subject (mean of 26 choices by that 
subject) and by choice (mean of all 7 subjects' scores on that choice in the 
individual condition and 15 subjects' scores in the group condition). This latter 
gave a series of 13 average scores, for each of the following four basic conditions: 
Individuals' 1st choices; Individuals' 2nd choices; Groups' 1st choices; and 
Groups' 2nd choices (with sharing). The n,., -an scores by gamble are set out in 
Table 3.2. 
This allowed a detailed examination of scores and shifts at each 
risk/reward level and the investigation by multiple linear regression of the 
drivers of the choices made. Independence of the mean score data points was 
arguable; the choices were made in a random order for each subject on each 
Erdal: Ch. 3. Risk and Sharing 73 
occasion, and the main analysis was carried out on the mean scores of all subjects 
in each condition per gamble. 
These data do not have a normal distribution, so non-parametric tests 
were appropriate. Analysis of Variance was also utilised for exploratory 
purposes, in view of its robustness and ability to identify interactions. Linear 
regression was used to evaluate which factors were most influential in the 
subjects' choices. 
In the individual condition there were no ceiling or floor effects. In the 
group condition the safest gamble was chosen on 29 out of 30 occasions, a near 
ceiling. All data were retained in the analysis. 
3.3 RESULTS 
3.3.1 Scores. 
The overall mean score was 0.527: i. e. there was a 52.7% chance of the 
gamble being chosen with this set of choices. 
One set of three subjects in the group condition chose spontaneously to 
share all their rewards. The first-time scores of this group correlated more closely 
with those of the other groups when they shared (r--0.834), than with the other 
groups on heir first scores, when they xý ere not sharing (r = 0.751). So the 
comparison between sharing and non-sharing groups was carried out by 
including that group's mean scores for both times in the sharing group scores 
and not in the non-sharing group's scores; i. e. N=4 groups of 3 for the groups' 
first scores, reported as the "Non-sharing Groups", and N=6 groups of 3 on the 
second scores, reported as the "'Sharing Groups". Since the scores of the group 
that shared both times were first averaged before being included in the Sharing 
4 
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Groups" score, that group is weighted only once. The overall mean scores by 
gamble are set out in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Mean Score by Gamble, by Condition by TiMe. 
Gamble Individuals 
_ 
Groups 
Number Ist Time 2nd Tinte Non-SltaLiag Sharin 
1. 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.55 
2. 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.22 
3. 0,21 0.00 0.08 0.47 
4. 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.40 
S. 0.29 0.29 0.21 0.58 
6. 0.71 0.64 0.67 0.77 
7. 0.43 0.50 0.83 0.62 
8. 0.79 1.00 0.96 0.83 
9. 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.45 
10. 0.71 0.71 0.92 0.80 
11. 0.14 0.29 0.54 0.72 
12. 0.79 0.93 0.79 0.88 
13. 0.93 0.86 1.00 0.97 
Mean scores vs.. f3 and fA. N of Ss: Individiwi 7; Groups: Non-sharing 12; Sltaring15. 
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These scores are displayed graphically in Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.3. A. Individual Condition: First and Second Scores. 
1.00 T 
0.80 
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 
0.00 
cy) V) CO 
Figure 3.3. B, Group condition: Non-sharing-and Sharing Scores 
1.00-- 
0.80 
0.60 
0.40 
0.20 -f- 
0.00 
The diamonds are thefirst scores, the squares the second scores, 
A shift towards risk is shown by the square lying above the diamond. 
The X axis is the gamble number, with risk levelfiffling to the right, The Y 
axis is the proportion of Ss choosing the gamble. 
3.3.2 Coffelations. 
The scores were strongly inter-correlated (Table 3.3). The highest between- 
subjects correlation (r = 0.934 - the second highest of all the correlations) was 
between the individuals' second choices, after discussion, and the groups' first 
I 
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Lr) CY) m 
(non-sharing) choices, also af ter discussion. These two scores are shown in 
Figure 3.4. 
Table 3.3. Scores in the 4 conditions: Pearson Correlation Matrix. 
fird. 1 hid. 2 Non-shr. 
Ind. 2 0.948 
Non-shr. 0.892 0.934 
Sharing 0.850 0.901 0.869 
13 obss. "Ind. 1 "= Individuals'first scores, "Ind. 2 "= individuals' secomi 
scores; "Non-shr" = non-sharing groups' (first) scares, "Sharing" -- 
sharing groups' (second) scores, including the inean score of the group that 
shared both times. 
Figtire. 3,4, 
The Individuals' 2nd and the Non-sharing Groups' Ist Choices 
The highest betiveen-subjects correlation (r = 0.934) was between the tivo 
"with discussion, without sharing" conditions: the individuals'second 
(diamonds) and the groups'first (squares). 
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3.3.3 Analysis of Variance. 
In analysis of variance the independent variables were risk, time (first or 
second) and the individual/ group condition. The risk of the gambles was the 
probability of getting no reward (P: O): this measure is psychologically salient, 
correlates highly with the variance of the rewards (r=0.843) -a commonly used 
measure of risk - and even more so with the variance of the product of the 
probability of each reward and its amount - i. e. an intuitively sensible weighted 
variance (r=0.939). Regression confirmed that P: O was an important influence on 
the choices of gambles. Details of the regression results are given further below. 
For analysis of variance the 13 levels of risk were simplified into "'high" 
(P: O > 0.50, N= 5) and "low" (P: O < 0.50, N= 8). 
The following overall main effects were identified by analysis of variance. 
3.3.3.1 Risk. 
Subjects were risk sensitive. They chose the gamble significantly less often 
when there was a high risk of getting nothing, and more often when there was a 
low risk of getting nothing (F (1,44) = 51.85, p<0.0005). The proportion of choices 
of the higher-risk gambles was 0.245 and of the lower-risk gambles was 0.703. 
3.3.3.2 Individual vs. Group Condition. 
The predicted main effect for the Individual/ Group condition was 
confirmed (F (1,44) = 6.87, p=0.012). The groups chose the gamble more often 
than the individuals: the overall proportions of subjects choosing the gambles 
were 0.579 for the groups and 0.415 for the individuals. 
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3.3.3.3 Time - The Shifts and Polarisation. 
No overall shift towards risk was identified by analysis of variance (F (1, 
44) = 1.38, ns). The mean scores by group of gambles - grouped by risk level as 
used in the analysis of variance - are shown in Table 3.4: 
Table 3.4. Score by Risk Group by Condition by Time 
Individuals Groups 
Mean Scores Ist 2nd Non-shr Slir 
5 Risky Gambles 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.44 
8 Safer Gambles 0.57 0.63 0.74 0.76 
The individuals with discussion shift a7vayfivin risk on the riskij gambles 
and touvrds risk on the safer gambles, the groups With sharing do the 
opposite on the risky gambles. 
It is clear from Table 3.4 that, as predicted, in the individual condition 
subjects show the classic group polarisation pattern: with discussion their mean 
scores on the risky gambles fall (from 0.14 to 0.09), and on the safer gambles rise 
(from 0.57 to 0.63). However, this effect is not strong enough to reach statistical 
significance. Analysis of variance on the scores of the subjects in the individual 
condition alone showed no overall upward shift in scores (F (1,178) = 0.003, ns), 
with risk level alone being a significant driver (F (1,178) = 93.85, p<0.0005). This 
is in part because the shift towards risk only takes place on the safer gambles, 
which is vitiated by the inclusion of the cautious shifts on the riskier gambles. 
With sharing, the groups show almost the opposite pattern: analysis of 
variance on the scores of the subjects in the group condition alone showed not 
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only that risk (F (1,126) = 80.9 p<0.0005) and time (first time without sharing 
and second time with sharing) (F = 9.05, p=0.003) were significant, but also that 
there was a significant interaction between them (F (1,126) = 7.133, p=0.009). 
This interaction is evident from Table 3.4: the mean score stays steady on the 
safer gambles, and rises steeply on the risky gambles, from 0.10 to 0.44. 
Looking at the shifts in greater detail, each subjects first score on each 
gamble was compared with their second. In the individual condition, on the 
risky gambles there were 5 risky and 7 cautious shifts, a net shift of 2 awayfi-oill 
risk; and on the safer gambles there were 13 risky and 5 cautious shifts, a net 
shif t towards risk of S. In the group condition (taking only the four groups which 
changed from non-sharing to sharing) on the 5 risky gambles there were 43 risky 
shifts and 2 cautious, a net +41; on the safer 8 gambles there were 29 risky and 27 
cautious shifts, a net +2. These results are tabulated in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
Table 3.5. Frequencies of Shifts. 
Risbj Sluyts: 
Risk of Gambles: Riskit 5 Safer 8 
Individuals 5 13 
Groups 43 29 
Chi sq. = 4.69, p<0.05 
cautious Shills. 
Risky 5 Safer 8 
75 
2 27 
Chi sq. = 10.28, p<0.005 
Groups shift more towards risk on the high-risk gambles and more towards caution 
on the low-risk gambles, individuals do the opposite. The groups'scores are taken 
onlyfrom thefour groups who changedfrom non-sharing to sharing. Using all 5 
groups'scores made no nzaterial difference. 
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Table 3.6. Net Shifts towards Risk. 
Riski 5 
. L- 
Safer 8 
Individual 
Group 41 2 
Each figure is the difference between the frequencies of risky and cautious 
shifts in table 3.5. Adding 2 to each frequency differeme, to remove the 
negative, chi square I df = 32.48, p<D. 0001, confirming the significant 
interaction. 
These shifts are seen clearly in the graphs in Figure 3.3. In the individual 
condition the shifts are relatively small, with two quite large cautious shifts on 
gambles 2 and 3. In the group condition, with sharing there are fairly large shifts 
towards risk on the 5 most risky gambles. 
3.3.4 Factors influencing the choices: Regression. 
It is clear from the foregoing that overall there was risk aversion and risk 
sensitivity in every condition. The design of the experiment permitted closer 
examination of those factors using regression. 
Each gamble carried two risks: the risk of getting no reward at all, and the 
risk of getting less than the fixed alternative. Me Pearson correlation coefficient 
between these two risk variables was 0.58. In setting out the pattern of risk 
avoidance so far, the risk variable has been the risk of getting no reward at all. 
The regression equations for the trends in scores in the four conditions are 
shown in Table 3.7. The increase in the coefficient of the Risk variable in the first 
three equations (in bold type) shows increasing risk sensitivity; the much. lower 
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coefficient for the Groups' second choices, when they were sharing, shows 
decreased risk sensitivity. 
Table 3.7. Trend line equations: raw coefficients and R squareds. 
R sattared 
Ind. 1st Scores = 0.900 - 1.280 x P: O 0.422 
Ind 2nd Scores = 1.039 - 1.599 x P: O 0.538 
Non-sharing Gp Scores = 1.213 - 1.866 x P: O 0.677 
Sharing Gp Scores = 1.005 - 0.959 x P: O 0.564 
Thefirst three rising coefficients show progressively increasing risk sensitivity: the last 
shows much lower risk sensitivity, All the equations are highly significant (p = 0.004 or 
better). 
Regression against both risk variables (the probability of getting notl-dng - 
P: O - and the probability of getting less than the alternative - P<Alt) as separate 
independent variables established that the subjects in the 3 non-sharing 
conditions paid attention more to the alternative reward, and less to the risk of 
getting nothing. 
Table 3.8 shows the results of regression analyses with the independent 
variables being the chance of getting more than nothing and the chance of getting 
more than the altemative. 
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Table 3.8. a) Regression Results: Two IVs, Raw Coefficients 
R Squared 
Ind Ists = -0.029 + 1.24 x P>Alt - 0.41 x P: O 0.594 
Ind 2' s=0.031 + 1.35 x P>Alt - 0.65 x P: O 0.704 
Gp I sts, = 0.361 + 1.14 x P>Alt - 1.07 x P: O 0.786 
Gp Share = 0.316 + 0.92 x P>Alt - 0.31 x P: O 0.789 
This table shows the equations using two independent variables. In thefirst 3 conditions 
the sensitivity to the risk of getting nothing increases. P>Alt = probability of getting 
more than the alternative. P. 0 = risk- ofgetting nothing. 
Table 3.8. b) Regression Results: Two IN's, Standardised Coefficients. 
Takenfrom the regressions in Table 3.8. a) above, these show the extent to which 
variance is shared Inj the dependent and independent variables individually. 
Ind 1st Ind 2nd Gp Ist Shr. Qi 
P>Altertuitive 0.606 0.595 0.483 0.694 
P: O 0.208 0.300 0.470 0.245 
The focus on risk rises, and on the alternative falls, until sharing reverses the 
effect, making the altertuitive reward much nwre salient than the risk of getting 
nothing. 
Again, the first three conditions show increasing risk sensitivity: after 
discussion the individuals were more sensitive to the pure risk of getting 
nothing, and the groups on their first choices were even more sensitive to that 
risk. However, compared to the groups' first choices, the sharing groups' appear 
to be less than half as sensitive to risk (as shown by the raw coefficients) 
although in approximately the same balance between the two IVs (as shown by 
the standardised coefficients). 
I 
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To understand this result fully it is necessary to recognise that the same 
gamble faced by individuals seeking purely their own rewards, and by 
individuals with a prior commitment to share any rewards gained, has two 
different risk profiles. This is illustrated by coin-tossing, which for any 
individual has a 50: 50 risk profile - the only possibilities are heads or tails with 
equal probabilities. So if the reward for heads is 100 and the reward for tails is 0, 
each person playing has a 0.5 chance of getting 100 and a 0.5 chance of getting 0. 
But if two individuals agree in advance that they will share the rewards, then 
there are four possible outcomes, with each person getting half CIL' the total 
outcome: heads + heads, heads + tails, tails + heads, tails + tails. This gives each 
individual a 0.25 probability of getting 100 (heads + heads) ,a0.5 chance of 
getting 50 (heads + tails, tails + heads) and a 0.25 chance of getting 0 (tails + 
tails). The mean expected value is unchanged (50), but the risk profile is different 
- there is less chance of getting either extreme, and a substantial chance of getting 
an intermediate reward. 
It was thus necessary to recalculate the shape of the IVs for groups of 
three who had committed themselves to share the rewards. The probability of 
getting 0 is simply the cube of the probability in the original gamble. But to 
recalculate the chance of getting more than the alternative is a lengthy and 
complex calculation. 
Two possibilities were examined. The first was that the subjects had 
responded accurately to the new risk profiles, in which case the recalculated IVs 
would prove better predictors of the Groups' sharing choices than the original 
IVs. The second was that they had responded in some general way to the fact of 
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being in a sharing group, which would mean that the changes in their scores 
would be substantially predicted by the changes in the risk profiles. 
The regression results are shown in Table 3.9. 
Table 3.9. Reuessions for the Sharine Grotios' Choices. 
1. Using Simple Ws (as in Table 3.8): R squa 
Shr Gp = 0.32 + 0.92 x P>Alt 0.31 x P: O 0.789 
2. Using Recalculated "(R)" Ws, taking account of the sharing effect: 
Shr Gp = -0.20 + 1.41 x P>Alt(R) - 1.40 x P: O(R) 0.651 
3. Using Changes in both DVand Ws (A = "change in "): 
, &Gp Score = -0.24 + 0.73 x AP>Alt + 0.78 x, &P: O 0.435 
The standardised coefficientsfir the equations above are: 
P>Alt P>() 
1. Simple Ws 0.69 0.25 
2. Recalculated Ws 0.45 0.61 
3. Cluinges in Variables 0.43 0.30 
None of these equations leaps out as clearly the best solution. 
In Table 3.9, equation 1, with the best R squared, uses the same IVs as the 
regressions in Table 3.8, but fails to explain the much lower risk sensitivity of the 
Groups' second choices. Equation 2, whi-h uses the TVs re-calculated to reflect the 
effects of sharing, suggests that the responses do reflect the changed risk profile 
fairly accurately. Equation 3, using the changes in scores and in the Ivs brought 
about by sharing, gives a less sound prediction of the Groups' second scores. 
None of these equations is entirely satisfactory as an explanation of the scores of 
the sharing groups. 
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3.4 DISCUSSION. 
This experiment suffered from a number of weaknesses. It used a small 
number of subjects in the final analysis, all the same sex, with a narrow spread of 
ages and cultural and educational backgrounds. There was a possible confound 
between risk level and gamble complexity. So all conclusions must be treated as 
tentative, requiring replication in experiments without these design faults. 
In general, the results suggest a more complex picture than was set out in 
the predictions, which are now discussed individually. 
1. "Groups will take more risk". 
The first prediction was that groups would take more risk than 
individuals. This was confirmed, in that overall, there was a significant 
difference in the average level of risk taken. The results also suggest that there is 
a difference in the pattern of risk-taking between sharing and non-sharing 
groups, which must be taken into account when predicting risk-taking. 
A related prediction was that groups will never take less risk than 
individuals. This was proved false: for example, Table 3.4 shows that on the five 
risky gambles the non-sharing groups (mean score 0.10) were more risk averse 
than the individuals (mean score 0.14). 
2. "Groups will tend to share". 
This prediction was that groups taking gambles would tend to share what 
they obtained. The prediction was supported, although not strongly, in that one 
group decided from the first to share all their rewards, without prompting; and 
all the other groups decided to share after the intermediate discussion, which 
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included the prompt to discuss sharing. Since a prompt from an experimenter 
must be classed as a strong steer, this prediction is only rather weakly confirmed. 
3. "Sharing groups wiH take the most risk". 
This prediction was that sharing groups would take more risk than 
subjects in any other condition. Here, there is a new and interesting result - the 
unpredicted interaction shown in Table 3.6. With sharing there is a very highly 
significant increase in risk taken by groups at risk levels above 0.50, but not at the 
safer end of the risk spectrum. The mean score of the sharing groups on the risky 
gambles (0.44) was over three times higher than the nearest in any other 
condition (Individuals' first scores, 0.14) (Table 3.5). 
The conclusion suggested by this interaction is that sharing does have an 
effect which is both significant and different from group polarisation: sharing 
increases risk taking with risky gambles but not on safer gambles - both opposite 
tendencies to the normal group polarisation, as seen in the control condition. 
Sharing groups seem to be less risk sensitive than individuals or non-sharing 
groups, and in this they seem to be responding to the collapsing of the extremes 
in risk that takes place with sharing. 
It is not conceivable that this change takes place by any form of accurate 
calculation: it took the experimenter a considerable time using a computer to 
work out all the incentive alterations. And yet the scores with sharing seem to be 
driven quite accurately by the altered risk profile with sharing: the sharing 
responses were fairly well explained by the fully calculated risk profiles 
(Equation 2 in Table 3.9). 
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Further, both the risk aversion and risk sensitivity seem to be dampened- 
the sharing groups took no more risk on the safer gambles, those with a mean 
risk of less than 0.50 (Figure 3.33), in spite of the considerable incentive to do so 
(Table 3.1: the mean value of the alternatives was E3.50, that of the gambles 
; E4.985). Thus the sharing effect seems to be in part responsive to the new risk 
profile, and in part still avoiding risk: it is still risk averse on average, but it is 
much less risk averse at high levels of risk. The interpretation of this pattern will 
remain uncertain until tested with a set of gambles which are free from the 
possible confound between risk level and stimulus complexity. 
In this connection it is perhaps relevant that hunting returns tend to be at 
the higher end of the risk spectrum. Bailey reports that Efe hunters only have a 
10-30% chance of killing an animal in group hunts, and about a 307o chance in 
individual monkey hunts (1991, p. 88). Lee found that the ! Kung had a 0.5 chance 
of getting spring hare on any expedition and in big game hunts the best had a 
0.38 chance of success on any day, the worst no chance at all (1979, pp. 141 and 
267). It is the products of hunting , with their high variance, which are shared, 
far 
more than the products of the more dependable gathering. 
One possible conclusion is that if there is an evolved algorithm dealing 
with risk in sharing groups, it seems to be tailored to dealing especially with 
relatively high levels of risk - that is, the levels of risk where sharing can make a 
material difference. And it seems to be fairly rational in the way it reacts - 
although not conscious in its calculations. This makes sense, in that any response 
which was irrational, in the sense that it took no account of the actual 
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probabilities of gaining rewards, would- tend to be bettered by one that did take 
fit with actual probabilities. 
So the data are consistent with the hypothesis that the sharing response is 
influenced by a specific evolved algorithm: it works fast and unconsciously, and 
it responds relatively rationally, especially at risk levels where it makes a real 
difference. Even the dampened effect may be rational in evolutionary terms: just 
as humans are risk averse even in situations where the consequences of failure 
are insignificant, so it may have made evolutionary sense to err on the cautious 
side when sharing, particularly where sharing was not important because the 
risk levels were low. Any evolved algorithm will only opffi-nise on average, 
across the full range of situations faced in the environment where the evolution 
took place, and not on every specific situation. 
One of the predictions was that "rational optimisation will not explain the 
results". This was confirmed in that the failure to increase risk taking by sharing 
groups on safer gambles, in spite of the considerable incentive to take the 
gambles, flies directly in the teeth of rational optimisation. But the outcome is 
more complex than that: there seems to be a strong element of (unconscious) 
rationality in the group sharing response on the higher risk gambles - which are 
the important ones in evolutionary terms. 
4. "Individuals will show polarisation". 
This prediction was that the individuals in the control condition would 
show the normal shift towards risk. This was not confirmed: the control 
condition did not produce a significant risky sl-dft overall. However, the detailed 
analysis showed that the individuals had a tendency to take a little more risk 
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across most of the spectrum of risk, but less on the riskier choices, with the 
second and third most risky gambles producing a consistent cautious shift 
(Figure 3.3. A). This result was in line with the general group polarisation pattern. 
This pattern was the opposite of the shifts in the group results with 
sharing. So the control condition, while not fully confirming the prediction, 
showed that the group shift caused by sharing was not simply the conventional 
group polarisation: it had quite a different pattern. 
One difficulty with the original simple model - which stated that the 
group algorithm would be triggered whenever people are in groups - is shown 
by the strong risk sensitivity of the groups on their initial choices. TI-ds showed a 
pattern very similar to that of the individuals after discussion (Table 3.3 and 
Figure 3.4). This suggests A possible interpretation which would take the original 
theoretical framework to a higher level. The original thesis was that since 
humans evolved in groups, which handled risk by sharing high-variance 
resources, groups would take more risk. However, these results suggest that, 
until they actually commit themselves to share, individuals in groups are inore 
sensitive to risk: choosing risky gambles less and safer gambles more. Discussion 
alone is enough to trigger greater risk sensitivity, and non-sharing group 
formation triggers it more intensively (shown by the regression coefficients in 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9). 
One factor which an evolutionary perspective should highlight, and 
which was neglected in the original simple predictions, is that individuals are not 
only potential sharers but also potential competitors, One possibility suggested 
by these results is that, as long as there is no commitment to share, other group 
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members are viewed more in the guise of potential coinpetitors for resources than 
potential sharers of resources. In these circumstances it makes sound evolutionary 
sense to be extra wary of losing (which causes the shift away from 1-dgh-risk 
choices), but to try to win as much as one safely can (causing the shift towards 
risk on the safer choices). If one is surrounded by competitors, it is important to 
play the game, and important to try to win - but it is perhaps almost as important 
not to be seen to lose rashly. Not only one's wealth but also one's status is 
involved, when one is facing risky decisions in a group of potential competitors. 
This changes with sharing. Once the commitment to share has been made, 
loss carries no stigma, for the risks have been recognised and a shared strategy 
agreed: no-one will end up with more, or less, than anyone else. Now one can 
relax even in the face of substantial odds, confident of an outcome no worse than 
anyone else's. Perhaps that is why risk taking does not rise significantly on the 
safer choices, at the same time as increasing substantially on the riskier choices: 
the incentive to beat the competition has disappeared, as well as the incentive to 
avoid risk. 
It seems from this study that there may be a different mode of risk 
evaluation attaching to each of three broad social situations (individual, a group 
of potential competitors and a sharing group). In idealised form these are: 
a) Ego. If the social situation is an individual alone, then reward-seeking 
with a relatively low awareness of risk is appropriate. 
b) Ego in a Group, If the social situation is a non-sharing group, which 
may still be a friendly group, then the avoidance of high risk becomes a priority, 
automatically, as does the desire to obtain rewards wherever it is relatively safe 
I 
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to do so. Among potential competitors, even friendly ones, one seeks 
instinctively to be a winner and not to be a loser. 
c) Sharing Group Member. Finally, if the social situation is that of a 
sharing group, then one becomes relatively serene even in the face of substantial 
risk, but also less driven to win every last penny. 
Social interaction such as discussion by itself triggers the group-of- 
potential-competitors mode; a shift towards greater risk sensitivity then results. 
Where the risk levels are high, with a more than 50yo chance of getting nothing, 
there will be no shift, or even a cautious shift; where they are low there will be a 
shift towards risk. This may not be because of an aberration caused by social 
processes, nor because of new arguments being available, but because of a sound 
evolutionary algorithm: if you are in a group, and the group is not going to 
share, then attend to the risk, and try to win by playing harder on the safer 
choices. In the language of social facilitation (Allport 1920, Zajonc 1965), the non- 
sharing involvement with others facilitates the taking of low risk and inhibits the 
taking of high risk. 
This model does not necessarily imply awareness of the cognitive 
processes involved. To the experimenter's eye, although no attempt was made to 
measure this, the groups, because of the pleasure they took in the initial brain- 
storming which achieved group formation in the first place, generally appeared 
to enjoy the whole experience more than the individuals. They were relaxed and 
laughing together, even while responding to risk on their first choices in a way 
that showed intense avoidance of the riskier end of the spectrum. So this effect 
does not seem to be the result primarily of a reasoning process, (since it was not 
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consciously calculated) nor of an emotional process (insofar as the affect 
displayed was not at all keyed to the pattern of choices made); rather it seems to 
be a change in the perception of risk. If that were confirmed in further 
experiments, it would reinforce the suggestion that what is at work is an evolved 
algorithm. This algorithm, it is suggested, switches automatically into different 
modes of risk-evaluation, depending on the social situation. 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
The tentative conclusion of this experiment is that ways in which risk- 
taking varies with the social situation may be predictable from an evolutionary 
perspective. 
As humans evolved, they spent most of their time in small groups where, 
in the face of uncertain resources, sharing was ubiquitous. Each person had 
always to be vigilant - to make sure that no-one got away with more than they 
did, that no-one was becoming too dominant, and that they personally did not 
look like losers (Erdal and Whiten 1996). But they lived in groups which shared 
resources, and the present results suggest that this evolutionary legacy may 
shape our psychology in significant ways. 
This conclusion must remain tentative until further experiments are 
carried out, involving larger numbers of subjects, of both sexes, from a variety of 
social and cultural backgrounds, using a set of stimuli which are uniform in data- 
processing complexity (or differ randomly on that measure). But this experiment 
suggests that such work is worth doing. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EGALITARIANISM IN A WIDER SOCIAL CONTEXT 
CHAPTER 4: EGALITARIANISM IN A WIDER SOCIAL-CQNTEXT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1. Hypothesis 
The earlier sections of this thesis have set out one perspective on the 
likely characteristics of the social environment in which Hoino sapiens evolved, 
identifying two universals characterised as "egalitarian": meat sharing and 
counter-dominance. In broad terms, these maintained a relatively equal 
distribution of physical and political resources, of wealth and of influence. To 
the extent that individualpsychological algorithms for behaviours affected by 
the social environment have been designed by natural selection, it is to this 
egalitarian social environment that they lArill. be adapted. If counter- 
dominance was instrumental in maintaining the sharing of meat and 
broadening access to mating opportunities, with crucial consequences 
respectively for nutrition and reproduction, then human psychology should 
measurably reflect that evolutionary history today. 
A specific hypothesis following from this model is tested in the study 
described in this section. This hypothesis is relatively complex and wide in its 
scope: it is that since human psychology is adapted to an egalitarian social 
environment, living in such an environment will have widely beneficial 
effects, reflected in measurable social psychological variables. A corollary of 
this hypothesis is that living in an inegalitarian environment will be to some 
extent harmfuL any organism living in an envirom-nent which on relevant 
variables is different from that to which it is adapted may experience stress at 
the lack of fit. In extreme form an example was provided by the work of 
Harlow on young rhesus, macaques raised in isolation from their natural 
mothers (Harlow 1958): even after successful rehabilitation using normally 
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reared macaques as "therapists" the ex-isolates remained more susceptible to 
stress (Gleitman 1991, p. 585). 
4.1.2. Independent variable: an egalitarian environment 
The characteristics of a relatively egalitarian enviroranent in the 
modem world would include: 
a) The Social Environment: a lack of class differentiation, and a 
relatively equal distribution of wealth. 
b) The Work Environment: co-operatives and businesses owned by 
their employees would create such an environment, with those employed 
being given information, involvement in decisions and the right to influence 
them, and participation in profits made. A sense of widely shared local 
ownership of businesses rather than absentee ownership would help create 
an egalitarian environment. 
c) The Political Enviroranent: a democratic tradition where voters had 
the experience of influencing policies and events would characterise an 
egalitarian envirom-nent. 
It is difficultin practice to determine the extent to which such variables 
are independent. The two aspects of the social environment listed as 
independent variables have aspects which would also be beneficial outcomes 
of such a system, not simply drivers of other variables: the independent and 
"dependent" variables will interact. For example, a high rate of participation 
in the political process is likely to be more effective, and also to be reinforced 
by the experience of its efficacy. A high political participation rate will thus be 
an outcome of such an environment at the same time as it perpetuates it. A 
feedback process will operate which will sustain the system. 
The inost independent of these complex interacting variables may be 
the business ownership system. To the extent that businesses are owned by 
their employees living in the local community, there is a material factor 
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underlying the egalitarian environment. To the extent that they are not, 
people within the communitýy will be faced from time to time by the effects of 
important decisions made by distant owners, and so will have a reduced 
sense of control, whether individuallyor collectively. 
4.1.3. Dependent variables 
The dependent variables would include a very wide range of social 
behaviours. Examples of behaviours which would logically be affected by 
living in an environment closer to that to which the human organism is 
adapted would include: 
a) Criminal Behaviour: crime rates should be lower. Crime has been 
shown to be more severe in areas of greater wealth differentiation, and less 
severe in areas where there is a strong community tradition. Clinard (1978) 
described the main factors behind Switzerland's low crime rate, emphasising 
the importance of the cohesive community, where differences in wealth were 
downplayed and the police were closely linked with their communities. 
The literature on one aspect of criminal behaviour, domestic violence, 
generally focuses on how to intervene constructively (e. g. Martin 1978, 
Fiorenza and Copeland 1994). Most theoretical discussion appears to 
concentrate on cultural rather than material explanations: e. g. Dobash and 
Dobash (1979) see inequality in marital relationsl-dps but make notl-dng of 
wider social inequalities. Nonetheless domestic violence has been linked to 
unemployment (Komarovsky 1940 discussed in Pahl 1985). To the extent that 
domestic violence is a response to frustration, which would according to the 
present hypothesis be worsened by living in an unalterably unequal 
envirom-nent, there should be an improvement in rates of domestic violence 
where egalitarian social conditions create less frustration. 
b) Educational Performance. The large-scale youth cohort studies in 
the UK have shown that educational performance varies with rates of 
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truancy, leaving school early and negative attitudes towards school 
(Bosworth 1992). Given the hypothesis that people living in an egalitarian 
community will feel less in conflict with the institutions around them, it 
follows that cl-dldren in a more egalitarian community should play truant less, 
stay at school longer and feel more positive towards their schools. Taylor and 
Spencer showed that negative experiences as a child at school provided a 
significant disincentive from pursuing education and training later in life 
(Taylor and Spencer 1994, p. 20). It is likely that an egalitarian community 
would tend to promote more constructive school experiences, resulting in 
better performance in adult education and training, while a lack of 
psychological fit with the social environment would make the problem more 
intractable. 
c) Social Participation: voluntary societies and charitable activity should 
be at a higher level, as should rates of participation in the political system. 
Given the seminal study by Titmus (1970) of blood donation, it was decided 
to collect data on that activity. On political involvement, Franklin established 
that country differences were much larger than individual differences in 
voting rates, with Italy very highly placed at an average 90yo participation in 
national elections (1996, p. 218, Table 8.1). Putnam (1993) identified the whole 
of Emilia Romagna, the province in which the three towns under study are 
situated, as having an environment conducive to good local government, due 
to its long-standing co-operative traditions. The current study was designed 
to make fine distinctions within this excellent environment. Franklin also 
showed that low voting rates in some cases were "associated with the 
widespread use of alternative avenues for participatory activities" (1996, 
p. 216), which might suggest that an egalitarian community with its wider 
range of olýportunities to participate would be associated with lower voting 
rates. However, it was decided to keep the intuitive prediction that voting 
rates in an egalitarian society should be high. 
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d) Social networks should be more developed. By this is meant not the 
mathematical analysis of networks of relationships (Bames 1972), but rather 
the support felt to be available from workmates, friends and family. 
e) Levels of trust should be higher than in communities with a lower 
sense of solidarity, as would be caused by salient inequalities. 
f) Health should be better, particularly where stress could affect the 
outcome. Black et al. (1980) established that material deprivation was 
associated with poor health outcomes and Whitehead (1988) gave further 
evidence that this was the case. The bibliographies in those two books 
provide a full sample of the extensive literature on equality and health. 
Two studies seem particularly relevant to this thesis. The first is the 
large (over 10,000 subjects) longitudinal study, started in 1967 by Marmot and 
his colleagues, of the health of the people working in the hierarchical 
Whitehall bureaucracy of the British government. They showed (e. g. Marmot 
1991) that mortality and many serious diseases, including heart conditions, 
were inversely related to status in the hierarchy, after controlling for all other 
known factors. Given that the egalitarian environment should decrease the 
sense of hierarchy, it is therefore possible to predict that Imola's population 
should have lower morbidity and mortality. 
The second relevant work is that of Wilkinson (1996) which surveyed 
research from many sources showing that once a population has reached a 
reasonable state of economic development, health improvements appear to 
follow not from further economic development, but from a more even 
distribution of wealth. This work tends to be suggestive rather than 
conclusive, and not to have the rigour of Marmot's work referred to above, 
but it produces a range of evidence to support an egalitarian effect. 
g) Sex Differences. In addition, an evolutionary perspective suggests a 
new hypothesis: that there may be a sex difference in the response to such an 
environment. The -first leg of the argument rests upon general evolutionary 
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theory. Intra-species competition is stronger among the members of the sex 
which invests less in reproduction, which in humans, as in most mammals, is 
among males (Trivers 1972). The variance in male reproductive success is 
very much higher than the variance in female reproductive success, so the 
sexual selection stakes are higher and the readiness to compete greater in 
males. Among humans, this competition should include efforts to appear 
competent, and measures of competence would include wealth and social 
status (Symons 1979, Buss 1994). Miller argues that much current research 
focuses too simplistically on superficial cues, but does not dissent from the 
theoretical model (Miller 1997). Among many other confirmed predictions 
this theory gives the best explanation for the age and sex distribution of 
homicidal killers (Wilson and Daly 1985, Daly and Wilson 1988). 
The second leg rests on the distinction between modem environments 
and the environments in which evolution took place. A particular feature of 
post-hunter-gatherer societies, which modem technology has reinforced 
strongly, is the ability of some individuals to build up unassailably 
conspicuous surpluses of resources and status (Frank and Cook 1995). Since 
this possibility seems never to have arisen before agriculture - that is, during 
the millennia that passed while Homo sapiens evolved - then to the extent that 
human psychology is tuned by evolution, it is not tuned to this situation 
where some individuals can obtain a vastly greater share of wealth and 
status. So it follows that males in particular, sensitised to evaluations of social 
competence by sexual selection over vast tracts of evolutionary time, will 
suffer from a degree of "insult", living in this social environment and being 
unable to do anything effective about it. 
The third leg of the theory concerns the role of egalitarianism. An 
egalitarian ýnvironment is one in which the display of differences in status 
and resources is more muted: so egalitarianism represents a moderation of 
intra-species competition. In view of the greater competition among males 
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than females for these resources, this should be particularly relevant to males 
rather than females. 
A specific prediction following from this perspective would be that 
moving from a less to a more egalitarian environment should result in a 
greater improvement for males rather than females, particularly in those 
measures which are most closely related to sexual selection. This would 
include sensitivity to the difference between rich and poor, where males in an 
unequal environment will suffer more severely, since they are measured 
more than females on demonstrated competence in providing goods for 
paternal investment (Buss 1994). Another prediction is that there should be a 
difference in the stress response to an inegalitarian environment, with males 
suffering more severely: they are constantly reminded, by the obvious 
disparity in wealth, that they are failing in important ways. This would 
manifest itself in sex differences in the improvement in health and mortality; 
it would also predict a smaller gap in age-at-death between the sexes in the, 
more egalitarian environment. 
Given the many possible confounds of looking at a wide selection of 
variables in populations in the real world, it is not possible to be more than 
tentative in these predictions. For example, it can be argued that if females 
show less improvement than males in an egalitarian environment, it may be 
that for females there is less of a difference in the environment. For females a 
significant level of male dominance in the home - likely to be common across 
all the towns - could mute the egalitarian effect for the females as opposed to 
the males, for whom the working envirom-nent may be more salient. 
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4.2. STUDY DESIGN 
4.2.1. Populations 
The main goal was to find a population which was living in a relatively 
egalitarian social environment, and had done so for several decades, and to 
compare the population of that town with controls. Imola -a town of some 
60,000 people, approximately 30 km Southeast from Bologna in Northern 
Italy, was chosen because it was believed to have the highest proportion of 
co-operatives in Italy (Earle 1986, Oakeshott 1990a), and probably in Europe 
after Mondragon in Spain (Oakeshott 1990b). Mondragon was considered as 
an alternative site for this study, but it was felt that Mondragon's relative 
isolation in the mountains of the Basque region, and the fact that it is 
associated with an unusual set of social-support institutions, would make 
controls hard to identify. As a result, Imola would provide a clearer and more 
general test. 
The second task was to find a control town or towns for comparison. 
The target here was to find towns that were approximately the same size, a 
similar distance from a city, clear of the coast (to avoid the influence of the 
tourist industry), equally industrialised and as close as possible 
geographically, politicallyand culturally. 
Two towns were chosen, bracketing Imola in population size and 
geography: Sassuolo, which is smaller (approx. 40,000) and slightly further 
away (about the same distance on the other side of Bologna, although closer 
to its nearest city, Modena, at about 15 km) and Faenza, which is larger 
(approx. 80,000), very close to Imola, (about 12 km further away from 
Bologna), and some 25 km from Ravenna, its nearest city, which is on the 
coast. Both ýontrol towns are in the same province as Imola and both appear 
equally prosperous and industrialised to a broadly similar degree. 
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In addition, the search for mortality statistics revealed a detailed study 
conducted by the health authorities in Ferrara. Ferrara is a city a little more 
than double the size of Imola - with a population of approx. 136,000 - situated 
some 55 km to the North. Apart from its size, it fits four of the criteria for 
comparison: it is in the same political province and the same geographical 
area, it is similarly industrialisedand it is not near the coast. 
Since Imola also provided data on deaths by age and sex, the specific 
prediction could be tested that males would benefit more than females from 
living in an egalitarian environment. Ferrara's mortality data were only 
discovered towards the end of the study, too late to include Ferrara in the 
questionnaire survey. 
The hypothesis covered a wide variety of variables in five main areas: 
health, education, crime, social participation and social environment. In 
addition, data on demographic variables were gathered to ensure that the 
populations were not significantly different on these background measures. 
4.2.2. Data from Published Statistics 
Published statistics were gathered as follows: 
Health: each town publishes statistics on mortality. In addition, local 
health boards were contacted to provide data. 
Education: public statistics were checked, and local school boards 
contacted. 
Crime: No data are published at the level of the town. The police and 
the carabinieri (which are separate organisations but which share 
responsibility for combating crime) were asked for data in each town. 
Social Participation Statistics on voting rates are publicly available, and 
the organisýtion which collects blood, AVIS, was contacted in each town. 
Social environment. No data were available from published sources. 
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Demographics. Statistics are published by each town, covering the 
population by age and sex, household size, employment, and other details. 
One national survey included Imola and Faenza on various measures, set out 
in the Results section below. 
4.2.3. Data from a Postal Survey 
The second source of data was a postal survey, described below. 
4.2.3.1 Questionnaire design 
Questions were taken from various sources, as foHows: 
Health: on the advice of Marie Johnston, Professor of Health 
Psychology at the University of St Andrews, the Italian version of the SF36 
(see Shiely et al., 1996; Tsai et al., 1997) was obtained from the Medical 
Outcomes Trust in Boston. There was room to use only the 12 questions of 
the abbreviated version, the SF12, which were not altered in any way. This 
questionnaire produces 2 scales, one for physical health and one for 
emotional health. 
The sections on Education, Social Participation and Social Envirom-nent 
were written from scratch. The Crime items were based on questions in the 
British Crime Survey (Chambers and Tombs, 1984). The Demographics 
section was designed to allow measures to be compared with the publicly 
available data. 
4.2.3.2 Sampleselection 
A representative random sample of addresses was generated from the 
telephone books in each town, using the most recent possible editions. To 
ensure the'most representative sample, the list of residential addresses in 
each town was divided into approximately 500 equal sections, and one name 
and address was selected at random within each section. Top-ups were then 
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taken at random from the whole list, to bring the number to exactly 500 in 
each town. 
4.2.3.3. Posted Materials 
500 envelopes were posted to each town in November 1998. 
A St Andrews University envelope, with an airmail sticker to ensure 
that it wotdd be noticed, was sent to each address, addressed only to the 
surname and containing the following materials: 
9a letter on official St Andrews University School of Psychology 
stationery, explaining the project, asking for co-operation, guaranteeing 
anonymity and giving instructions. 
* the questionnaire, on a single sheet of A4 paper, printed on both 
sides (Appendix 3). 
9a stamped envelope for the return of the questionnaire, addressed to 
the researcher c/oa not-for-profit organisation in Imola. 
4.2.3.4. The Questions 
The following summary gives the essence of the questions: 
The respondent was first asked to confirm that his or her answers 
could be used for this research. (This point was necessary to meet Italian legal 
requirements). 
4.2.3.4. A: Crime 
A. 1 Experience of crim : 
Since the beginning of the year, Jan lst 1998, in your town: 
has anyon6: * assaulted you? 9 robbed you? 9 assaulted you sexually? 
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* broken into your house? * stolen a bicycle belonging to a member of your 
household? * broken into a car belonging to a member of your household? 
" stolen a car belonging to a member of your household? 
" have you been stopped by the police or carabinieri? * have you seen a 
crime being committed, including vandalism? 
A. 2 Opinions about crim : 
* How much do you worry about crime: a lot/ little/not at all? 
* Alone at night in your town, do you feel: unsafe/fairly safe/completely 
safe? * Inside the family, do you think that husbands act violently towards 
their wives: never/ rarely/ sometimes/ frequently? * The police and 
carabinieri in your area work: well/neither well nor badly/ badly? * In your 
town crime is: growing/ steady/ decreasing? 
4.2.3.4. B: Health 
9 In general, would you say your health is: excellent/very 
good/good/fair/ poor? 
* Daily activities: does your health now limit you in the following 
activities, and if so, how much? (Categories for each answer: Yes, limits a 
lot/yes, limits a little/ no, does not limit) 
a) moderate activities such as moving a table, pushing a vacuum 
cleaner, bowling or playing golf? b) climbing a flight of stairs? 
* Physical health problems: in the past four weeks have you had any 
of the following problems as a result of your physical health: (yes/ no) 
a) accomplished less than you would like? b) were limited in the kind 
of work or other activities? 
* Emotional health problems: in the past four weeks, have you had 
any of the f6llowing difficultiesas a result of any emotional problems, such as 
feeling depressed or anxious: (yes/ no) 
a) accomplished less than you would like? 
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b) didn't do work or other activities as carefully as usual? 
* During the past four weeks, how much did pain interfere with your 
normal work (including housework): not at all/ a little bit/ moderately/ 
quite a bit/ extremely? 
* Energy and emotions: in the last four weeks give the answer closest 
to the way you have been feeling: (all the time/ most of the time/ a good bit 
of the time/ some of the time/ a little of the time/ none of the time) 
a) Have you felt calm and peaceful? 
b) Have you had a lot of energy? 
c) Have you felt downhearted and low? 
* Social activities: in the past four weeks, how much have physical or 
emotional problems interfered with your social activities: all the time/ most 
of the time/ a good bit of the time/ some of the time/ a little of the time/ 
none of the time? 
4.2.3.4.0 Education 
C-1 Experience of Education 
9 How old were you when you finished studying: age: ... 
/still 
studying? 9 What was the highest educational level you reached: 
elementary/ middle/ "superiore"/ professional/ degree/ postgraduate/ 
adult/ other? * When you were at school, did you play truant: never/very 
rarely/ sometimes/ often? * Have you had training since leaving school? 
C. 2 Opinions aboUt Educati! 2n 
* Nowadays, do you think that young people play truant: never/ very 
rarely/ sometimes/ often? * How important is education for happiness: 
very/fairly /not very/not? 
I 
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4.2.3.4. D: Voluntary Organisations 
* Are you a member of a voluntary organisation? If yes: how many? 
* In the last four weeks, how much time have you spent on activities of 
voluntary organisations: none/less than one hour/1-3 hours/4-8 hours/ 9 
hours or more? * Are you a member of a committee in one of the 
organisations'you belong to? If yes, how many? 9 What motivates you to 
belong: duty/ to help others/ to make friends/ to have fun/ to learn/ other 
4.2.3.4. E: General Information 
* Age. s Sex. 9 Married/ umnarried but living together/ separated or 
divorced/ single/ widowed or widower/other. e Town of residence. * Time 
you have lived in your town: less than one year/ 1-5 years/ 6-10 years/ 11-20 
years/ over 20 years. * Number of people in your household. * Number in 
the following age brackets: under 16/ 16-60/ 61 or more. 0 Do you have a 
job: yes, full time/yes, part time/no, looking for work/ no, not looking for 
work/ no, pensioner. * How many in your household work? * Do you work 
in a co-operative? * How many in your household work in a co-operative? 0 
In the last week, how many times have you eaten "insaccati" (high-fat 
processed meats such as salami)? 
4.2.3.4. F: Social Environment 
Finally, some opinions about Iffe in your town: 
* If you have personal dffficulties, how many people can you turn to 
for help: many/ a few/ only one/ none? 9 In your town, is the difference 
between rich and poor: very big/ big/ not a big difference? # In your town 
are the authorities helpful: always/ usually/ not usually/ never? 
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4.3 Test. 
The aim was to construct a table of measures of all these factors so that 
a sign test could be carried out identifying whether there were consistent 
differences between the populations. 
In decidingwhen to treat scores as having a sign difference worthy of 
inclusionin a sign test two levels of difference were examined: 
1. a simple sign difference of any magnitude 
2. a sign dffference of at least one standard error of the mean. These 
are referred to as "starred" differences, and marked with an 
asterisk * in the tables. 
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4.3 RESULTS 
4.3.1 Questionnaire Responses 
500 questionnaires were sent to each of the three towns. Some were 
returned by the postal service for a variety of reasons, mainly death or "no 
longer resident here". The response rates were low, as shown in Table 4.1: 
Not Delivered Delivered Completed Cml2ltd % Deliv, 
Imola: 11 489 73 14.97o 
sassuolo: 38 462 49 10.6% 
Faenza- 497 
-- 
85 
Total 50 1450 207 14.37o 
The relatively high number not delivered in Sassuolo may have been associated 
with thefact that the telephone book Was older thatt thosefrom littola and Faenza. 
4.3.2. Demographic Comparisons 
Demographic comparisons were made between the questionnaire 
samples and published data to check whether the age and household-size 
distributions of the questionnaire respondents were typical of the underlying 
populations. 
Looking first at the total populations of the three towns, in the age 
range chosen (16 and over for the samples; 15 and over for the populations) 
the age distributions were similar, as shown by Figure 4.1, but Sassuolo had 
fewer old people, giving an average age in this range of 44.7 against 48.1 for 
hnola and 48.7 for Faenza. 
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Fig 4.1 Age Distributions 
Population Age 
Distributions 
Imola 
13 Sass 
13 Faenza 
Sassuolo has a sliglitýy younger population. "<20" = "15-19". 
Comparing the samples with their populations, Fig 4.2 shows that the 
Imola sample greatly under-represented the proportion of people aged 60 or 
more. 
Imola: Age dist'n: 
Population vs Sample 
40.0 
30.0 
20.0 
10.0 
0.0 
Population 
13 Sample 
C) 0 IA 
This Oroved to be characteristic of all three samples - with an additional 
over-representation in the 30's - as shown in Figs 4.3 and 4.4. 
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- 
Fig 4.3. Sasstiolo: Rol2ulation vs sample age distribution 
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For making comparisons simply between the samples, there were two 
important differences between the three samples, which are shown in Fig 4.5. 
These are that Imola had a lower proportion of people in their 30s and 
Sassuolo a lower proportion age 60 or more. Correlations showed that those 
in their 30s were more likely to be in work, and those over 60 to have poor 
physical health and narrow social networks. An imbalance in these age 
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groups could thus distort comparisons on these measures between the 
samples. 
Sample Age Distribution 
3 
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25 
it 20 
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c0000 
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The nwjor imbalatwes between the samples are highlighted: Imola's lout proporti . oil Of 
people in their 30s, and Sass itolo's loup proportion of people age 60 and over. 
Comparisons by household size showed that there was an under- 
representation of one-person households in Imola (W(" of the sample vs. 
23.57o of the total) and Sassuolo (2(yo of the sample vs. 221yo of the total). No 
comparative data were available for Faen; -.,, 
but with one-person households 
making up only 13% of the Faenza sample - less than Imola's - it was safe to 
assume a similar under-representation. Members of one-person households 
were more likely to report being older; having received more training; and 
having lived in their towns for a shorter time than average. 
In viýw of these disparities between sample and population, and 
between sample and sample, it was decide to focus on comparisons between 
sub-samples matched by age and sex. 
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4.3.3. Matched Samples. 
Two sets of matched samples were prepared, matching by age and sex. 
It was possible to match 44 (23 male, 21 female) of the 49 Sassuolo 
respondents with same-sex respondents from each of the other two towns, 
allowing up to 4 years difference in age, but with 94% of all pairs within two 
years of each other. In addition, 56 same-sex respondents from Imola and 
Faenza were matched (29 male, 27 female) with an age difference of no more 
than two years per pair (597o identical; 277o with one year's difference and 
147o with two years' difference). The distribution of the differences between 
the ages is shown in Table 4.2, the mean ages in Table 4.3 and the age 
distribution in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.2-freguencies Of the gge differences in the matched samules 
Age Difference; -3- -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
Imola-Sassuolo (N--44) -23 22 791- 
Faenza-Sassuolo (N=44) 177 17 83 
Imola-Faenza (N=44) 56 15 11 232 
Total N=44 1 14 16 54 26 14 52 
Imola-Faenza (N=56) -45 33 10 4 
The tighter distribution of the larger sample reflects the lower complexity of matching across t7vo 
samples rather than three. 
Table 4.3. 
-Mean ages 
N=44 
Imola 38.5 
Sassuolo 38.0 
Faenza 38.1 
N-=-56- Total Sam PoRulation 
39.9 43.2 48.7 
38.5 44.7 
39.9 41.7 48.1 
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Table 4.4. A ce distributio n by ag e band in the W atched samples 
N=44 Teens 20s 30S 40s 50s 
- 
60+ 
Imola 1 9 14 11 8 1 
Sassuolo 1 9 16 11 6 1 
Faenza 1 9 15 11 7 1 
N=56 
Imola 2 14 15 9 10 6 
Faenza 2 14 15 10 9 6 
Relative to the populations, these age band proportions are all 
characterised by over-representation of the 30s and under-representation of 
the over 60s, so the exact quanta of the variable scores may not accurately 
reflect the underlying populations; however, differences between the samples 
may reasonably be expected to reflect differences between the underlying 
populations, in the dependent variables to be investigated. 
4.3.4. Correlations Between Dependent Variables 
In the total sample there were 207 data points for each variable, (73 for 
Imola, 85 for Faenza and 49 for Sassuolo). The critical correlation coefficient 
(p<0.05) was r=0.137 (N = 207, t=1.97). In the matched sample of 44 from 
each town the critical correlation coefficient was 0.172 (N = 132, t=1.991). 
Most variables were scored by giving the most positive response ("Not 
very large"' in the case of the perceived difference between rich and poor) the 
top mark (3 in that case) and the least positive response ("Very large") the 
lowest mark (1). In this way the towWs sample's responses are reduced to a 
single mean score, which is higher in the "desirable" direction. So for 
example when the perception of a gap between rich and poor is greater, the 
score is lower, and when the expectation of domestic violence is lower, the 
score is higher. This scoring system enabled correlations to be calculated that 
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made intuitive sense, although the naming of the variables is Perhaps less 
clear than in the negative: "'serenity" about crime for the opposite of anxiety, 
"'domestic peace" for the opposite of domestic violence, "security from crime" 
for the opposite of crime victimisation. 
The correlation matrix for the total sample was first examined for high 
correlations indicating two variables measuring a single factor, rather than 
plausibly cause and effect. 
Six cases were identified. First, the two health measures (r--0.72). These 
were retained as separate variables, given that they have been verified 
independently (Shiely et al. 1996; Tsai et al. 1997). 
Second, those who had been victims of crimes against the person were 
also likely to live in households which had experienced crimes against 
property (r=0.321, N=132, t=3.864, p<0.001), so these two variables were 
combined into one, and to this were added the small numbers of people 
witnessing a crime. The resulting variable is a broad measure of any contact 
with crime: expressed positively, this was"'Security from contact with crime". 
Third, the measure of "worrying about crime"' was correlated with 
"feeling insecure when out at night" (r=0.42, p<0.0001). These were combined 
into a single variable, named in the positive "'Serenity about crime" - 
Fourth, the belief that the police were doing a good job was correlated 
with the belief that crime was not growing (r=0.288, p<0.001). It was also 
correlated with the belief that the authorities were helpful, but since the 
pattern between the towns was consistent for the first pair and not for the 
second, the first pair were combined into a single variable: "Confidence that 
Crime was under Control". The highest correlation between the three 
compound crime variables (Security, Serenity, and Confidence) was that 
between thý experience of being a victim of crime, and having a low level of 
confidence about crime (r=0.201, N=132, t=2.412, p<0.02); this was judged to 
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be likely to be a reflection of cause and effect rather than a double measure of 
a single factor, so no further combinations were created under "crime". 
Fifth, the variables "Age at which finished education" and "Educational 
level attained" were very closely correlated (r--0.769 in the total sample). 
There was a significant outlier effect on the age variable, which produced a 
reversal in the Imola-Faenza order between the two matched samples. These 
two were standardised and combined to produce a single variable: 
educational performance. 
Sixth, all three variables under "voluntary associations" (number of 
associations per member, time spent in the associations, and committee 
members) naturally correlated very strongly with being a member of a 
voluntary association. In view of this and the fact that the numbers involved 
were small, with no significant differences between the towns, the 
membership variable was taken as the sole one in this section. Nonetheless, 
for completeness the data are given for each question separately. 
In the presentation of these results, asterisks represent correlations with 
the following significance levels: no aSL g :5 'erisk =p<0.05; p: 0.01; p 
0.001; and (***) = p:! ý 0.0001. Generally the correlations were consistent across 
the samples, but where an asterisk is shown with a letter "T" e. g. (T**) the 
significance is that in the total sample only. 
4.3.5. Independent variable: Numbers working in co-operatives 
The variable treated as independent under the hypothesis being tested 
was the number of household members in employment who worked in co- 
operatives, shown in Table 4.5: 
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Table 4.5. Numbers EVaploygd alld Employ2d by Cooperatives 
Tot EMploved CO-012S % in co-opi 
Imola 63 16 257o 
Sassuolo 73 0 Wol 
Faenza 63 10 16% 
The significant difference in Table 4.5 (chi square 2 df = 19.84, p<0.0001) 
was driven entirely by the difference between Sassuolo and each of the other 
two towns, which were not significantly different from each other (chi square 
1 df = 1.212, ns). The percentages were consistent across the different sample 
sizes, as shown in Table 4.6: 
Table 4. fi. No, in Co-ol2s a s% of All Employed 
No in sample: U Zk Tot 
Imola 25 23 26 
Sassuolo 0 0 
Faenza 16 16 13 
Thus there is a gradient between the towns. Given these differences in 
the prevalence of co-operatives, by the hypothesis of the study the wider 
effects of egalitarianism should be shown most clearly by Imola and least 
clearly by Sassuolo, with Faenza in between. 
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4.3.6. Dependent Variables 
4.3.6.1. Social Environment 
1.1, The similarity between rich- and 12oor perceived by respondents 
A), Score . The 
distribution of responses is shown in Table 4.7: 
lable 4. Z. Perceived Diff2rence betwCen Rich and Pgor 
Vely large LUg_e Not vely large 
Imola 1 20 23 
Sassuolo 15 22 7 
Faenza 1 25 17 
These results are in the same pattern as the numbers working in co- 
operatives: the very significant result (chi square 4 df = 31.81, p<0.0001) is 
caused entirely by Sassuolo being different from each of the other two, which 
do not differ significantly from each other. 
Again, there was consistency across the samples (with a higher score 
indicating a greater similarity) (Table 4.8. ): 
Table 4.8. MCan Scores: Percciyed-Similarity betlyegn Rich and Poo 
No in sample: JA a T-91 
Imola 2.50 2.51 2.44 
Sassuolo 1.82 1.84 
Faenza 2.37 2.44 2.43 
B). Corrglations. Several variables were correlated with this perception 
of a small difference between rich and poor: 
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a) Demographic: not living in Sassuolo (***), living in Imola (**), not 
being in the 30s or 40s, not being in work (*) and having one or more 
household members working in a cooperative, 
b) Social: seeing the authorities as helpful (**), and having good social 
networks; 
c) Crime: seeing domestic violence as less prevalent (*) and feeling 
confident that crime is under control N. 
Thus those who see a relatively small difference between rich and poor 
also report having family members working in co-operatives, and positive 
perceptions in social and crime factors. 
0, Sex differences. One of the predictions was that there would be a sex 
difference, with males showing greater sensitivity to this measure than 
females, and so showing greater improvement in the more egalitarian 
environment. The results in the total sample showed that in Imola, where the 
difference between rich and poor was small, males were more positive than 
females, with the correlation between the sex variable and this variable r=- 
0.119. (This r is not by itself significant, but the negative sign indicates that 
males - coded 1- are more positive than females - coded 2); in Sassuolo and in 
Faenza males are more negative than females (Sassuolo: r= +0.217 n. s. but 
positive sign; Faenza N= 85, r +0.254, t 2.393, p<0.02. Combining Faenza 
and Sassuolo: r= +0.197, N 123, t 2.2l, p<0.05). Imola's correlation 
coefficient is significantly different from that of each other town by the z 
transformation test (Cohen and Cohen 1983, p, 54, equation 2.8.5), (vs 
Sassuolo: z=1.765, p<0.04; vs Faenza: z=2.295, p<0.012). This means that in 
Imola, the most egalitarian town, the difference between rich and poor is 
rated as smaller by the men than the women; in the other two towns it is 
rated largeý by the men than the women, and the difference is significant. As 
predicted, the men appear more sensitive than the women to differences in 
tl-ds variable. 
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Figure 4.6. shows the scores by town, with the mean score represented 
by a column, and the line representing the standard error of the mean). 
Fi gure 4.6. Perception of an even distribution of wealth 
3.00 
2.50 
2.00 
iL 
0 
). 1.50 
A 
1.00 
0.50 
0.00 
The scores of Imola and Faenza are both significantly above that of Sassuolo. 
1.2 Social Networks 
A) Scores. The question here was: "If you are in difficulty, how many 
people can you turn to for help? ", with the distribution of replies in Table 4-9. 
Table 4.9. Social Networ6s: Nuwber of HelRers when in Difficulty 
-MULY. 
NP= 
Imola 19 23 1 
Sassuolo 17 21 23 
Faenza 19 21 22 
These differences are not statistically significant. 
I 
The order of scores was consistent across the samples, with some 
variation in the mean scores (Table 4.10). 
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Imola44 Faenza44 Sass44 Imola56 Faenza56 
Table 4.10. Mean Scores: Social Networks 
No in sample: JA a 121 
Imola 3.36 3.44 3.35 
Sassuolo 3.21 3.19 
Faenza 3.30 3.23 3.22 
B). Correlatio . Correlates of this measure were all constructive: those 
reporting good social networks also reported seeing the authorities as helpful 
(**), seeing less difference between rich and poor (*), seeing domestic violence 
as less prevalent (*), and believing education is important for happiness (*). 
Figure 4.7. shows the scores by town, with the SE intervals plotted. 
4.00 
3.50 
3.00 
2.50 
2.00 
1.50 
1.00 
0.50 
0.00 
Imola56 Faenza56 
The SE intervals for the scores on social neturrks myerlap, but the 
same progressi . on i. s ezn . dent: Imola > Faenza >. Sassuolo. 
1.3. Helpfulness of Authorities 
A). Scores. Authorities were judged to be helpful with the frequencies 
shown in Table 4.11. 
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Imola44 Faenza44 Sass44 
lable 4.11, Helj2fulness of Authorities 
Alwa)Ls Ljsulll)L Not Often Never 
Imola 4 18 19 2 
Sassuolo 0 14 26 3 
Faenza 0 14 26 2 
Viese differences do not reach significance (chi square 6 df = 10.31; a one tail test critical 
value is 10.64). Since the "always" and "never' categories have low ftequencies, giving 
expected values below 5 in more than 20% of the table, this table was collapsed into a W, for 
which the same result occurred (chi square 2 df = 3.99, vs. a one tail critical value of 4.61). 
It is Imola's view of the authorities as helpful which drives what 
difference there is in this result, producing the consistent pattern shown in 
Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12. Mean Scores: Helpfulness of Authorities 
No in sample: a 56 Tot 
Imola 2.56 2.52 2.48 
Sassuolo 2.26 - 2.27 
Faenza 2.29 2.37 2.41 
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The SE intervals show Imola clearly ahead of the other t7w towns. 
B). Correlatio . This measure was correlated with not living in a two- 
person household (*), living in Imola, having good social networks (**), seeing 
less gap between rich and poor and feeling that crime was under control M. 
Social Envirorunent: SummaU 
Table 4.13 shows the relative positions in pairs, using the N=44 sample 
for the Sassuolo comparison and the N=56 sample for the Imola: Faenza 
comparison. On all four measures Imola > Faenza > Sassuolo. 
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Table 4.13. Social Envilonme nt- Relative Positio ns 
lmola: sass ImolrFaenza F, 1en7a: ',;, 1SS 
Percent in co-ops 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0* 
Rich vs. Poor Difference 1: 0* 1-0* 1: 0* 
Social Networks 1: 0* 1: 0 1: 0 
Authorities' Helpfulness 1: 0* 1,, 0* 3-0 
Total 4: 0 4: 0 4: 0 
* This difference is equal to or greater than one standard error of the mean. 
4.3.6.2. Crime 
The questionnaire results relating to crime were as follows: 
2.1 Crimes against the 12erso (the individual respondent) occurred in 
small numbers (Table 4.14. ) 
Table 4.14, Crimea against thg Individual Respondent 
Assault Robbely Sexual violence 
Imola 010 
Sassuolo 121 
Faenza 
2.2 Crimes against 12rol2erty of any household members: 
The frequencies of crime against property in the last 12 months in the 
matched sample of 44 from each town are shown in Table 4.15. 
Table 4.15. Crimes against PropeEjy of Househol d Members 
Burs]= Bike theft Car enlry Car thýft 
Imola 4 14 82 
Sassuolo 497 
Faenza 2 16 51 
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On bike theft, it is perhaps relevant that road gradients are steeper in 
Sassuolo than in the other two towns, so that there may be fewer bicycles per 
household. 
2.3 Sight of Crime being Committe 
No-one in Sassuolo reported having seen a crime being committed. The 
frequencies are set out in Table 4.16. 
Table 4.16. Numbers Wilnessing a Crime 
Sample N: 44 56 Total 
Imola 466 
Sassuolo 0-0 
Faenza 56 
The scores for the compound variable expressed positively, as "'security 
from contact with crime", which incorporates the three victimisation 
measures given above, with lower contact giving higher scores, have the 
consistent pattern in Table 4.17. This variable does not distinguish severity of 
crime: an assault counts equally with seeing a vandal daubing a wall. 
Table 4.17. Mean Scores: Security from Cdme 
No in sample: 56 
Imola 6.55 6.45 6.49 
Sassuolo 6.50 6.47 
Faenza 6.73 6.63 6.60 
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Mean ± SE. Faenza's mean score is clearly higher than the other t7m, indicating 
that the Faenza sample had had less contact with crime. 
B), Correlations showed that those with more education and those over 
30 were more secure from crime; and that those who were more secure from 
crime were more confident that crime was under control (T). 
Respondents were asked to note if they had been stopped by the police 
or carabinieri in the last twelve months. The percentages stopped are ; et out 
in Table 4.18 and displayed in Figure 4.10. The Faenza police were the most 
active. 
This statistic can be interpreted either positively or negatively. It could 
be that the police are more constructively involved with the people in the 
town, or that they are hostile. Given the pattern of the "helpfulness of 
authorities" seen in figure 4.8, it is likely that this intervention is interpreted 
as positive rather than negative. However, there are no data to help decide 
the issue. 
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Table 4.18. % of respondents stoj2ped by police in 12 months 
No in sample: 44 56 191 
Imola 48 46 40 
Sassuolo 32 -- 33 
Faenza 50 45 46 
F igure 4.10. Police Activity Level 
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Police are most active in Faenza and least active tit Sassuolo. The reversal tit the 
linola-Faenza order between the two samples (N=44, N=56) suggests they a" sliffilar. 
The scale is 1+ the proportion of people stopped. 
B). Correlations established that females (T*) and those over 50 had 
been stopped less. 
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2.4, Serenitý about cHm 
A). Score . 
D Anxig-ty, Respondents were asked if they worried about crime and 
gave the distribution of responses in Table 4.19. 
Table 4.19. Anxiety about Crime 
WO= a lot WorQ! a little Do not %vo= 
Imola 17 17 0 
Sassuolo 25 19 0 
Facnza 20 20 2 
There are no significant differences. Imola's N=34 as this question was 
changed after a pilot, rendering 10 responses invalidfor the mainaitalysis. 
ii) Feelina Safe, The question how safe they felt going out alone in their 
town at night elicited the distribution of resPonses in Table 4.20. 
Table 4.2Q. Feeling safe whell out ajone at night 
Not safe Fairly safe Completely safe 
Imola 6 37 1 
Sassuolo 12 29 3 
Faenza 4 27 13 
These responses are significantly different (chi square 4 df = 21.12, p4.001). 
In Table 4.20, the Imola and Sassuolo responses are not significantly 
different from each other (chi square 2 df = 3.97, ns), but the inhabitants of 
Faenza felt significantly more secure than those of each of the other towns 
(chi square ý df = 12.25 vs Imola and 10.32 vs Sassuolo, both p<0.01). 
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Those who felt safe at night were also less anxious about crime (r--0.428, 
N=132, t=5.399, p<0.0001), so these two variables were combined into one, 
expressed positively as "Serenity about Crime" (Table 4.21 and Figure 4.11). 
Table 4.21. Serenity about Crime 
No in sample: 44 ý% Tot 
Imola 1.68 1.68 1.65 
Sassuolo 1.61 -- 1.59 
Faenza 1.89 1.90 1.87 
Figure 4.11. Serenity about Crime 
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This graph shows Faenza clearly more tit ease about crime. 
B). Correlatio showed that those who were more serene about crime 
were likely to be male (***), to live in Faenza and not Sassuolo (*), to believe 
that children currently did not play truant frequently (*), to be a member of a 
voluntary society, to be in good physical health and to eat less salami-type 
foods. 
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2.6 Confidence that Crime is Under Control 
A). Scores. 
J) Police performance. They were next asked whether they felt the 
police were doing a good job, which brought the responses in Table 4.22. 
Table 4.22. Police Performance, 
. LO-Qd 
Neutral L-Ld C 
Imola 16 25 3 
Sassuolo 11 28 5 
Faenza 19 24 1 
ii) Growth in Crime. Responses to the question whether they believed 
crime was growing had the pattern in Table 4.23. 
Table 4.21 Growth in C 
Growine Steady Decreasine 
Imola is 24 2 
Sassuolo 28 15 1 
Faenza 10 25 7 
As seen above, those who felt that crime was not growing also tended 
to believe that the police were doing a good job (r--0.352, N=132, t=4.288, 
p<0.0001), so these two measures were combined into a single variable, 
"Confidence that crime was under control" (Table 4.24 and Figure 4.12). 
Table 4.24. Confidence that-Crime was under CSIntrol 
No in sample; Ii ak 121 
inýola 1.97 1.96 1.95 
Sassuolo 1.76 -- 1.80 
Faenza 2.15 2.17 2.15 
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Figure 4.12. Confidence that crime was under control 
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Faenza's inhabitants are clearly more confident about crinw.. 
B). Correlations. Low confidence about crime was associated with 
living in Sassuolo (**) and not Faenza (*), having been a victim of a crime and 
having had better education; also with seeing domestic violence as prevalent, 
a large gap between rich and poor, and the authorities as unhelpful. 
2.7. Domestic Peace (i. e. absence of domestic violence). The responses to 
the stimulus: "In the home, a husband acts violently towards his wife ...... had 
the patterns shown in Tables 4.25 and 4.26, and Figure 4.13. 
Table 4.25. Domegfic Violence resRunse fregue i, 
Never RarelX Sometimes Often 
Imola 11 13 16 3 
Sassuolo 5 23 2 
Faenza 8 12 22 2 
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Table 4.26. Mean Scores: Domestic Peace 
No in sample: 44 56 Tot 
Imola 2.74 2.70 2.63 
Sassuolo 2.46 -- 2.57 
Faenza 2.59 2.61 2.68 
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The order of scores is the same as that on the social environment measures. 
B), Correlation . Those who felt that domestic violence was relatively 
low also reported seeing little difference between rich and poor (*), having 
good social networks (*), being confident that crime was under control and 
feeling that children were playing truant less. 
Q. Regressio . Since domestic violence was the crime variable that was 
logically most clearly unaffected by any but the local culture; and since it was 
also predicted to be especially responsive to levels of frustration, themselves 
predicted to be low in a more co-operative culture; an additional exploratory 
analysis wa s carried out using multiple regression. 
The best independent variables for predicting a belief that domestic 
violence was infrequent were: 
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1. perceiving a low difference between rich and poor (individual factor 
p=0.013) 
2. having supportive social networks (factor p=0.014) and 
3. being male rather than female (factor p=0.047). 
The overall equation using these three IVs (N = 126 with 6 cases 
missing) only explained 10.5 'Yo of the variance (adjusted r squared = 0.105) 
but was highly significant (p=0.001). 
Crime: Summary 
Table 4.27 shows the summary results of the crime section, using the N 
56 samples for the Imola comparison with Faenza, and the N= 44 samples 
for the other two comparisons. 
Table 4.27. SUmmaLy of Relative Crime Sgorea 
Troola: Sass ImolaTilenza, Fa enz ji: 51 ss; 
Security from crime 1: 0 0: 1 1: 0* 
Police activity 1: 0* 1: 0 1: 0* 
Serenity about crime 1: 0 0: 1 1-0* 
Confidence crime controlled 1: 0* 0: 1 1: 0* 
Domestic peace 1,0* 1: 0 1-0 
Total 5: 0 2: 3 5: 0 
SE test: 3: 0 0: 0 4-0 
* The "SE test". i. e. the magnitude of the difference between means 
was equal to or greater than one standard error. 
Thus the overall pattern of results on crime is generally that Faenza has 
the most p6sitive scores, Imola the next and Sassuolo has the worst scores on 
all crime measures. The "co-operative"' pattern, Imola > Faenza > Sassuolo, 
appears on domestic peace and police activity. 
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4.3.6.3. Health 
A), Score 
On the health measures, the results had a different pattern. 
The scores on physical health and emotional health were highly 
correlated, but given that they have been independently verified they were 
left separate. The mean scores were as shown in Table 4.28a and 4.28b. 
Table 4.28a. Mean Scores: Physical Health 
No in sample: 44 56 Tot 
Imola 3.09 3.09 3.03 
Sassuoto 3.04 -- 3.05 
Faenza 2.91 2.93 2.94 
lable 4.28b. Mean Scores: Emotional Healtb 
No in sample: 44 56 Tot 
Imola 3.282 3.28 3.26 
Sassuolo 3.279 -- 3.30 
Faenza 3.06 3.10 3.08 
These scores are displayed in Figures 4.14 and 4.15. 
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Figure 4.14. P4sical Health. Mean SE 
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Faenza had the worst self-reported health, both physical and emotional. 
Sassuolo and Imola were almost identical in both, with Imola marginally 
ahead in * matched sample but behind in the total sample, where the 
difference in age spread between the towns had an effect. Independent t tests 
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showed that Imola was significantly better than Faenza in physical (t = 2.13, 
df = 71, p=0.037) but not emotional health (t = 1,56, df = 79, p=0.12 n. s. ) 
B), Correlations. Those reporting good physical health were more likely 
also to report being members of voluntary organisations. Those reporting 
good emotional health were more likely to be male (**), to be living with a 
spouse or partner (*) and to be confident that crime was under control N- 
also, in the total sample, to be members of voluntary associations (T*), to be in 
their 50s, in larger households and with good social networks. 
Table 4.29 sets out the relative positions on health. 
Table 4.29. Relative jpositiong on health 
Jmola: Sass Imola: FaeLjza, Faenza-Sass 
Physical 1: 0 1: 0* 0: 1* 
Emotional 1: 0 1. -0* 0: 1 * 
Total 2: 0 2: 0 0: 2 
* This difference is at least one standard error in inagnitude. 
TI-ds gives an order for this section of Imola > Sassuolo > Faenza 
4.3.6.4. Social Participation 
The scores in this section were affected by smaU numbers: in the N=44 
sample Imola had only 16 members of voluntary associations and each of the 
other towns had 15. There were no significant differences by any test. For 
completeness the results are set out below. 
A). Sýores. The proportions of respondents who were members of at 
least one voluntary organisation are set out in Table 4.30. 
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Table 4,30. % of saml2le in 1 or more volunta-ly oTganisation(s) 
No in sample: 44 56 Tot 
Imola 36 39 41 
Sassuolo 34 -- 37 
Faenza 34 29 31 
B). CQrrelation . Members of voluntary organisations were likely to 
have good physical health (T* and also in the total sample good emotional 
health, T*), to live in a large household (five people or more) W), to have 
played truant less and to be less anxious about crime. In the total sample they 
also reported more training (P), not working in co-ops and good social 
networks. 
4.2 The numbers of voluntary organissitions, to which each person 
belonged are shown in Table 4.31. 
Table 4.31. Number of voluntalygrganisations per gerson belo 
No in sample: 44 56 Tol 
Imola 1.50 1.91 1.77 
Sassuolo 1.53 1.45 
Faenza 1.53 1.38 1.62 
The difference between Imola and Faenza reverses between the nwtched samples, 
and is uncharacteristically great in the larger matched sample (Imola total 22 
members of 42 organisations and Faenza 16 members of 22 organisations), but it 
still does not reach statistical significance. 
In the N= 44 matched sample the frequency distribution of voluntary 
organisatiofts per member is shown in Table 4.32. 
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Table 4,32. Fregugncy of voluntaryas, -; ociations 12er member 
No. of orgs. 123 
Imola 10 42 
Sassuolo - 11 21 (+ I belonging to 5) 
Faenza 10 23 
Thesefigures are not significantly different. 
4.3 Time spent, The mean time spent on voluntary organisations per 
week, per member in each sample is shown in Table 4.33. 
Table 4,33. MeaLl hours on voluntaLy organisations ger week 
No in sample: 44 --56 
Tot 
Imola 3.2 4.2 4.6 
Sassuolo 4.5 4.3 
Faenza 4.7 4.3 4.7 
The lowfigurefor Iniola in the N= 44 matched sample is due to thefact that 
only 2 people in that sample spent over 9 hours a week-, vs. 4 itz each of the 
other towns -a simll sample size effect. 
4.4 Committee MeMbership 
In Sassuolo 5 respondents were also members of committees, and in the 
other two 4- again a small number for statistical analysis, In the larger 
sample Faenza stayed at 4 committee members, and Imola rose to 7. These 
numbers are too small to provide a basis for drawing conclusions. There was 
a reversal in the Imola-Faenza order between the two matched samples. 
In all , three towns the main reasons given for this involvement were to 
help others and to have fun. 
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Table 4.34 shows a summary of the results of the voluntary 
organisations section of the questionnaire: 
Table 4,34, Voltilitail Asseciations 
lmola: sass lmola: Faenza. Faenza-,,.; ass 
Member 1: 0 1: 0 0: 0 
Organisations/ member 0: 1 1: 0 0. -0 
Time spent 0: 1 0: 1 1-0 
Committees 0,1 1-0 0: 1 
Total 1: 3 3: 1 1: 1 
These rankings are inixed, and affected by synall nunibers, with scores venj close. 
4.3.6.5. Education and Training 
5-1j) Age d. 3yWch full timg education stopped. 
A). Scores. 
The mean ages reported are shown in Table 4.35. 
Table 4.35, Mean age at which full time edlication stoj2ped 
Sample N: 44 56 To ta I 
Imola 19.5 20.8 20.3 
Sassuolo 19.0 -- 18.8 
Faenza 20.5 19.7 20.0 
None of these differences, were significant Inj t tests. 77te strong reversal between 
hnola and Faenza on the two ritatched sainples indicates approxiinate equivalence. 
The reversal in the Imola-Faenza order between the two matched 
samples wýs influenced by an outlier: the top reported age in the total sample 
from any town was 38, with the next highest being 31, at the top of the 
continuous distribution. The age 38 response is included in Faenza's N= 44 
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7f; 
sample, but not in the N= 56 sample. However, excluding the top reported 
age in each town does not alter the ranking: Imola 19.2, Sassuolo 18.8 and 
Faenza 20.0. Faenza also had the two lowest outliers - age 6 and age 8: not 
included in either matched sample - the next age being 10 which started the 
continuous distribution. 
Figure 4.16 shows the mean age ± SE for the samples. 
Figure 4.16. Age at which full time education stol2ned 
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Mean age ±SE. linola and Faenza reversed positiOn in the larger tnatched samples. 
This strong sample effect dominates the more consistent differences in 
the next variable, educational level, to produce a reversal in the combined 
variable, educational performance. 
5.1. i ). Educational Levels 
A). Scores. 
The results for the N= 44 samples are set out in the following 
frequency table for the highest level of education attained (Table 4.36). 
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Table 4,36. Hii! he,,,, t level of education 
Elem. Mi d "Super" Prof Grad postarld 
Imola 23 23 861 
Sassuolo 4 10 17 373 
Faenza 18 23 543 
This table is "unsafe "for testing Inj chi square, in that many cells have N<5. 
Combining the adjacent columns gives the frequencies in Table 4.37. 
Table 4.37. Highest Educational Lgvel- Frequency, 5implified 
Elem, +Midd-- 'ý; -vwef 
'+Prof Grod+Postgrad 
Imola 5 31 7 
Sassuolo 14 20 10 
Faenza 9 28 7 
There is a significant difference between bnola and Sassuolo (chi square 2df = 7.15, 
p<0.025 I tail) but not between any other pair. Wilcoxon signed ranks tests on the data 
sorted in ascending order showed that Imola and Faenza were both higher Own 
Sassuolo, but with p=0.09 only, I tail. Imola and Faenza were not different (p=0.734). 
The scores are set out in Table 4.38. 
Table 4.38. Educational Qualifications 
Sample N 44 56 Total 
Imola 3.02 3.09 2.99 
Sassuolo 2.89 -- 2.80 
Faenza 3.00 2.91 3.01 
Thý top hvo are venj close in two out of the three saniples, 
with the N--56 looking aberrant. 
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B). Correlatio . Those with high educational qualifications were less 
likely to be over 50 years old (*) or in a large household or to be confident that 
crime was under control (*) but more likely to have been trained since 
finishing education. In the total sample they were less likely to have been the 
vicitm of a crime (T*), and more likely to feel that domestic violence is 
frequent. 
5. I. iii) Educational Performance. 
The combination of the age and level variables to give an "educational 
performance" variable required the standardisation of each one, given the 
very dissimilar scales. Adding two to the resulting scores to give a positive 
reading produced the graph in Figure 4.17. 
This is the combittation of the age at which full time education finiShed and the level of 
education attained. The reversal between the two sample sizes is due to the effect of the age variable. 
- -- ;_ 
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5.3 School Attendanc 
A). Score 
Respondents were asked how much they had played truant when they 
were at school, with four options, giving Table 4.40 for the N= 44 samples: 
Table 4.40. ,l jayed truLint when I wasat schgol 
Never V, Rarely Som2times Oftell 
Imola 21 14 90 
Sassuolo 16 14 13 1 
Faenza 21 17 4 
This gave the scores set out in Table 4.41 and the graph in Figure 4.19. 
T 
Sample N: iA 56 Total 
Imola 3.27 3.27 3.26 
Sassuolo 3.02 - 3.00 
Faenza 3.30 3.29 3.25 
71tere are no significant differences in these tables. 
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Figure 4,19. School Attendance (Mean score SE) 
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B). Correlatio . Females (T*) and members of voluntary societies 
reported playing truant less, and people in their 30s and 40s more, than 
average. In the total sample, those who said they had played truant more 
were more likely to have been stopped by the police in the last 12 months (T*) 
and less likely to be in work. 
5.4 Expected school attendance toda 
A). Sco - Respondents were also asked how often they believed 
children play truant today. Table 4.42 shows the N= 44 sample distribution 
of responses. 
Table 4.42 E; SlZgcted truangy today 
Never V. Rarely Sometimes Often 
Imola 03 28 13 
Sassuolo 2 27 13 
Faenza 4 31 8 
Scores were as set out in Table 4.43. 
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Table 4.43. Exi2ected School Attendance Today 
Sample N: 44 56 Total 
Imola 1.77 1.87 1.92 
Sassuoto 1.79 1.77 
Faenza 1.91 1.98 1.98 
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Mean score ± SE. Imola lws the lowest range. 
Here again Faenza is ahead of Imola and Sassuolo. Unusually, Imola 
has the lowest score. This is unexpected for what is essentially a measure of 
the level of trust that the population feels towards their children, which must 
count as a point against the hypothesis. 
B). Correlations. Females were more likely to feel that truancy today 
was high (T*), as were those who felt anxious about crime (*) and believed 
that domestic violence was relatively frequent. In the total sample truancy 
was felt to to be more widespread by people in their 40s (P) (parents? ) and 
less widespread by those over 50 (T*) (grandparents? ) and by those seeing a 
smaller gap between rich and poor. 
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5.5 Training 
A). Scores 
This was a binary choice: "have you had training since finisl-dng full 
time education? ". The response frequencies are in Table 4.44. 
Table 4.44. Training fre 
_. 
c leaving scbool 
J: rained hLol No Response 
Imola 23 18 3 
Sassuolo 16 23 5 
Faenza 14 25 5 
Imola reported a higher rate of training than the other two. The 
difference reaches significance against Faenza by a one tailed cl-d square test if 
the non-respondents are included as not having been trained (chi square 1 df 
= 2.985, p<0.05). The situation is slightly stronger with the N=56 sample: 
without adding the non-respondents, chi square 1 df = 3.27, p<0.05 1 tail. 
The percentages are set out in Table 4.45, and scores in Figure 4.21. 
Table 4.45. Percent of Sajnl2le Trained 
Sample N: 44 56 DO) 
Imola 56 53 56 
Sassuolo 41 42 
Faenza 36 33 39 
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Figure 4.21. Training. mean scores tSE 
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B). Correlations. Respondents were more likely to have had training if 
they were older (**), better educated, and a member of a voluntary 
organisation (*). In the total sample they also felt that truancy now was not 
widespread. 
5.6 Education and Happiness, 
A). Scores. The question was included whether education was 
important for happiness. The N= 44 distribution of answers is in Table 4.46. 
Table 4.46. T 
Imola 
he imlRortanc 
VeU 
13 
e of education f 
Ouite 
20 
or hap ' 
Not veU 
7 
Not 
4 
Sassuolo 17 23 1 3 
Faenza 12 23 7 2 
This gave the scores set out in Table 4.47 and graphed in Figure 4.22. 
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Table 4.47. Education for HaRginess: Scores 
Sample N: 44 56 Total 
Imola 3.00 3.02 3.03 
Sassuolo 3.23 -- 3.27 
Faenza 3.02 2.91 3.00 
There are no significant differences in this table. 
4.00 
3.50 'A 
do 
FL 3.00 
AL M 2.50 
!v 
c 2.00 
1.50 
z 
1.00 
0.50 
0.00 
Sassi, wlo stands out as having morefaith in education than the other t7m. 77te reversal 
Between I'mola and Faenza indicates approximate equality. 
B). Correlations. The only correlate of believing education to be 
important for happiness was having good social networks (*). 
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Education- Summary 
Table 4.48 summarises the relative positions on education 
Table 4.48. Education Summaly: Relative Positions 
lrnola. ý, lss lmolaFaenza F, ý en za - 5,1 ss 
N=44 bl=96 N=44 
Education: Performance 1: 0 0: 0 1: 0 
School Attendance then 
School Attendance now 
Training 
Education and happiness 
Total 
SE test 
1: 0* 0: 1 1: 0* 
0: 1 0: 1* 1: 0* 
1: 0* 1: 0* 0: 1 
0: 1 1: 0 0,1* 
3: 2 2: 2 3: 2 
2: 1 2: 1 
* Where the SE test applies (higher mean zýt lower inean+ SE) the score 
is marked with an astetisk. 
This gives an order for this section of Imola. > Faenza > Sassuolo. This is 
the same order as that for the proportion working in co-operatives. 
4.3.7. Questionnaire Summary Analysis 
The null hyp6thesis is that there should be no significant pattern of 
differences between these towns in the various measures examined: any 
differences should be random, once correlated variables have been combined. 
Table 4.49 draws together the mean scores listed above from the two sets of 
matched samples, and Table 4.50 sets out the overall relative positions. 
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Table 4.48. Ouesti! 2nna ire Score s: Sum maM 
N= 44 N= 56 
Imola Faeri7a Sassuolo Imol'i Faen7a 
Rich vs. Poor 2.50 2.37 1.82 2.51 2.44 
Social Networks 3,36 3.30 3.21 alý 3.23 
Authorities Helpful 2.56 2.29 2.26 2.52 2.37 
Security from Crime 6.55 6.50 6.45 6.63 
Police Activity 48 32 46 45 R 
Serenity re. Crime 1.68 1,89 1.61 1.68 1,90 
Crime Confidence 1.97 2,15 1.76 1.96 2.17 
Domestic Peace 2,74 2.59 2.46 2.70 2.61 
Physical Health 3,09 2.91 3.04 3.09 2.93 
Mental Health 12L2 3.06 3.279 3.28 3.10 
Member of Vol. Society ak 34 34 39 29 
Education 2.02 2.11 1.88 Ill 1.88 R 
Attendance at School 3.27 3,30 3.02 3.27 3.29 
Attendance Now 1.77 1-92L 1.79 1.87 1,98 
Training % -35 41 53 33 
Educ'n/ Happiness 3.00 3.02 '3_ 0 2.91 R 
Total N W12 scores. 871 11 5 
Top scores are underlined. "R" indicates that the order of scores has reversed between Intola 
and Faenza in the N=44 and N=56 samples, implying approximate equivalence. 
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Table 4.50, Relative Posi tions on e ach variable 
Imola-'s'Iss Imola: Fýien7il Fienza-Sass 
(N=44) (N=56) (N=44) 
Rich vs. Poor 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0* 
Social Networks 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0 
Authorities Helpful 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0 
Security fromCrime 1: 0 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Police Activity 1: 0* 0: 0 R 1: 0* 
Serenity re. Crime 1: 0* 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Crime Confidence 1: 0* 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Domestic Peace 1: 0* 1: 0 1: 0 
Physical Health 1: 0 1: 0* 0: 1* 
Mental Health 1: 0 1: 0* 0: 1* 
Member of Vol. Society 1: 0 1: 0* 0: 0 
Education 1: 0* 0: 0 R 1: 0* 
School Attendance 1: 0* 0: 1 1: 0* 
School Attendance Now 0: 1 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Training 1: 0* 1: 0* 0: 1 
Education & Happiness 0: 1* 0: 0 R 0: 1 
Totals All Scores 14: 2 8: 5 11: 4 
Totals SE test 10: 1 7: 4 8: 3 
* Where the SE test applies (higher inean -- lower mean+SE) the score 
is marked with an asterisk.. "R" indicates that since there is a reversal 
between the N=44 and N=56 samples from linota and Faenza, their scores 
are counted as equal. 
Coml5aring overall scores by the sign test Imola is significantly higher 
than Sassuolo both overall (p<0.005,1 tail) and on the SE test (p<0.025,1 tail) 
but none of the other differences in totals are significant. 
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Since the arithmetic means of the scores are arbitrary measures, and in 
different units, the scores were standardised and the towns compared in pairs 
using Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Imola's scores on the whole N=44 table are 
significantly higher than Sassuolo's (N = 16, W= 11, p<0.025, I tail) but not 
Faenza's (W=58), and Faenza's are not quite significantly higher than 
Sassuolo's (W = 33 vs critical 30). Comparing Imola. and Faenza using the N= 
56 sample scores also gives no significant difference (Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test, N= 16, W= 42, n. s). 
Finally, to avoid over-weighting any particular category of question, 
since the different categories have different numbers of questions (Social 
environment 3; crime 5; health 2; voluntary associations 1; education 5), if the 
scores are first evaluated by section to give a single point per section, Table 
4.51 results. 
Table 4.51. Relative nositions by section 
IMS? 10: sflsstlolo 
Health 1: 0 
Education 1: 0 
Crime 1: 0 
Vol. Associations 1: 0 
Social Environment 
Total 
lmol, i: Faej]z Faenza-, Sassuolo 
1: 0 0: 1 
0: 1 1: 0 
0: 1 1: 0 
1: 0 0: 1 
1: 0 1: 0 
-1-, 
0 
5: 0 3: 2 3: 2 
By this test again the only significant difference is that between Imola 
and Sassuolo (Sign test p<0.05). These questionnaire results will be discussed 
further in the Discussion section. 
I 
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4.3.8. Public Statistics 
: Fhe second source of data consisted of the sets of statistics published by 
the authorities and other organisations in the towns and the cities covering 
their areas. The main statistics targeted were Demographics, Crime, 
Mortality, Voting and Blood donation. 
4.3.8,1 Crim 
Only the Imolese officials provided data on crime. Even with the active 
help of a local person, it proved impossible to persuade the police or 
carabinieri in the other two towns to co-operate with this research project. 
From both the police and the carabinieri in Imola there was a clear view 
that outsiders played a significant part in the criminal activity in Imola, and 
in all these Northern towns. 
Taking the police first, a sample of 20 consecutive arrests from the 
"day-book" for 1997 in the police headquarters in Imola was examined. Of 
those arrested, only nine were Imolese and of these nine, three came 
originally from the South of Italy. Analysed by origin, the 20 included 8 from 
Southern Italy, 6 from Imola, 4 from North Africa, and 2 from other countries. 
Three of the 20 were local drug addicts: drug addiction was said to be the 
single biggest cause of crime, that too was said to be caused by incoming 
drug pushers. 
Secondly, the carabinieri in Imola said that from examining their 
records they believed that most robberies were committed by people from the 
South of Italy; thefts by foreigners from further afield; and only shoplifting 
was characteristically committed by locals, mainly elderly people. 
Thirdly, it was also clear that the people of Imola believe that a very 
large proportion of the crime in the whole area is committed by outsiders: in 
1997 107 (307o) of the 356 people reported to the police as having committed a 
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crime were foreign residents; on 10th Oct 1996 there were 761 foreigners 
resident in Imola, only 1.2% of the population. 
4.3.8.2. Demographic- easures 
Most of these measures have been reported in the section comparing 
the survey samples with the populations. In addition, a national survey of 
medium sized towns was identified, carried out by ISTAT, the Italian national 
bureau of statistics, in 1991. This compared data on various measures from 67 
towns, including Imola and Faenza but not Sassuolo. Imola was rated as 
having fewer cars per 1000 inhabitants than Faenza (576 vs. 590), and a 
smaller percentage of those cars over 2000 cc in engine volume (3.0% vs 3.51yo: 
over the whole of Italy the range was 2.87o to 6.27o, so both are towards the 
lower end of the range). Imola also had a higher average house price (by 
4.77o) and more liquid resources per person (by 0.97o) but used 6.87o less 
electricity per person, had a much larger average school class size (35.2 vs 
21.7) and fewer pharmacies (3927 people per pharmacy vs 3859). 
One other demographic comparison is worthy of note. Marriage can 
take place in church or in a civil ceremony. Data were obtained for the 11 year 
period 1985 to 1995 on the marriages in Imola and Sassuolo. Table 4.52 gives 
the data showing that Imola with 257o civil marriages is significantly more 
secular than Sassuolo with 187o. One implication is that Imola's generally 
more positive scores than Sassuolo's are not driven by a religious culture. 
aurd, -QLV-d 
Sassuolo 1285 287 
Imola 2213 720 
This is a significant difference (chi square I df = 22.98, p<0.0001). 
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4.3,8.3, Mortality 
Data were collected on mortality from the three towns and in addition a 
detailed study on mortality by the city of Ferrara was obtained. 
Mortality data sets differed among the three towns. For Imola, 
mortality rates by 5-year age band (e. g. aged 50-54, aged 55-59 etc. ) were 
provided for six years (1990-1995). 
For the same six years Sassuolo provided the age breakdown of the 
population, and the overall mortality rate, but not the mortality rate by age 
band. 
From Faenza it proved possible only to obtain the overall mortality 
rates, and only for four of these years: 1991, and 1993-5. Again the population 
breakdown was provided, but not the mortality by age band. 
To make comparisons, the mortality rates by age band from Imola were 
applied to the population by age band of the other two towns, and the 
resulting predicted mortality rates were compared with the overall actual 
mortality rates recorded. The results were as follows. 
31, Imola's MortaLty. The raw Imola mortality rate was increasing over 
the six-year period measured, as is clear from Figure 4.23. 
Figure 4.23. Imola Deaths. 1990-95 
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kt the same time the population remained nearly steady, moving frorn 
62,352 in 1990 to 63,699 in 1995, so that the rate increased from a low of 10.0 
per thousand in 1991 to 11.2 per thousand in 1995. The age structure of the 
population did not alter materially in this period. 
3.2. Mortality: Imola vs Sassuolo 
By contrast, the raw mortality rate in Sassuolo had no trend, and was 
lower than Imola's (Figure 4.24). 
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Overall mortality rates Der 100,000 
This IS (lie raw mortality rate in the actual popultitions, before the 
standardisation of the age profiles. 
Adjusting for the difference in age distribution, however, by applying 
Imola mortality rates per age band to the Sassuolo population, showed that 
Imola's mortality rates were lower on an age adjusted basis in all six years: 
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A Wilcoxon signed ranks test shaws this difference to be significant (W = 0, N=6, 
p<0.025). Pie differences in the last three years were smaller, as Imola's mortality 
rate rose. 
3.3. Mortality: Imola vs Faenz 
Using the same system on the four years for which data are available 
for Faenza shows that for 1991 and 1993 the projected deaths at the Imola 
rates are lower than the actuals, by 48 and 60 respectively, but in the next two 
years this reverses, and the actual rates are better than the projected by 20 and 
24. The artual deaths were 926,1006,927 and 955. This implies that the 
growth in the Imola mortality rate over this period has moved Imola. from 
being better than Faenza to worse than Faenza - not by as much as they were 
previously better, but nonetheless clearly not better overall. 
Thus, to the table of self-reported health differences taken from the 
survey can be added the mortality differences: Imola: Sassuolo 1: 0 (also by the 
SE test) and Imola: Faenza 1: 0 (but not by the SE test). There was no way of 
I 
testing the difference between Faenza and Sassuolo directly, given that 
neither town provided mortality by age band. 
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3.4, Mortality: Imola vs Ferrara 
The data from Ferrara enabled a comparison by sex. The hypothesis 
here was a) that mortality would be lower in Imola than in Ferrara, as in the 
other two towns, b) that the improvement would be better among males than 
among females and c) that the age gap between the sexes at death would be 
lower in Imola by comparison with Ferrara. 
a) Mortality Rates by town. 
The analysis was concentrated on deaths in 1994 and 1995 between the 
ages of 50 (when the death rate starts to rise beyond very low rates) and 74 
(above which the age distributions of the populations in the two towns are 
unknown, which makes comparisons unsafe). 
Fig 4.26 shows the mortality rates by sex by age band for the two towns 
over this age range. 
Imola vs Ferrara 
in -- 
13 imola Males 
13 Ferr. Males 
13 Imola Females 
LID Ferr Females 
For every age band above age 55, Imola's inortalihj rates are lower, 
for both rnales andjernales. 
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Figure 4.27 shows the differences by age band. Only for those in the age 
band 50 to 54 - when mortality is low - are the Imola rates higher, for both 
sexes. The difference is in all cases better for males than females. 
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The absolute difference in mortality between hitola and Ferrara is greaterfor males than 
females. Males appear to benefit rnore thanfemalesfroin the linola social envIrOnnient. 
b) Improvement by Sex 
Figure 4.28 shows the overall weighted average difference for the whole 
sample, age 50-74, with the proportions of each age band standardised to the 
mean across the two towns. The Imola male mortality rate at 13.7 deaths per 
1000 is 24% lower than that for the Ferrara males; the Imola female mortality 
rate at 7.9 deaths per 1000 is 17% lower than that for the Ferrara females. 
Imola vs Ferrara: 
Diff. in Mortality 
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Figure 4.29. Imola vs. Ferrara. 1994-5 Mortality by Sex. Age 50-74 
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Imola inale nwrtality rate is better by 24%, female by 17%. 
Taking the actual mortality rates in these age groups for 1994 and 1995, 
and standardising the populations by age band, it is evident that the 
predicted sex difference exists; Imola males appear to benefit even more than 
females from living in Imola (Table 4.53). 
Adj. Deaths: 94-95 Imola Ferrara 
Males 5516 17457 
Females 3173 9222 
Ratio 1.74 1.89 
This sex1town difference is statistically significant 
(chi square I df = 10.87, p<0.001). 
c) Sex difference in age gap. It was not possible to calculate the mean 
age at deatlý with any confidence, given that such a high proportion of both 
populations died in the top, open-ended age band (over 75): 631yo of all deaths 
in Imola, 5917o in Ferrara. However, it was possible to approach this question 
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by looking at the difference in each town between the mortality rates of the 
males and females. Fig 4.30 shows this difference, from which it is clear that 
in Imola age 55-69 male mortality rates are less different from the female rates 
than they are in Ferrara. So the data are to an extent consistent with the 
prediction: the age gap at death in Imola is lower than it is in Ferrara, until 
the age of 70-74, when it is identical. It also appears identical from age 75 
upwards, the age band in which most deaths occur, although given the 
unknown age distributions at this level no definite conclusion can be drawn 
from this. As predicted, the gap in age-at-death between males and females 
appears confirmed as lower in the more egalitarian town. 
Fig 4.30. Differellge between mate and female mortality rates by town 
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3.5. Cardiovascular Mortalijy 
Data indicated that the main factor behind Imola's lower mortality rates 
I 
was cardiovascular mortality. Imola published data on death by age by cause 
for 1985, and Italy for 1984. For Italy as a whole, 85.3yo of all cardiovascular 
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deaths occurred at age 65 and upwards; in Imola, 85.5% of all cardiovascular 
deaths ocurred at age 70 and upwards. 
Data were obtained on cardiovascular mortality for 1993 for Imola town 
and for Sassuolo covering a wider area than the town. The data are set out in 
Table 4.54, showing that Imola's rate of cardiovascular mortality is 
significantly lower than that of the Sassuolo area. 
Table 4.54.1993 Cardiovascular and gther deaths: Imola and Sassuolo 
Imola 225 468 
Sassuolo (area) 399 543 
This difference is highly significant (chi square I df = 16.13, p<D. 001) 
3.6. Mortality and Diet. 
The control towns were selected to be geographically as close as 
possible to Imola, to give the maximum probability that there was no 
difference in diet. However, it was recognised that Sassuolo lies close to the 
main Italian centre of production of processed salami-type meats known as 
insaccati. A question was therefore included in the questionnaire to establish 
how often the respondents had eaten this food in the last week. The 
inhabitants of Sassuolo had eaten insaccati significantly more often than those 
of Imola. For the N=44 samples, the mean numbers of times per week were: 
Imola 1.64, Faenza 2.05 and Sassuolo 2.36 (Imola vs Sassuolo t= 2.18, p=0.032; 
Imola vs. Faenza t= 1.06, P=0.29 n. s.; Faenza vs Sassuolo t= 0.74, p=0.46 n. s. ). 
A difference in diet cannot therefore be ruled out as a contributory factor to 
the differences in mortality rate between Imola and Sassuolo. 
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4.3.8.4. Social Participation 
a) VQting Rates 
Comparing the two local elections of 1995, the voting rate for Imola in 
the election of 23rd April 95 was 87.417o of all those eligible. In Sassuolo, the 
rate in the election of 31.12.95 was 837o of those eligible. The difference 
between these rates is highly significant (chi square 1 df = 367.5, p<0.0001). 
No data were obtained from Faenza. 
b) Blood Donation 
Blood collection in Italy is voluntary and unpaid. The largest collecting 
agency by far is AVIS, who gave us their figures for the three towns. 
The members of AVIS represented in 1997-1998 6.62o' of the population 
in Imola, 2.77o in Sassuolo and 3.07o in Faenza. The two lower figures are 
significantly different from that of Imola (Imola vs Faenza chi square 1 df = 
950, P<0.0001). 
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4.3.9. Overall Summary 
Table 4.55 shows the complete picture. 
Table 4.55. Relative Bositi ons on each variable, including 12tiblic statistics, 
Tm ol, I: Sas2 Imola: Faenza Faenza: sass 
(N=44) (N=56) (N=44) 
Rich vs. Poor 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0* 
Social Networks 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0 
Authorities Helpful 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0 
Security fromCrime 1: 0 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Police Activity 1: 0* 0: 0 R 1: 0* 
Serenity re. Crime 1: 0* 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Crime Confidence 1: 0* 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Domestic Peace 1: 0* 1: 0 1: 0 
Physical Health 1: 0 1: 0* 0: 1* 
Mental Health 1: 0 1: 0* 0: 1* 
Mortality 1: 0* 1: 0 1: 0 
Member of Vol. Society 1: 0 1-0* 0: 0 
Voting 1-0* 
Blood donation 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0* 
Education 1: 0* 0: 0 R 1: 0* 
TruantatSchool 1: 0* 0: 1 1: 0* 
Truant Now 0: 1 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Training 1: 0* 1: 0* 0: 1 
Education & Happiness 0: 1* O: Q R 0: 1 
Totals All Scores 17: 2 10: 5 13: 4 
Totýls SE test 13: 1 8: 4 9: 3 
Where the SE test applies (higher ittean a lower inean+ SE) the score is marked 
with an asterisk.. "R" indicates a reversal between the N--44 an d N=56 samples. 
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By section, with the addition of voting rates and blood donation to 
voluntary associations to fill out the "social participation" section, Imola's 
position ahead of Sassuolo is reinforced (Table 4.56). 
Table 4.56. Relative lRositions by section 
fmolo: sassuolo ImolmRienvi Ffienza-Sissuolo 
Health 1: 0 1: 0 0: 1 
Education 1: 0 0: 1 1: 0 
Crime 1: 0 0: 1 1: 0 
Social Partn 1: 0 1: 0 0: 1 
Social Environ't 1: 0 1: 0 1,0 
Total 5: 0 3: 2 3: 2 
If Table 4.56 is re-cast using only differences of at least 1SE in 
magnitude, it remains the same, except for one change: Faenza's social 
participation moves ahead of Sassuolo's, so that the overall score between 
Faenza and Sassuolo becomes 4: 1. This changes nothing for the overall 
analysis. 
Thus, even by this rather blunt instrument, hnola is significantly ahead 
of Sassuolo, the least egalitarian town (sign test p<0.05,1 tail). Overall, the 
scores show that Imola > Faenza > Sassuolo, which is the same pattern as the 
proportion of people working in co-operatives and the perception of a 
relatively even distribution of wealth. 
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4.4. EGALITARIANISM IN A WIDER SOCIAL CONTEXT: DISCUSSION 
4.4.1. Sample Representativeness - discussion. 
The first question of importance is the representativeness of the 
survey respondents: are these samples representative or not? 
The demographic measures suggest that they are broadly 
representative, with three characteristic biases that are the same in all 
samples: the under-representation of single-person households, the over- 
representation of people in their thirties and the under-representation of 
people over 60 years old. 
It seemed best not to attempt to compensate for these biases by 
adjusting the weightings of responses in these categories; thus the equal 
weighting of each respondent is maintained. Given this acceptance of 
demographic bias, the comparisons made between the two levels of matched 
samples are secure as comparisons between the samples; but care must be 
taken in drawing conclusions about the implications for the underlying 
populations. It is reasonable to conclude that significant differences between 
the samples will reflect differences between the populations, since the same 
pattern appears in all three samples, and there is no reason to believe that the 
relationship between sample and population will be different from one town 
to another. But from this survey alone it would be unwise to conclude that 
the exact quanta of the differences will apply to the populations. Conclusions 
drawn from the survey must be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive 
in this respect. 
This caveat does not apply, of course, to the public statistics, which 
cover the whole population. 
I 
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4.4.2. Design - discussion. 
The approach of this study is essentially evolutionary in its hypothesis 
construction: the hypothesis is that living in an environment which is more 
egalitarian will lead to measurably better social-psychological characteristics, 
because an egalitarian envirom-nent is in important respects close to the 
envirom-nent in which Hoino sapims evolved - such an environment is the 
kind of social environment to which we are adapted. 
This does not imply that we are incapable of living in other social 
envirom-nents, nor that our genetic inheritance determines our behaviour 
without reference to the particular features of our environment. Clearly, 
human psychology has a high level of responsiveness and human behaviour 
is contingent on complex sets of cues, social as well as physical. 
The design of this study used the evolutionary model, which proved a 
fertile hypothesis generator, to formulate testable predictions. Tests showing 
that the predictions were not supported would count against the hypothesis 
and would suggest that human psychology is not tuned to egalitarian 
environments. But if the data are consistent with the predictions, it may be 
argued that other explanations may explain the data without invoking 
evolutionary theory. The theory itself was not under test, simply the specific 
hypotheses generated from it, but it may be argued that these same 
hypotheses could be generated from a different theory. 
For example, the specific prediction was made that male mortality 
would improve more than female mortality in a shift from a less egalitarian 
(Ferrara) to a more egalitarian (Imola) environment. This was based on the 
theory of parental investment, which has been well tested across the whole 
animal kingdom (Trivers 1972). This theory predicts greater competition 
among meiýtbers of the sex which invests less in reproduction. Building on 
the work of Symons (1979) and Buss (1974) who show that in humans males 
are judged by females on their social competence, including their ability to 
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gain physical resources and social status, a more specific prediction was made 
that a less egalitarian environment would be more distressing for males than 
for females. The prediction was confirmed at the level of p<0.0001 (Figure 
4.29). 
However even this test is only. indicative at this stage. The mortality 
data from Ferrara were only discovered after the survey had been carried 
out, so that the survey did not include Ferrara. There are therefore no 
comparative survey data for Ferrara, and so no independent confirmation 
that it is less egalitarian than Imola. And since mortality is affected by many 
factors, tl-ds result should be confirmed with all other known factors 
controlled. 
Moreover, it could be argued that it is possible that the difference in 
social environment may be greater for males than for females. Since females 
may experience domination by males as a common factor across all the 
towns, and since for males the working environment may be particularly 
salient, the data may be explained by differences in the degree of change 
experienced, rather than by a different degree of sensitivity to it. Only further 
work could differentiate between these two possible explanations. 
The design depends on the assumption that Imola's environment is 
more egalitarian than that of the other two towns, because of the prevalence 
of co-operatives there over a period of well over 50 years. There may be 
competing theories about why this set of social effects has arisen: the mayor 
of Imola expressed a personal conviction that it was the long history of 
domination by the Italian communist party with its excellent record of caring 
local goverm-nent which provided most of the explanation. However, since 
the first co-operative was formed in 1874, well before any communist party 
influence, ýnd since it had been imitated by many others by about 1900 
(Oakeshott 1990a), the roots of co-operation pre-date the party. 
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4.4.3. Results - discussion. 
The results of the survey confirm that over 25% of all employed in 
Imola are employed in co-operatives, approximately twice the proportion in 
Faenza, and that in Sassuolo, a negligible number of people work in ro- 
operatives. The basic design is therefore confin-ned as having been achieved. 
Within the five sets of measures that were examined, overall the predictions 
were confirmed, as demonstrated by the summary Table 4.55, repeated for 
convenience on the next page. 
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Table 4.55, Relative Posi tions on each variable, in cl tiding -12uhl 
ic stati'stic 
Imola: Sass Imola: Faenza 
-Faenza-Sass 
(N---44) (N=56) (N ---44) 
Rich vs. Poor 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0* 
Social Networks 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0 
Authorities Helpful 1-0* 1: 0* 1: 0 
Security fromCrime 1: 0 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Police Activity 1,0* 0: 0 R 1: 0* 
Serenity re. Crime 1: 0* 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Crime Confidence 1: 0* 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Domestic Peace 1: 0* 1: 0 1: 0 
Physical Health 1: 0 1: 0* 0: 1* 
Mental Health 1: 0 1: 0* 0: 1* 
Mortality 1: 0* 1: 0 1: 0 
Memberof Vol. Society 1: 0 1: 0* 0: 0 
Voting 1: 0* 
Blood donation 1: 0* 1: 0* 1: 0* 
Education Level 1-. 0* 1: 0 1: 0* 
Truant at School 1: 0* 0: 1 1: 0* 
Truant Now 0: 1 0: 1* 1: 0* 
Training 1: 0* 1: 0* 0: 1 
Education& Happiness 0: 1 * 0: 0 R 0-, l* 
Totals All Scores 17: 2 11: 5 13: 4 
Totals SE test 13: 1 8: 4 9: 3 
* Where the SE test applies (it igher inean >- lower mean+SE) the score 
is marked with an asterisk:. 
I 
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4.4.3. a) Perceptions of the social environment- discussion. 
It follows from the hypothesis that the most directly relevant aspect of 
the social environment is the perception of the difference between rich and 
poor. Although any psychological mechanism producing the beneficial results 
hypothesised could in theory act without affecting consciousness, a conscious 
awareness that the environment is egalitarian is likely to strengthen the 
psychological effect, so that this measure is particularly important. If the 
Imolese perceived their environment as less equal, that would be a strong 
piece of evidence against the hypothesis. By the highly significant cl-d square 
result on the table of responses, and by the fact that Imola's mean score is 
greater than Sassuolo's and Faenza's by the SE test, it is clear that the Imolese 
do perceive their wealth distribution as more equal than do the inhabitants of 
the other two towns. Faenza's score is also significantly higher than 
Sassuolo's. 
In this connection, it is worth recalling that the males in Imola were 
more positive than the females about the difference between rich and poor - 
the opposite was true of the control towns. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis derived from parental investment theory: in the egalitarian town 
the males appreciate that they are in an egalitarian environment, and so 
report being so to a greater extent than the females; in the other two, the 
males are sensitive to the inegalitarian distribution of resources and so report 
that more than the females. 
If this interpretation is correct, then it suggests that there may be a 
threshold effect: Faenza, with an intermediate level of perceptions of 
egalitarianism, may he below the threshold for this sex difference to occur. 
However, as previously discussed there is no way using these data of 
distinguishing whether this correlation is best explained by this hypothesis, or 
by another involving an intervening variable. For example, males were more 
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in work than females, and it could be that disparities in wealth are more 
evident in the workplace than in other situations. I 
The national survey which showed that Imola had among the lowest 
ratios of cars vAth an engine capacity over 2000 ccs is another indicative sign 
that the distribution of wealth in Imola has a different, more egalitarian 
shape. 
These measures should perhaps be considered, along with the greater 
proportion working in co-operatives, as additional confirmation that the 
design was succesfully implemented, rather than as separate dependent 
variables. 
Social networks and the helpfulness of authorities were both perceived 
by the Imolese more positively. This is consistent with the hypothesis, 
suggesting in Imola a beneficial effect both on intimate social circles - hence 
the difference in social networks - and on the wider life of their communities - 
hence their view of the authorities as being on their side. (It would follow 
from the hypothesis that the authorities are likely actually to be on their side, 
and that this is not simply a perception effect. No attempt was made to 
discern the extent to which the behaviour of the authorities really was 
different. ) 
So under perception of the social environinent one measure, the 
perception of less difference between rich and poor, confirms that the design 
has been achieved - Imola really is more egalitarian than the other two 
towns. The two dependent variables show the same order as the order for 
the proportion of people employed by cooperatives: Imola > Faenza > 
Sassuolo. 
4.4,3. b) Crhýie - discussion, 
The results from Imola show a huge disparity between the proportion 
of outsiders living in Imola, and the rates at which outsiders are reported to 
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and arrested by the police and carabiiiieri. The Imola officials believe that this 
is true also of all towns in this area. Even allowing for substantial prejudice, it 
would be unsafe to regard the rates of security from crime victimisation, and 
so of serenity and confidence about crime, as reflecting the local culture 
rather than strong outside influences. The implications of these crime figures 
and attitudes must be treated as uncertain. 
For example, Faenza's rate of security from crime vicffi-nisation is 
better than the other two towns by the SE test. Faenza's survey respondents 
also are more serene about crime (less anxious about crime and less insecure 
when alone at night) and feel more confident that crime is under control 
(believing that crime is not growing so fast and the police are doing a good 
job) than the inhabitants of the other two towns. These results could mean 
that Faenza's officials and citizens unite successfully to combat crime, which 
would be relevant to this thesis; or it could mean that the networks of 
criminals from outside the area have not yet targeted Faenza as intensively as 
they have the other two towns, which would render these measures 
irrelevant to this thesis. It follows from this that most crime measures from 
the survey do not provide good data to test the current thesis, wl-dch is 
concerned with the effects of differences in egalitarianism on the local cultures. 
There are two measures which merit further discussion: the rate at 
which inhabitants are stopped by the police and the expected rate of domestic 
violence. The view of whether the police are doing a good job or not is also a 
candidate, but should be rejected on the grounds that an increase or decrease 
in crime will affect it, regardless of the source of that crime. 
On police activity, it is clear from the survey that the police in Faenza 
and Imola (this is a case where the order of these two reverses between the 
two matchdd samples, so they are treated as equal) have more contact with 
the population than do the police in Sassuolo. This could be interpreted in at 
least two ways, with opposite implications: perhaps the authorities really are 
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more helpful, or perhaps the police are behaving more aggressively. No 
confident conclusion can be drawn from these data. 
On domestic violence, the assumption is that most domestic violence is 
committed by men, and the question was easier to phrase in those terms. The 
hypothesis is that men who come home content from work-, secure in their 
feeling that they are valued and involved and share in the benefits of success, 
willbe less likely to assault their wives than those who feel less wen treated. 
The results show the same order as with the first three: Imola is top, then 
Faenza and then Sassuolo. By the SE test Imola is better than both Faenza and 
Sassuolo. 
The question was phrased obliquely, to avoid the "When did you stop 
beating your wife? " syndrome and it could be argued that tl-ds makes the 
replies only approximately related to actual rates of domestic violence. This is 
a possible explanation for one sublety in the regression analysis. The variable 
which contributed most was the difference between rich and poor: this is in 
line with the current hypothesis - those who believe that there is less 
difference between rich and poor see domestic violence as less prevalent. In 
addition, there was a sex effect, which may best be explained as either a 
difference between the sexes in the threshold of what constitutes violence - 
any particular act is more likely to be perceived as violent by females than 
males - or a guilty conscience - males suppressing memories where they 
themselves were the perpetrators. Neither of these suggests any confusion 
caused by the framing of the question. However, the third factor, with a 
slightly greater effect than sex and just over half the effect of the egalitarian 
measure, was the level of education: those with higher education tended to 
see domestic violence as more prevalent. This would be explained if those 
with more ýducation tended to experience more domestic violence; or if they 
had read more about domestic violence; or again if they had a lower 
threshold for seeing violence than those with less education. It is impossible 
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to choose between these explanations on the basis of the data, so the 
possibility of ambiguity (i. e. the answers reflecting knowledge about wider 
society rather than actual rates of violence) cannot be discounted. However, 
the strongest effect remains the egalitarian measure, in line with tl-ds 
hypothesis. If Imola had shown a higher rate of expectation of domestic 
violence than the other two, this would have counted against the hypothesis, 
so this result may be regarded tentatively as supporting it. 
So the crime measures do not provide satisfactory data. Even the 
domestic violence data - broadly in line with the proportion of people 
employed in co-operatives: Imola > Faenza > Sassuolo - may have been 
confused by the phrasing of the question. 
4.4.3. c) Health. - discussion. 
By the SE test, both Imola and Sassuolo are better than Faenza on both 
scales from the survey. 
The mortality measures are partly consistent with that result: they 
show that Imola's mortality was significantly better than the other two in the 
early 1990's but by the mid-1990's rose to levels indistinguishable from the 
other two by statistical tests. 
The fact that the main driver of the difference was cardio-vascular 
mortality fits well with the work by Marmot (1991), who found that there 
was higher cardiovascular mortality among those lower in the hierarchy, 
even after controlling for all known causes, and by Wilkinson (1996), who 
pointed out that cardio-vascular mortality had reversed its class-related 
pattern in the mid-20th century, suggesting risk factors that were socially 
related. This suggests that the cardio-vascular system may be affected by the 
social envirýnment to a greater extent than the other physiological systems - 
The comparison of mortality rates by sex between Ferrara and Imola 
has been discussed above. 
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The conclusion suggested by these results is that the Imola 
environment may produce a positive effect on the health and mortality rates 
relative to the other two towns. The results further suggest that the mortality 
rate effect is primarily on the cardio-vascular system, but that that this effect 
is decreasing. One possible interpretation of this point is that the wider social 
environment may be undermining Imola's sense of solidarity, as happened in 
Roseto, Pennsylvania. Bruhn and Wolf (1979), discussed in Wiu&son (1996), 
found that the cohesive and egalitarian social system of the town from the 
1930s onwards was associated with very low levels of heart disease, but that 
this degenerated slowly during the 1950s and 1960s as more materialistic 
influences from the wider culture undermined the towns egalitarianism. In 
Imola, this is something which could be tested over time. 
However, it may also be that the data indicate a tendency for mortality 
rates to fluctuate over relatively shor periods of time. No data were found to 
decide the issue. 
The health results are not directly in line with the proportion of co- 
operatives in the towns, since Sassuolo is only slightly worse than Imola 
overall, and is significantly better than Faenza. This suggests either that 
Faenza's health is being affected adversely, or that Sassuolo's health is being 
affected positively, by an unidentified factor or factors. Professor Bruce 
Charlton has suggested that one possible confound is the level of wealth. 
Imola's mean financialwealth per head was greater than that of Faenza, and 
locals suggested that Faenza's economy may be slightly more agricultural 
than the other two towns. 
The self-reported measures of health show broadly Imola = Sassuolo > 
Faenza, and the mortality rates show Imola > Faenza > Sassuolo: the latter is 
the same ýattern as the co-operatives. Mortality clearly involves evolved 
physiological systems; so tl-ds result is consistent with the evolutionary 
perspective of this study. If further study confirms tlds effect, it would 
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suggest a policy implication: in order to lower mortality, authorities should 
encourage the spread of co-operatives and similarly egalitarian institutions. 
But it may be necessary to reach a fairly high threshold before this effect is 
produced. 
4.4.3. d Education- discussion. 
The results here show a n-dxed pattem. 
Imola's and Faenza's scores are clearly higher than Sassuolo's, except 
on one measure: the perceived importance of education for happiness. This 
last measure is ambiguous. The Sassuolo sample achieved the lowest 
educational qualifications, and yet gave the highest importance to education 
for achieving happiness. This may be purely related to a desire for what one 
does not have, but there may be further implications, in line with the current 
hypothesis. In Imola's relatively egalitarian environment there is the highest 
level of educational attainment, and subsequently the highest level of 
training. In addition, there is a more positive attitude towards the authorities. 
This cluster may be indicative of an underlying belief that the social 
institutions are "on our side". Under these circumstances there could 
paradoxically be a recognition that education is less important for happiness 
than is the fit with the wider, positive social environment - confirmation of 
that is suggested by the fact that Imola had the lowest proportion of higl-dy 
educated people: graduates and postgraduates. In Sassuolo, by contrast, with 
a less egalitarian and less constructive social environment, there could 
naturally be a greater emphasis on the need to build up one's personal 
resources, as an individual, in order to compete better against the others in 
that environment. However, since education and training are delivered by 
social institýtions, this feeling does not result in better actual performance - 
and may even result in a greater sense of loss, which in turn would contribute 
to the cardiovascular mortality. 
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Faenza does best on the measures of truancy. Imola and Faenza both 
beat Sassuolo by the SE test on actual truant played by respondents when at 
school; and Faenza beats Sassuolo and Imola (in that order) by the same test 
on expectations of truancy by children. This result is one of the very few that 
seem to run directly counter to the current hypothesis, wl-dch implies that 
social attitudes - such as trust extended towards children - should be highest 
in the most egalitarian town, Imola. This implies at least that the positive 
social effects are not driven uniquely by egalitarianism: there must be other 
factors at work as well - an unsurprising conclusion. 
In summary the education measures show the following patterns: 
Qualifications and training: Imola > Faenza > Sassuolo (the co- 
operative pattern) 
School attendance: Faenza > Imola > Sassuolo 
School attendance expected now: Faenza > Sassuolo, > Imola 
Happiness: Sassuolo > Faenza > Imola 
4.4.3. e Social Participation - discussion. 
The numbers in the survey were too small to draw conclusions except 
on the proportion of people who belong to voluntary organisations. This 
order was Imola > Faenza = Sassuolo. 
On voting, while the two elections took place some 8 months apart, 
they were both local elections governed by the same laws and should 
represent a fair comparison: Imola > Sassuolo. 
The public statistics also added blood donation (Imola > Faenza > 
Sassuolo) - the co-operative order. 
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4.5. CONCLUSION 
After the more ambiguous variables have been eliminated, the results 
described in this chapter give 14 main measures for comparing these three 
towns (two perception of social environment; two crime; three health; four 
education; and three social participation). 
Since these samples are small, and since each individual variable can be 
argued to arise from separate, disparate causes, the best approach may be 
simply to retain all the measures for the sign test, as originally planned. 
Taking this approach, whether one takes all differences of any magnitude or 
qualifies a difference only when it is greater than one SE, Imola, the most co- 
operative town is significantly better than Sassuolo, the least co-operative 
town, with Faenza in an intermediate position. This overall pattern is in line 
with the proportion of co-operatives, and with the size of the wealth-gap 
perceived within each town. This is consistent with the evolutionary 
hypothesis of this thesis. 
Because of possible ambiguities in some questions, and competing 
possible explanations variable by variable, only further work could establish 
whether these correlations are indeed due to an evolved psychology which 
flourishes in an egalitarian environment, or due to a disparate set of other 
influential variables. Given the clear pattern of these results, such further 
work seems fully justified. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINAL DISCUSSION 
CHAPTERS: FINAL DISCUSSION 
"If the doctrine of Evolution is trite, the inevitable implication is that Mind 
can be understood only by observing how Mind is evolved. "' (Spencer, 1870, p. 291) 
""The proposition that the human psyche has been shaped by a histonj of 
selection cannot reasonably be doubted, but just what this Proposition implies has 
barely begun to be explored. "' (Daly and Wilson, 1988, p. 7) 
Each section of this thesis has included a discussion of its own results. 
Here, the main findings of each section are discussed in the light of possible 
criticisms and alternatives. 
Section 1: The Evolutionary Perspective 
Section 1 set out the evolutionary perspective wl-dch lies behind the 
hypotheses and predictions tested. Since the approach taken is by no means 
universally accepted, some criticisms levelled at it, and its application in 
psychology, are now discussed, with reference to the specific research 
conducted for this thesis. 
In principle, evolutionary theory provides the key to the investigation 
of any biological system at the functional level. It answers the fundamental 
question of why a biological system is the way it is, and not some other way, 
and gives reasoned causal histories as to how it is likely to have come about. 
Evolutionary theory can also guide research on the proximate causes of 
specific behaviour patterns, by elucidating likely adaptations and suggesting 
Erdal: Ch. 5. Final Discussion. 180 
critical scrutiny of hypothetical mechanisms which would be unlikely or 
impossible to evolve. 
The psychology of the twentieth century has largely ignored this 
perspective. But the human brain, and the behaviour to wl-dch it gives rise, 
clearly constitute a complex biological system, which must logically be 
adapted to the environment in which it evolved. Since adaptations are 
designed to fit functionally relevant features in a persisting environment, the 
method used to generate testable hypotheses in my studies was to start from 
plausibly relevant aspects of the specific social environment to which the 
human organism is adapted - the small group of foragers - and then to 
predict psychological characteristics which in that environment would be 
likely to correlate with functionally effective behaviour. 
This approach is not a test of the theory of evolution, nor even of 
specific sub-theories such as parental investment theory (which, combined 
with the hypothesis that inter-male competition will be exacerbated in an 
inegalitarian social environment, led to the prediction that males should 
suffer more than females in an inegalitarian society); it is specific hypotheses 
and predictions derived from the theory that are tested. 
For example, if the data had indicated that males and females suffer 
equally from living in an inegalitarian social environment - falsifying a 
prediction made - this would not have undermined parental investment 
theory; it would have raised doubts about the hypothesis that an inegalitarian 
social environment exacerbates inter-male competition. It is the posited 
implications of the theory and the specific predictions made from them that 
are under test, and not the theory itself. 
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A significant problem in establishing an evolutionary psychology is 
that although its foundations go back to Darwinýs serious scientific effort to 
understand the emotions (Darwin 1872), it was developed by later 
practitioners into simplistic justifications for dubiously self-serving political 
attitudes, and has been seen as naturally associated with reactionary politics. 
An example is given by the great interpreter of the British constitution Walter 
Bagehot, who argued in 1872 that "'The strongest nation has always been 
conquering the weaker .... Conquest improved mankind by the intermixture of 
strengths. " (Bagehot 1872, p. 49). The debt to the theory of evolution is not 
direct, but the adoption of evolutionary thinking to justify imperialism was 
clear. Bannister argues that Darwin, Wallace and Huxley "supported the 
theory that nature provided no guide to ethics or social policy" but Spencer 
resisted this conclusion in his "'Synthetic Philosophy" (Bannister 1979 p. 9). 
However, the concept of Social Darwinism "first surfaced in the New Liberal 
writings of the 1880s as a weapon ... against laissez; faire and utilitarianism" 
(Bannister 1979 p. 10). It proved so successful a weapon that it remains today 
a potent influence against the adoption of an evolutionary perspective on 
human society. Nonetheless, Herbert Spencer's quotation at the head of this 
chapter (give or take precise details of formulation - it is hard to observe how 
something is evolved) is a view shared by most researchers in this field. 
After over a century of work on the theory of evolution, which has 
illuminated every comer of zoology and biology, there is now no necessary 
association between evolutionary science and any political position. 
From the left wing, Singer maintains the necessity of basing social 
policy on an understanding of evolved human nature, to help identify 
effective means to achieve social goals, and the probable costs and benefits of 
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specific policy initiatives. I-Es position is that any social policy to be effective 
must take account of evolved human nature, in order to avoid attempting the 
impossibly utopian, such as the Marxist revolutionary aim of transforming 
human nature by transforming social relations, and in order to recognise 
likely costs of implementation (Singer 1999). 
Tooby and Cosmides argue that evolutionary theory predicts that the 
fundamental complex adaptations cannot be subject to evolved local 
variations, since they would be in danger of being disrupted by any genetic 
alteration, and that this provides the strongest basis for positing the real, non- 
ideological psychic unity of the human race (Tooby and Cosmides 1992, p. 79) 
- dearly not a racist position, nor one that would support a fundamentalist 
religious view, nor necessarily a conservative political ideology. 
Some of the approaches taken by early evolutionary psychologists 
were too simplistic. For example, Ardrey argued mainly from analogy that 
there must be an instinct for aggression in territorial disputes, which is 
triggered in war between nations (Ardrey 1966). But others, such as Bowlby 
in his work on infant attachment, developed an approach informed by theory 
and made significant progress as a result (Bow1by 1981). This thesis has 
attempted to build on a proper appreciati., n of theory to explain patterns in 
the human psychology of sharing. 
A second criticism of the evolutionary approach is that it is 
reductionist: it attempts to reduce the full and glorious complexity of the 
human spirit to a set of inherited tendencies. In part, this point is true. Along 
with all psychology, evolutionary psychology tries accurately to describe 
patterns of behaviour, and to develop hypotheses to explain why they show 
those patterns and not others. In doing so, along with all psychology, 
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evolutionary psychology makes no confident claim, as yet, to be able to 
explain consciousness, nor the freedom of the will. Instead, it marks off 
specific areas of human behaviour such as mate selection (Symons 1979, Buss 
1994), motivational conflict and homicide (Daly and Wilson 1988) and the 
logic of social exchange (Cosmides and Tooby 1989) and asks questions 
generated by the theory of evolution: is there a predictable pattern of 
behaviour? is it universal or does it vary between individuals or between 
groups? what are the logical consequences of this behaviour in the ancestral 
environment? and what selective pressures in that environment would 
logically give rise to it? 
In asking these questions, a basic assumption is that cross-culturally 
consistent patterns of behaviour are likely to be influenced by genetically 
transmitted information. The more significant the reproductive consequences 
of any pattern of behaviour, the more likely it is to be generated and 
constrained by inherited tendencies. Darwin in his 1840 diary observed that 
his baby's reflexes when he touched the sole of her foot functioned perfectly, 
although every attempted action driven by her will suffered from extreme 
incompetence; he concluded that her muscles were perfectly adequate, but it 
would tal,, ý time for her to learn how to use them, and he noted how the 
ability to control some actions - putting things in the mouth - came under 
control well before others, such as leg movements (Darwin 1877). The 
survival and reproductive consequences of a baby having inadequate 
reflexes, or insufficient musculature to allow them to operate, would logically 
have been terminal in many cases, so that both are under strong genetic 
control; the advantages of learned control of those muscles in dealing with a 
highly varied environment made the costs of the learning period worthwhile. 
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This does not mean that the learning is independent of inherited tendencies: 
rather, the ability to learn was itself so advantageous that the capacity to do 
so was selected and designed by the evolutionary process. In every culture, 
babies are normally born with good reflexes and poor control over their 
muscles; and in every culture they learn to control their leg muscles for 
walking in the same way, by putting one foot in front of the other, with 
difficulty. 
. 
This analysis, of course, does not claim to exhaust the study of reflexes, 
nor of learning. The study of the reflex system as a physiological system, and 
its developmental trajectory, and the study of the neurophysiological basis of 
the capacity to learn, are separate fields of study with perfect validity in their 
own right: the evolutionary view does not claim to do away with other 
perspectives and levels of analysis. Tinbergen's useful elucidation of four 
separate but interrelated levels of analysis - causation, development, function 
and evolution - emphasised this point (Tinbergen 1963). But the evolutionary 
perspective does claim to illuminate the other levels of explanation, and to 
make useful predictions which can help guide them away from culs-de-sac. 
A further criticism levelled at the attempt to bring evolutionary theory 
to bear on human psychology is that it is determinist: that it does noý allow 
for freedom of choice or free will. Again, in one sense this criticism is one that 
should be applied to psychology as a whole, which attempts to explain 
human behaviour in terms of its predictable regularities, as is cogently 
argued by Daly and Wilson (1988, p. 8). Every explanation is determinist - it 
sets out to show what pattern of behaviour exists and why it takes the forrn 
that it does. In this sense this is not a meaningful criticism. 
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However, there is another sense in which this criticism is used and in 
which it is profoundly mistaken. That is in implying that something is lost, 
that the beauty of the human soul is sullied, when patterns of human 
behaviour are shown to be predictable from evolutionary theory. When a 
falsifiable hypothesis is confirmed, the only thing that is lost is confusion. 
And when a later hypothesis shows that the earlier was in some way 
incomplete, the result is to increase the level of understanding of the world 
and its phenomena. 
Taking an example from the current study, after several decades of 
intensive, imaginative and rigorously conducted experimentation on group 
polarisation two of the competing explanations were firstly that people 
respond essentially to information and arguments about the decision, and 
secondly that people respond to the social context. The evolutionary 
perspective suggests, on highly developed theoretical grounds, a possible 
integration: in the ancestral environment the considerable daily risks were 
handled both by careful, often socially discussed, evaluation of the specific 
characteristics of the decisions, and also by sharing resources; the social 
context and information about the decision were both crucial. The 
evolutionary approach also suggests the prediction that sliaring groups will 
be different in precise ways. Although the experiment was limited in scale, 
the data generated were consistent with that prediction, suggesting that 
further work is worthwhile. The evolutionary perspective illuminates the 
difference between groups in which intra-group competition is salient, and 
those in which sharing has reduced intra-group competition. It may thus shed 
light on why cautious shifts occur as well as risky ones. Far from creating a 
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world sullied by determinism, the approach may help to integrate tl-ds 
substantial body of research in a new way. 
Behind this use of the "deten-ninist" criticism there sometimes lies the 
effort to defend the special place of humanity in the cosmos. This is 
n-dsplaced, and perpetuates confusion. Every human, like every pigeon, 
butterfly, oyster, flu-virus and dandelion, is an evolved organism. The 
psychological capacities of humans are complex, and responsive more than 
any other animals to social traditions which vary from group to group, but 
these capacities, including the capacity to pass on variable cultural traditions, 
were designed by natural selection in the usual way - by the preferential 
inheritance of variants that proved productive in the ancestral physical and 
social environments. This is perhaps the most powerful theory yet to cast 
light on the biological world, and it is worth applying it to the assumptions 
made in psychological theory. Tooby and Cosmides (19929) have written 
powerfully on the impossibility of the psychological assumptions made in 
what they call the standard social science model, which stands apart from 
evolutionary insight. They argue that the assumption that the child is a tabida 
rasa is computationally unsound, as is the hypothesis that language and 
culture are learned by a general, concent-independent learning mechanism. 
Tooby and Cosmides argue that the logical evolutionary prediction is that, as 
with vision, which is the best studied psychological capacity, the n-dnd will 
contain highly detailed and organised "modules" shaped by evolution to 
anticipate, discern and respond to regularities in the environment. This fits 
with research in developmental psychology (Bowlby 1981), for example, and 
with research on language learning (Pinker 1994), better than the unrealistic 
general learning capacity assumption. 
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This discussion is currently a live controversy even among those who 
aver the evolutionary perspective. Gould, for example, has over two decades 
taken a strong stand against what he sees as the "fundamentalists" of "New 
Darwinism" (Gould and Lewontin 1979; Gould, 1997a, 1997b). Gould makes 
the point that some features, such as the human chin, exist not because they 
themselves are functional but because they are side-effects of other functional 
structures (like "'spandrels" in a cathedral), and warns against trying to 
explain too much: "Many if not most universal behaviors are probably 
spandrels" (Gould 1997b, p. 52). However, this argument in itself does not 
give rise to new falsifiable hypotheses: it seems to be a proposal to cease from 
predicting. A constructive way to accept Gould's valid point is to make the 
predictions, test them, and bear in mind in analysing the data the possibility 
of non-functional forms existing. 
Gould also argues that "saltations" - sudden leaps of evolutionary 
change - may have played a larger part in evolution than Darwin allowed, 
and appears to claim that this is a fundamental revision of the theory of 
evolution. It is not. It is simply the idea that during the process of evolution 
through natural selection, first understood by Darwin and Wallace, it is 
possible that some changes were quicker than others. Some of the "anti- 
Darwinist" writing of Gould carries echoes of the reductionist and 
deten-ninist criticisms discussed and answered above. 
Dawkins" metaphor of the selfish gene (1976) has played a 
considerable part in triggering both the re-affirmation of the usefulness of the 
evolutionary perspective in psychology, and also the reactions against it. The 
power of the ""selfish" gene metaphor is interesting from a psychological 
point of view. One of the "modules" or inherited tendencies predicted to be 
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in the brain is the capacity to discern in the environment "persons with 
interests", to see oneself as one such person and to be able to imagine other 
people's perspectives, taking account of their interests. Whiten has 
highlighted the functional importance of "mind-reading" in the social life of 
primates, including humans (Whiten 1991b; see also Byrne and Whiten 1988, 
Whiten and Byme 1997). Baron-Cohen identified the inability to take the 
perspective of other-persons-with-interests as a possible cause of autism 
(Baron-Cohen 1991,1995). So in characterising the ("selfish"') gene as a 
"person with interests" -a characterisation which is completely unjustified, 
since the gene is simply a self-replicating unit utterly blind to its existence 
and characteristics, let alone any purpose or interest - Dawkins may have 
appealed (inappropriately but effectively) to a fundamental evolved social- 
psychological frame. This use of the social-psychological frame made it much 
easier for humans to conceptualise and analyse, even mathematically, what 
had previously been abstruse and hard to grasp. 
Cosmides explored a similar effect of using evolved social- 
psychological frames to reinforce and to disrupt logical thinkdng, showing 
that where a logical task, the Wason selection task, is presented as an abstract 
puzzle, people perform rather poorly; when, however, it is presented as a 
problem for which there is an inherited social-psychological frame - the task 
of detecting whether cheating has occurred - it becomes easy to understand 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1989). 
As Cosmides showed, the social aspect of a logical frame can disrupt 
logic. In the case of the "selfish gene" metaphor, the use of a psychological 
I 
concept to characterise genes has led to confusion as well as clarification. The 
fact that Dawkins' reference to selfishness makes use of a psychological 
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concept, and therefore is easily generalised to the level of the individual, has 
produced overtones wl-dch have been less than constructive. Even Dawkins 
himself is sometimes guilty of this generalisation. In chapter 1 of The Selfisli 
Gene (1976) he writes 
"... a human society based simply on the gene's law of universal ruthless 
selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live ... Be warned that if you 
wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals co-operate generously and 
unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological 
nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are bom selfish. Let us 
understand what our selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least have the 
chance to upset their designs ...... (Dawkins 1976, p. 3, emphasis in original). 
This has the clear implication that individuals are selfish because of the 
"selfishness" of the gene. In fact, however, there is no justification for this 
link. The link between psychological tendencies and functional consequences 
is stochastic; what drives behaviour is the psychological structure developed 
according to its genetic blueprint, and not the genetic blueprint directly nor 
the gene nor the metaphorical "'purpose" of fitness maximisation. Dawkins 
seems to be saying that co-operation arises only against the genetic "interests" 
of the person co-operating, and must have been achieved only by the 
civilising influence of taught moral rules. If that is the case, then it is hard to 
imagine how the ability to teach such rules first prospered in the transition 
from the common ancestor to Hoino sapiens. The whole passage shows a 
confounding of the two different levels of analysis: the psychological 
mechanisms sensitive to context which give rise to behaviour, and the 
unconscious genetic consequences of that behaviour. Imagining that genes 
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have interests, which they do not, and are selfish, which they are not, has here 
resulted in a failure to understand the full implications of the fact that the 
capacity for psychologically driven co-operation may evolve and be selected 
where the consequences of such behaviour include relatively better survival 
rates: meat sharing being one such instance. 
One of the side-effects of that confusion has been to reinforce the 
reaction against incorporating the evolutionary perspective into the study of 
psychology. I believe that the research described here shows that the 
evolutionary perspective can inform psychological study invaluably, but only 
if there is a clear distinction between the functional (genetic) and the 
psychological (phenotypic) realms. 
Where psychological capacities for constructive group behaviour, such 
as sharing, had the consequence, net of the costs of being in groups, of 
promoting survival and reproduction more effectively than less constructive 
group behaviour, these psychological capacities have been preferentially 
inherited, selected and designed by evolution into human psychology. Group 
selection, recently re-evaluated by Sober and Wilson (1998) as discussed 
above, will have played a role. Sober and Wilson differentiate clearly between 
the functional and psychological levels, wlich is a necessary prerequisite to a 
proper appreciation of the role of psychological co-operation in human 
evolution. Human society, including the propensities to share and to 
counteract dominance, was born precisely out of the evolution of Hoino 
sapiens by natural selection. 
To conclude the discussion of this section with a general observation, 
the main role of evolutionary theory in this thesis has been to provide a 
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means of generating specific hypotheses and making falsifiable predictions, a 
role in which it has proved effective. 
Section 2: Hunter-gatherer Egalitarianism 
In the second section, two psychological foundations of the egalitarian 
cultures of hunter-gatherers were shown to be meat-sharing and counter- 
dominance. The argument was made that meat-sharing must have been 
characteristic of'life in the evolutionary enviroru-nent, and must have been the 
result of a new and unique step in psychological evolution. Sharing was a 
new adaptation to the dangerous life on the savannah, where it alone could 
provide a steady source of valuable protein. 
The approach taken was to identify universals across all hunter- 
gatherer groups, on the basis that the more universal the behaviour, the more 
likely it is to be generated and shaped by inherited capacities as well as 
reinforced and differentiated by cultural traditions - another instance of the 
link between the evolutionary approach and the idea of a single basic human 
nature. 
The conclusion from the survey of hunter-gatherers does not include 
an exact , nd detailed specification of an "algorithm" for sharing high- 
variance resources. This thesis is agnostic on exactly how such an algoritlun 
would be instantiated in the nervous system. It is clearly not simply an 
evolved desire to share, similar to the evolved desires to eat and to mate; no 
person wakes in the morning and says "I must go forth and share". And it 
was clear that there is sometimes a conflict between the desire to get a goodly 
share for oneself, and the desire to see fair play, accepting and promoting 
sharing with others as a way of doing that. 
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However, it is the contention of this study that sharing is not simply a 
by-product of the behaviour of self-interested individuals in groups, as 
described and analysed by game-theory. Binmore maintains this game- 
theoretical position, emphasising the power of group enforcement of sharing 
to maintain an equilibrium among self-interested actors. But he resorts to 
varying the Hoino ecominicus assumption ""by assigning to him a utility 
function whose arguments include the well-being of his fellows" (Binmore 
1997, p. 369) in order to account for the fact that people sympathise even with 
strangers. The incorporation of such a utility function seems a clear sleight- 
of-hand: redefining self-interest to include other non-kins interests explains 
nothing. But it does re-state the problem precisely: human psychology 
evolved to include the well-being of one's fellows, and how this happened is 
not easily explained. A psychology which values "the well-being of one's 
fellows"' is not the purely self-interested psychology that is assumed in the 
"'reciprocation and punishment"' explanations of game-theory. It is the 
contention of this thesis that sharing is no spandrel, but is an adaptation. Key 
supporting evidence is provided by the three rigorous studies which showed 
that meat is shared throughout the hunter-gatherer group to an "irrational" 
extent (Kaplan and Hill 1985, Bailey 1991, Hawkes et al. 1991). It is reir, 4'Orced 
by the fact that throughout recorded history the sharing of food has been a 
pleasure, as it is today at every dinner party (at least those where no-one tries 
too hard to dominate the proceedings, triggering the counter-dominant 
reactions, which are associated with rather less satisfying emotions). 
Counter-dominance, the second element of egalitarian psychology, 
was first and most thoroughly documented by Boehm (1993), who named it 
the "reverse dominance hierarchy". I became aware of Boehms work only 
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after the tendency had been postulated in the review of ethnographies now 
presented in Section 2 of this thesis. Erdal and Whiten (1994) was written 
following the discovery, responding to Boehm and setting out our more 
evolutionary perspective. This separate, nearly simultaneous recognition by 
two different researchers of a universal tendency reinforces the likelihood 
that the theoretical construct is well grounded. 
Recognising the fact that hunter-gatherers in the 20th century have 
been marginalised to infertile areas, Cosmides and Tooby have suggested that 
egalitarianism may not be typical of what would have happened when 
hunter-gatherers dominated the whole landscape, living in the most fertile 
and favourable areas; they argue that something more like the 
institutionalised chiefdoms of the Pacific Northwest were likely to have 
formed (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992, p. 217). That would decrease the 
importance of any evolved tendency towards counter-dominance, and make 
it mainly a response to impoverishment. However, firstly the archaeological 
record and secondly the earliest ethnographies do not back up Cosmides' 
suggestion. For example, the 17th century reports of Father Lejeune's contacts 
with the Naskapi are unequivocal: they "laugh at and make sport of their 
[captains and] .... only obey their c1def through goodwill towards him... "' 
(Leacock 1980,29). At that time the colonisation of that area was in its very 
earliest stages, and the Naskapi by no means marginalised. There is no way of 
proving either way, but the lack of data for hierarchy and the overwhelming 
ubiquity of egalitarianism make it prudent to accept the hypothesis that an 
egalitarian social structure was by far the dominant form. 
The conviction among game theorists that human sociality may be 
explicable essentially by varieties of reciprocation is shared by many 
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researchers, such as Tooby and Cosmides (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). 
Hawkes (1993) and Erdal and Whiten (1994) have both put forward 
hypothesised processes of selection at the level of the individual which could 
have selected and reinforced these social tendencies. But given that the 
material consequence of sharing - reduced variance of crucial food - was 
highly significant for every member of the group, it seems wilful to insist that 
group selection cannot have played a part. For example, Hawkes builds on 
the observations that good hunters obtain more mating opportunities (Kaplan 
and Hill 1985) - there is a complementary earlier observation by Riches 
among the Inuit that good hunters also have the pick of the most competent 
women as their wives, a fact with clear reproductive consequences in an 
environment where child mortality is high (Riches 1984, p. 240) - to suggest 
that this mating effect may provide a complete explanation of sharing: it is 
essentially a male mating display. However, this cannot by itself explain 
generalised sharing, which could surely be invaded by a strategy of 
preferential sharing with actual or potential mates. This is not to deny that 
men may sometimes have been observed giving choice cuts to potential 
mates; but the counter-examples are so numerous that this cannot be a 
complete explanation. To take only one: during the distribution of meat from 
an eland among the ! Kung the answer to Marshall when she asked a young 
man why he had just given a piece of meat to an old man with no relatives in 
the group was "He is an old man whom I like in my heart" and a similar 
instance brought the reply "He was hungry for meat" (Marshall 1976, p. 362). 
If reciprocation for mating is the driver, that seems as likely to put off 
potential mates as to entice them: take him as a lover and you may find your 
family's meat given away to old, unrelated men. Sociality is deeper than is 
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explained simply by reciprocation and individual mating, though both 
certainly will have played crucial roles in its evolution. Sharing and counter- 
dominance involve motivational changes that bear the hallmarks of group 
selection (Wilson 1998, Sober and Wilson 1998). 
Bruce Charlton (personal communication) has suggested that counter- 
dominance might not have required an alteration in the motivation system, 
but simply an escalation in the flexibility and intelligence with which the goal 
of countering dominant individuals, shared with primates, is pursued. De 
WaaYs (1982) work with captive chimpanzees showed that males had a 
strong motivation to undermine the position of the alpha, wl-dch became 
particularly evident when there seemed to be a chance of usurping his 
position. The escalating "arms-race" suggested in Erdal and Whiten (1994) 
would have been built on this type of characteristic in the common ancestor. 
However, there seems to be a difference in motivational quality (as 
well as social expertise) in the satisfaction that humans take in the feelings of 
small-group membership, working jointly towards shared goals, which are 
themselves thoroughly undermined by attempts at dominance by 
individuals. The counter-dominant syndrome includes satisfaction at 
"'fairness", and specifically does not typically depend, as does counter- 
dominance in chimpanzees, on the effort to take over a dominant position in 
the group. This makes human counter-dominance something new, 
qualitatively different in motivation from a simple extension of primate- 
common-ancestor politics. 
Having applied the evolutionary perspective to hunter-gatherer 
groups and established some likely features of the social environment in 
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which Hoino sapiens evolved, the researcher was in a position to derive 
specific hypotheses and test falsifiable predictions based on them. 
Section 3. Risk Taking in Groups 
The third section of this thesis dealt with risk-taking in groups, testing 
the hypothesis that subjects would be significantly more prepared to take 
risks when they were in sharing groups, because of the evolutionary history 
of Hoino sapiens, and the importance of meat-sharing in it. 
The experimental design did not allow for a sex-difference in risk 
taking, but the males consistently took more risk than the females, with the 
result that the number of subjects able to be retained in the final analysis was 
small - only 22. This study should therefore be regarded as a pilot. 
Nonetheless, significant differences in the predicted directions were 
established, and the key prediction, that sharing groups would take more 
risk, was confirmed at relatively high risk levels, consistent with the 
hypothesis that it was the sharing of the relatively high-variance returns from 
hunting which were key in the evolution of this tendency. The fact that the 14 
subjects in the individual condition not retained in the final analysis showed 
the same pattern as those retained, reinforces the results. 
A further weakness in this experiment was that there was no control 
for the order of presentation: no subjects simply made the choices twice, 
without intermediate discussion. However, the results did show that those 
who discussed the decisions on their first choices (groups, first time) 
responded in a pattern that was closer to that of those who discussed the 
I 
decisions on their second choices (individuals, second time) (r-- 0.834) than it 
was to the pattern of their first choices, made without discussion (individuals, 
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first time) (r= 0.751). If confirmed, this will. show that the important element 
was not whether the choices were being faced for the first or second time, but 
whether or not the subjects were in a particular social situation -a non- 
sharing group. 
The experiment thus suggested that further work could usefully adopt 
a new paradigm, distinguishing three social situations which have different 
effects on the preparedness to take risk: being alone (individuals' first 
choices); being in non-sharing groups (individuals' second choices and 
groups" first choices); and being in sharing groups (groups' second choices, 
including all the choices of the group that shared spontaneously). 
From the point of view of evolutionary theory these three situations 
are distinct in relevant ways. In the first, an individual who does not feel 
under threat from being alone can focus on rewards as well as risk. In the 
second, the element of inter-individual competition is salient, even if at an 
unconscious level, and so the emphasis is on caution at high risk levels and 
"going-for-it"' at low risk levels. In the third, sharing the rewards results in a 
much higher acceptance of risk at the higher risk levels - the opposite effect of 
being in non-sharing groups. These results were shown by the regression 
equations in Table 3.8. 
The fact that those in the group condition were more risk-sensitive on 
their first choices than the individuals on their second (i. e. in the same social 
situation) may be explained by the fact that the design did not place as much 
emphasis on the group situation for the individuals (who had experienced no 
group formation process other than simply discussion) as for those in the 
I 
group condition (who had undergone a fairly intense, and richly enjoyed, 
group formation process). 
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The increase in risk taking with sharing was shown not to be irrational, 
given the first choices made by the subjects and the change in incentive 
structure. It was theoretically naive to predict that sharing would result in an 
irrational increase in risk-taking, since any risk-taking that was overdone 
would be selected out over evolutionary time. 
Evolutionary theory suggests a possible reason why risk-taking is 
sensitive both to information on the risks and consequences of a decision and 
to social factors. It thus suggests that the two theories of persuasive arguinetits 
and social coinparison are best understood not as competing but as each 
illuminating an adaptively essential factor. The meta-analysis carried out by 
Isenberg showed the effect size of "mere exposure"' of their initial positions 
by individuals in groups, without discussion, to be r=0.436 and the effect 
size of persuasive arguments to be r=0.746 (Isenberg 1986). T'he result of 
bringing in the evolutionary perspective is to suggest the integration of the 
pre-existing body of research. 
Section 4. Wider Effects of Living in an Egalitarian Environment 
Finally, the research conducted for this thesis moved from the 
controllable worlds of the library and the Looratory into the messy confusion 
of Italian town life. 
The theoretical grounds for the predictions made are that since 
humans evolved in an egalitarian social environment, they must be adapted 
to an egalitarian social environment. Specifically, the hypothesis is that when 
faced with the 'evolutionarily novel situation of living in an irremediably 
inegalitarian situation - even billionaires feel like paupers when they read of 
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Bill Gates' fortune - the counter-dominant response will be triggered 
repeatedly, in vain. The effect of this over time will be deleterious. 
This does not mean that the hypothesis entails the conclusion that 
humans evolved a inaladaptive response, something which is theoretically 
impossible. Rather, it means that humans evolved without ? neeting 
inegalitarian social situations, except at a level such as the attempted 
domination of a group by an individual or by a group, wl-dch could be 
resolved by the actions of individuals and small groups of individuals. An 
organism develops an adaptation to a situation only if it meets it repeatedly 
and if the consequences are material in reproductive terms, so humans had 
no need of adaptations to inegalitarian contexts which were never more than 
fleetingly met. By this theory the human adaptation to an inegalitarian 
situation is the effort to make it more equal - counter-dominance. 
The design of the test depended on some fairly heroic assumptions, in 
particular that the towns were similar on all relevant variables that were not 
measured, to make them valid as controls. Subsequent visits to Imola and 
discussion of the results with people from there and from Faenza have 
elicited the suggestions that Faenza's economy may be rather more 
agricultui.,, i than the others, and that Sassuolo may have more foreign 
immigrants than the others. In addition, the questionnaire item on 
consumption of salami-type sausage established that Sassuolo's diet may 
contain more fat. A further weakness was the smallness of the sample sizes, 
and another the fact that the samples were not demographically fully 
representative. As a consequence of these observations the results of this 
study must be treated as suggestive rather than conclusive. 
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But within the limits allowed by the qualifications in the previous 
paragraph, there is a clear consistency between the predictions and the 
results. Imola is perceived by its inhabitants as having a more equal 
distribution of wealth than are the other two towns by theirs. As in that case, 
the most common order of results is the same order as the proportion of co- 
operatives: Imola is better than Faenza which is better than Sassuolo. This 
was true of social networks; the helpfulness of the authorities; domestic 
violence; educational level; mortality; blood donation and participation in 
voluntary societies. It is hard to imagine another factor proving such an 
efficacious predictor across so diverse a set of variables. 
The sex difference in improvement in health, and in sensitivity to the 
level of distribution of wealth, were both new hypotheses: the researcher has 
not identified any similar prediction in the literature. They depend on an 
extension of well established parental investment theory - that males compete 
for females to a greater extent than the other way round, because females 
invest more as parents. This led to the hypothesis that an inegalitarian 
environment will exacerbate competition among males, since males are 
judged significantly by their social competence, evidenced by their wealth 
and status. Males will be more stressed where the gap between the. - own 
store of these resources and those of others is greater, than where it is smaller. 
In such an environment the counter-dominant response will be triggered 
continuously and in vain. The data were consistent with this hypothesis, but 
another possible explanation was discussed: that the envirom-nent for males 
was more egalitarian in Imola than the environment for females, who may be 
subject to male dominance in all the towns. 
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It is possible that this is a partial explanation of the class effect on 
health, as highlighted most rigorously by Marmot (1991). 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to highlight the importance of the 
psychological capacity for egalitarianism - sharing and counter-dominance - 
in evolution, and to show that the echoes of that evolutionary history shape 
today's responses both to risky decisions and to the wider social 
environment. 
The survey of ethnographies gave support for the theory. The 
experiment on risk-taking and the study of measures of social-psychological 
well-being generated data which appeared consistent with the theory. 
However, only further work can distinguish the degree to which these 
characteristics are universal and uniform - hence likely to be strongly 
influenced by evolved tendencies. 
If a strong evolved influence is supported by further work, then the 
design of institutions and social policies can be enhanced by taking this into 
account. 
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On Human Egalitarianism: 
An Evolutionary Product 
of Machiavellian Status 
Escalation? 
DAVID ERDAL AND ANDREW WHITEN 
School of Psychology. University of St. Andrews, 
St. Andrews, Fife KYr6q1U, Scotland. 8 IN 93 
Egalitarianism in hunter-gatherer societies continues to 
present an evolutionary pu=ie. It is not yet clear what 
social-psycho logical processes ire responsible for keep- 
ing egalitarianism in place or how they evolved. The 
papers oi Knauit (CA 32: 391-4291 and Boehm (CA 34: 
17.7-541 represent important advances in understanding 
both in their recognLtion of the unique pu--Ic repre- 
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seated by human egalitarianism from evolutionary and 
comparative perspectives and in the solutions they offer. 
Their initiatives, however, fall short of what we believe 
an adequate evolutionary analysis must consider. We of- 
fer a critique of Boehm's thesis in particular which leads 
us to thcoreticil and empincaL extensions of the endeav- 
our these authors have begun. 
An evolutionary model will seek to explain stable 
tendencies in human social behaviour as adaptations to 
specific aspects of the ecological and social environment 
in which Homo sapiens evolved. Archaeological data 
suggest that the ecological cnviro=cnc included vari- 
ous muctures of forests and savannabs, with scattered 
vegetable and prey resources which sustained a hunter- 
gatherer made of subsistence, at least for anatomically 
modem humans IFoley 19871. Hunter-gatherer ethno- 
graphic data suggest that the social environnaenr was 
one of small mobile foraging groups in which most peo- 
ple were related. people knew each other intimately, 
strangers rarely being encountered, and food and other 
resources were shared. 
There areweLl-rchearsed problems in taking data from 
modem hunter-gatherers and using such data as indi- 
cative of conditions in the Pho/Neistocene ! e. g., Foley 
1987*75-7'; Wilrnscn and Denbcw r9go). However, 
there ire much greater problems in using data from soct- 
cties wiucý clearly had ao parallel then. The evidence 
scroney suggests that the context in which H. sapiens 
evolved did not include domesticated food animals, do- 
mesncatcd plants, large usable food surpluses, systems 
for storing food over tong periods of tune, or concen- 
crated, highly productive assets. We agree with Knauiz 
that modem simple foraging societies provide the best 
source for iniCrCrICC3 about behaviour charactensing hu- 
man evolution. By contrast, Boehm takes data frara 48 
societies a maionty of which are not primarily hunters 
and gathextr3. Their modes of subsistence are known 
not to have developed until ac most r. 2. ooo years ago, 
long after the emergence of H. sapiens. In principle, no 
conclusions can. be drawn fmm these data regarding be- 
havtour evolutionarily adaptive for H. sapiens. 
Because Boehm uses data from post-hunter-gathcrer 
societies, he mixes behaviour patterns characteristic of 
hunter-gatherers with behaviours that are simply not 
found among them. For example, deposing a leader im- 
plies that there is a leader to depose (p. 13 11: this is not 
true of huntcr-gathcrers, with the exception of same of 
the Indians of the Northwest Coast of North America. 
whose social structures developed round rich productive 
resources in relatively recenc times (Kroeber r939:! 9; 
Surtles 1968: IoS). Bochin also states that "children are 
manipulated and not infrequently physically disci- 
plined, younger mates and females are very often treated 
as chattels in marriage arrangements. Marned females 
may be controlled decisively by males, while in many 
m2crilincal-matrilocal. societies married mates meet 
with very decisive economic control. Mort generally, 
adult offspring may operate in domestic units that vest 
substantial authority in the parents" 1p. 2341-none 
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of which is characteristically descriptive of hunter- 
gatherers. 
Boehm's great contribution is to establish clearly from 
the ethnographic literature that counterdominant be- 
haviour is a widespread characteristic of humans. His 
model is static, offering an explanation of how egalican- 
anism is sustained rather than how it is generated in 
the arst place. Yet the universality oi egalitarianism in 
huncer-garherers suggests that it is an ancient, evolved 
human pattern. 
We had reached a conclusion similar to Boehm's about 
the signLficance and ubiquity of counterdominant be- 
haviour, but our explanatory model is an evolutionarv 
one. An evolutionary hypothesis must explain why it 
became adaptive for the hierarchically oriented ances- 
tors oi H. sapiens to behave in in egalitarian way and 
will seek the source of that egaiitananism in the repro- 
ductive consequences for individuals exhibiting that be- 
ha-riour. In our model, counrerdominant behaviour is a 
stable tendency, an adaptation to the soc. al and physicai 
environments of the Plio/Pleistacene. It represents a 
pattern which structures the cognitive and motivzrional 
psychology of each individual. It may only be manifested 
in specific circumstances, but it is in inherited ten- 
dency. The conscious dec. sions to prevent dommanct 
catalogued by Boehm build on and elaborate it. 
Boehm's model uses, as an explanatory variable, con- 
scious, intentional choice. An evolutionary model must 
be compatible with the exercise-or sense or exercise- 
of conscious intention, but to invoke it as in explani- 
tory variable is simply to move the pu=lc one step fur 
ther back. One is left, then,. with the same question in 
a different form: how did conscious intention come 
play this tole! And whatever role consciousness plays, 
if humans as hunter-gatherers characteristically make 
some specific patterns of choices rather than others- 
sharing meat, for example, or forming groups of : o-5o 
persons, or countering dominant behivtour-then the 
prior question is- are there specific cognitive and moti- 
vational processes which lead people to make these par- 
ncular patterns of choices, and if so, how did those cog- 
nitive and motivational processes evolve! 
As illustration of the underlying evolutionary argu- 
ment, we may recall Sheplices lt983) demonstration 
that the incest taboo is based on negative imprinting 
among children brought up together. The varied and 
enormously elaborated cultural definitions of the taboo 
can thus be understood as extensions and elaborations 
of this basic inherited developmental psychological pro- 
cess. It cannot be countered by socialisation (we cannot 
be trained or encouraged to feel sexually attracted to- 
wards those with whom we have spent our earliest 
childhoodl, but it can be culturally elaborated and ex- 
tended. This in principle gives a general model ot how 
conscious and culturally defined practices may be 
founded on stable inherited tendencies. 
Knauit and Boehm interpret culture and conscious in- 
tent as undermining or counteracting biological motiva- 
tions. For example, Knauit invokes culture as key in 
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bringing about food sharing instead of open competition 
for food (P. 395) and pair bonding instead of aggressive 
incer-male competition for sexual access (P. 397). Like- 
wise, Boehm argues that "the primary and most imme- 
diate cause of egalitarian behavior is a moralistic deter- 
mination on the part of a local group's main political 
actors that no one of its members should be allowed to 
dominate the or-hers" (p. . 2.28). 
In our view these cannot 
be evolutionary explanations. The cultural and con- 
sciously intentional elements are not crucial so long as 
these behaviours are adaptive, and conversely they are 
not sufficient if these behaviours are riot adaptive. 
Rather, we see the cultural elaborations of food sharing, 
pair bonding, and egalitarianism as being grounded in 
inherited tendencies. 
Lf human culture and consciousness evolved on a bed- 
rock of inherited cognitive and motivational mecha- 
nisms which already underlay complex hominid social 
behaviour, it follows that conscious intention is un- 
likely to contradict seriously those inherited behaviour 
patterns. Both Boehm and Knauft cite Boyd and Richer- 
son f1985) in support of the contention that cultural 
transmission can in principle allow such a contradiction 
to develop, but in fac: these authors stress the funda- 
mental role of evolved predispositions without which 
cultural evolution "would provide none of the fitness- 
enhancing advantages that must have favoured the evo- 
lution of capacities for culture" (Richerson and Boyd. 
z989:: o6l. 
Therefore, in contrast to the Knauft and Boehm view 
of culturally sustained, conscious intention running 
counter to stable inhented tendencies, our model pre- 
dic-. s that culture and conscious action will generally fit 
with, build on. and elaborate such teridencies. 
In our made!, there is no reversal of hierarchy, we 
question the evidence for Boehm's concept of a "reverse 
dominance hierarchy. " The tendency to recognise good 
performance and to defer to individuals who achieve it 
is a cross -culturally stable tendency which would have 
had a clear adaptive advantage in promoting the learning 
of effective behaviour and ir structuring groups around 
effective individuals. Even among the most egalitarian 
of hunter-gatherers there is evidence that such recogni- 
tion was given and was enjoyed by its recipients. Thus, 
Turnbull (r965: 183) observes among the IMbuti that 
"some men, because of exceptional hunting skill, may 
come to resent it when their views are disregarded. " 
This implies both that they are habitually listened to 
and that they enjoy it. Kaplan and Hill's (1985) work 
with the Ache suggests that although hunters achieve 
no material benefit from gaining such recognition, they 
may have more frequent mating opportunities, an im- 
portant consequence for an adaptive model. 
Although effective individuals are recognised and gen- 
erally heeded, the function 6f leadership remains situa- 
tional and is not transformed into a permanent social 
role with a distinct status. When leading individuals at- 
tempt to achieve personal dominance through making 
such a transformation, they are brought down several 
pegs by those around them, and they are never "obeyed" 
(Rzýc'hes r982: 7, t). But this is best characterised as "coun- 
terdominant" behaviour rather than a reversal of hierar- 
chy. It does not start with a hierarchy and reverse it: 
good performers are generally heeded and enioy receiv- 
ing that attention, but they are prevented from attaining 
dominance. 
in our model, this enjoyment of recognition is an echo 
of dominance behaviour exhibited by the ancestor that 
Homo shared with the apes. This dominance behaviour 
was not entirely lost in evolution but was balanced by 
counterdominant tendencies which only evolved be- 
cause they provided fitness advantages in the ecological 
and social environments of the time. 
In hunter-gatherer conditions the fitness advantage 
provided by food sharing is the reduction of risk (Lovejoy 
iggi, Wiessner x982, Cashdan 1985, Smith 1988). How- 
ever, food sharing is not a simple evoived predisposition. 
The reports of meat sharing include references to cheat- 
ing. For example, Turnbull (1965: iggl reported that "it 
would be a rare Mbuti woman who did not conceal a 
portion of the catch in case she was forced to share with 
ochers. " And Tanaka (198o: i=J said of the San that "a 
man may sneak a small catch of game into his hut to 
share only with his family, or otherwise fail to share 
food as he should. " SeLf-interest is at work at the indi- 
vidual level. Those who have meat sometimes try to 
avoid sharing it all. Those who do not have meat some- 
times steal (Turnbull 1965: 198). These beliaviours are 
tolerated to an extent. 
Among the same African hunter-gatherers, food shar- 
ing is characterised by arguments (Turnbull -965: 158; 
Tanaka r980: 95), and Bailey 11991: 94) speaks of younger 
Efe men "yelling aggresively begging obsequiously, 
and even occasionally snatching pieces of meat. ... Never did overt physical violence break out, but ex- 
tremely heated vociferous arguments were not uncom- 
mon. " Envy and jealousy are sometimes observed to be 
important in this process of sharing (e. g., Marshall r976 
[19611: 368; Briggs 1970: 47; Tanaka 198o: i13). These 
motivations are interesting because they move the em- 
phasis away from simple self -interest towards a sense of 
fairness (Trivers 197 X), an interest in ensuring that "oth- 
ers do not get more than I do" and then, through antici- 
pation of others' reactions, that "I do not take more than 
others. " Cosmides and Tooby (1987) have offered experi- 
mental evidence that humans are well equipped to de- 
tect cheating. 
We propose the term "vigilant sharing" to cover this 
complex food-sharing behaviour. Kaplan and Hill's 
(198 5) tests rejected all hypotheses to explain food shar- 
ing except that food is distributed in such a way that 
everyone is fed. We suggest that this is the result, at the 
level of the social system, of the behaviour of sociable 
and self-interested individuals whose motivations in- 
clude a strong desire to get enough for themselves cou- 
pled with a strong desire to make sure that no one else 
gets more than they do. One important implication of 
this is that counterdominance ("no one is going to get 
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away with more than P) is an economically cificient to hold the options in mind and measure them against 
predisposition: it ensures that sharing takes place, and, important aspects oi the situation would provide a par- 
given the risk profile oi hunting, sharing rather than at- ticularly important function for conscious deliberation. 
tempted dominance is the efticient strategy. This model stands Boehm's on its head. Egalitarian 
if dominance patterns were indeed balanced by coun- behaviour patterns evolved because with the develop- 
terdominant tactics rather than being eliminated, then merit of self-control individuals became so clever at not 
there would still be a psychological potential to create losing out to dominant individuals that vigilant sharing 
dominance hierarchies, given triggering circumstances became possible, and this was the most effective eco- 
which rendered the counterdominant tendencies inoper- nomic strategy in the circumstances in which H. sarn- 
ative or ineffective. It is plausible that tne concentrated ens evoived. As a result of the complex set of internally 
resource conditions created by herding and agriculture contradictory behavioural tendencies which were en- 
provided exactly such triggering circumstances (Testart tailed, conceptual inputs to decision making became 
1987, Johnson and Earle 1987). This model fits the time- particularly crucial elements of human psychology. The 
scales required: first, an extended process of biologically extent to which conscious intention is the master rather 
driven evolution (> I million years) which led to the than the servant of our inherited behaviour patterns is 
expansion of the human brain and the evQlution of egali- not clear, but at minimum conscious deliberation seems 
tarian behaviour and viliganc sharing, ancrsecond, a rela- to have some effect in expanding the options for our 
tively sudden change of social behaviour (ca. zz, coo behaviour. 
years B. P. ) driven by an unchanged psychology meeting Subsequent hierarchies were built in response to new 
circumstances entirely different from those in which it economic circumstances with wholly different incen- 
evolved. This led to the creation oi hierarchies because tive structures, in which the counterdominant tenden- 
the counterdominant tendencies were disabled by the cies became disabled and ineffective except on the spo- 
new environment. Such hierarchies are not merely re- radic basis documented by Boehm. 
born ape hierarchies but uniquely human in both their 
behavioural detail and their cultural recognition. 
In common with humans, chimpanzees display rac- d Replies tics such as alliance formation an deception through 
which dominant individuals can be socially manipu- 
lated despite their inherent power ', de Waal iq8z, 199z). CHRISTOPHER BOEHM 
The "Machiavellian intelligence" expressed in such Department of Anthropology, University of SouLýem 
tactics jWhiren and Byrne 19881 would thus likely California. Los. ýIngeles, Calif. 90089-003-2. U-S-A- 
have characterised the human-chimpanzee common an- 9a 93 
cestor. 
If the subsequent rapia evolutionary expansion oi the E. -dal and Whiten raise several interesting issues involv- 
hominid brain was associated with greater Machiavel- ing the conscious intentions of nonliterare human be- 
lian intelligence 1993j, an escalation would ings. Ethnologically Speaking, the effects oi such inten- 
have been set up berween the capacities of group mern- tions have been lost in the explanatory shuffle, mainly 
bers to manipýiate the dominants and the ability oi because anthropology's iavonte paradigms are either 
dominant individuals to counter such skills. Indeed, "structural" or "formal" and are borrowed from disci- 
such a spiral might have played a causal role in the en- plines that deal with entirely self-organizing systems. 
cephalisation which took place. Given such an evolu- One reason I chose , to. study egalitarian 
behavior was 
tionary escalation, eventually the maintenance of direct that it offered an opportunity to factor purposeful behav- 
dominance would have become prohibitively costly in ior into the cultural equation. The thesis was that al- 
time and/or energy. Under these circumstances there though egalitarian societies appear to be devoid of hier- 
would have been a fitness advantage to the strategy oi archical behavior among males, from time to time 
"vigilant sharing" or "playing fair"-oi resisting domi- certain men try to dominate their fellows. They are dealt 
nance by others but not attempting to achieve domi- with through a variety of sanctions, most of which are 
nance oneself. This would have produced in each individ- found among simple foragers as Knauft defines them. 
ual a complex set of competing motivations-including Sanctions are enacted purposefully by a moral commu- 
tendencies both to dominate and not to dominate, both nity that coalesces around the issue of personal auton- 
to defer and to resist domination, both to share and to be omy and equality of males. Their application is rarely 
opportunistically selfish, all according to circumstance. reported because they are so predictable to members of 
Such a psychology of balancing, contradictory tenden- the society; most would-be upstarts remain cautious or 
cies would have created multiple choices for each indi- cowed. Such purposeful group domination is, I argued, 
vidual in any specific social situation. This in itself the most influential causal common denominator 
would have given each individual great behavioural among a very wide range of egalitarian societies and, as 
flexibility. It could also havýe given an adaptive advan- an independent variable, should be weighted more 
tage to what we experience as considerable conscious, heavily than the various ecological influences that are 
intentional choice. If there are multiple, competing, normally cited to explain egalitarian societies one at a 
contradictory psychological tendencies, then the ability time. Introducing conscious intentions into ethnology 
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in this instance provides an alternative way of ex- 
plaining an important social type. Erdal and Whiten 
seem somewhat uncomfortable with this approach, per- 
haps because it smacks of "teleology. " Attempts to keep 
ethnology distanced from the study of human "pur- 
poses" have a long history, the most recent being a stri- 
dently antipsychological version of "cultural material- 
ism. " Erdal and Whiten seem to favor a psychological 
approach, yet they suggest that Knauft and I present cul- 
rurally sustained intentions as running counter to inher- 
ited tendencies-that we view culture in its goal- 
directed made as a kind of independent variable from 
somewhere "ourside the system. " 
I believe that egalitarian behavior results from a long 
history of coevolution. Genes provide tendencies toward 
domination and submission and generate psychological 
ambivalence over submission because dominance tends 
to be more satisfying. The capacity for purposeful and 
decisive collective action provides a cultural antidote to 
the domination tendencies of would-be alpha males that 
over the generations ensures that strongey individuals 
cannot establish despotic political styles or dynasties. 
The cultural antidote is obviously not independent of 
behavior genes, for it is built ucon ambivalence over 
submission and is effec-. 1ve because group members use 
their potential for domination collectively. 
Purposeful behavior becomes analytically important 
when it has behavioral outcomes that vary from what 
genes, environment, and seLf-organizing systems make 
predictable on their own. An egalitarian state of political 
affairs results from what amounts to a social compact: 
adult males agree to give up their individual possibilities 
for domination of others in order to be certain that no 
one individual may dominate them. This set of concerns 
directly underlies the preoccupation with personal au- 
tonomy that is so predictable among foragers (see Gard- 
ner 199z). It is because groups deliberately and in- 
sightiully enter into this compact that purposeful 
behavior becomes analytically important; "culture" is 
shaping behavior in an important way here. I have called 
such societies "reverse dominance hierarchies" because, 
over time, there always seem to be upstarts who will 
try to gain personal power and because the group predict- 
ably curbs them. Thus, in egalitarian society moral sanc- 
tioning is a special, emergency type of domination by 
the group that is considered politically legitimate even 
though individual domination is not. 
It is well known that morality works "counterhedoni- 
cally" to diminish the effects of various behaviors that 
we are genetically disposed to, for example, inappropri- 
ately lustful behavior or murder (see Campbell 1975). 
Egalitarian manipulations are simply one more instance 
of humans' using moral sanctioning as a way of sorting 
through the effects of raw materials given by human 
nature and making some choices about tendencies that 
should be suppressed or reihforced. This purposeful ca- 
pacity is an evolved one that is surely a function of our 
large brain. it can neither be separated from our natural 
history nor taken for granted. 
Any new theory about egalitarian society has implica- 
tions or prehistoric interpre-ation. Erdal and Whiten 
suggest that I improperly mixed societal categories by 
pooling egalitarian behaviors of simple foragers, com- 
plex foragers, and sedentary tribesmen and by including 
sanctions such as deposition when simple foragers are 
reported to lack leaders. Had my focus been on prehis- 
tory this criticism would be appropriate. However, my 
aim was to demonstrate that egalitarian political ar- 
rangemeats derive not mainly from special ecological or 
social-structural circumstances but from moral sanc- 
tioning, Because "egalitarianism" was not limited to 
simple foragers; or even to foragers in general, I took it 
into account wherever I found it. It would be a simple 
matter to perform a similar analysis solely upon simple 
foragers. The first task, however, was simply to con- 
vince colleagues that "reverse dominance hierarchy" 
was a useful concept. 
Erdal and Whiten correctly state that I view "counter- 
dominant behavior" as present in all human societies. 
Does this make politically centralized societies that 
curb their rogue politicians "reverse dominance hLierar- 
chies"' I think not. What changed radically with the 
transition to chiefdoms was the cultural definition of 
the threshold at which collective counterdominant be- 
havior was activated. Leaders became able to command 
their former peers legitimateky in many contexts, and 
the strong egalitarian ideology ceased to drive behavior 
dennitively and in most cases atrophied or disappeared. 
Physical environmental factors and factors of social 
scale or group composition were obviously important, 
but more immediately it was the granting of limited 
yet substantial authority and the general acceptance of 
status differences that effected the transition to orrho- 
dox hierarchies. I disagree with Erdal and Whiten that 
counterdominant tendencies became ineffective except 
"suoradically" in orthodox hierarchies. Any prudent 
leader understands that assassination or popular revolt 
is possible, and a leader who is unrealisnc or unlucky 
may be deposed. This is not reverse dominance hierar- 
chy, however, because followers merely exchange an 
abusive leader for one who is not. Power remains con- 
centrated at the top rather than being neutralized as in 
a baný or tribe. 
Social- biological scenarios that relate egalitarian dom- 
ination by the group to "the reproductive consequences 
for individuals" are easy enough to imagine. Assuming 
that alpha-male-type hominids/humans had superior 
nutrition, were siring more surviving progeny, and pos- 
sibly were in a position to help their closer kin, their 
genetic advantage would seriously diminish with the ad- 
vent of egalitarian behavior. By contrast, rank-and-file 
types would gain an improved reproductive position, for 
each would gain equally (if modestly) by helping to cre- 
ate a system of equal sharing of power and resources. If 
this "revolution" was ancient, then many millennia of 
egalitarian behavior probably modified the behavior 
genes involved in domination and submission. This may 
help to explain some of the differences between humans 
and chimpanzees and gorillas with respect to agonistic 
potential. However, it is apparent that human nature 
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still had the potential to support orthodox hierarchies, for once domestication of plants was accomplished and 
group size and stability began to increase they indepen- 
dentl, y reappeared in many locations. 
To explore such a scenario more fully, one would have 
to speak to the issues of behavioral dispositions for both 
dominance and submission, for coalition formation, for 
sensitivity to group opinion and self-concrol, and for 
whatever else it takes to maintain a moral community. 
One would also have to account for the context: the 
ecological constraints, group size and structure, individ- 
ual differences in genetic predispositions and other be- 
haviors relevant to political power, and the distribution 
of wealth. Erdal and Whiten's notion of "vigilant shar- 
ing" of food resources by people who are ambivalent 
about sharing fits nicely into this picture and is relevant 
to the equally vigilant sharing of power that I described. 
It would seem that the two may have been interdepen- 
dent. Indeed, the food-sharing arrangements of simple 
foragers would not be likely to work if decisive political 
power remained in the hands of a few, while if large- 
game meat were not shared it could be difficult to equal- 
ize power. Thus I would link three developments 
(Boehm r9821: (11 the moral community capable of mak- 
ing rules for behavior and sanctioning deviants, includ- 
ing those who committed incest, cheaters, and political 
upstarts, (2) domination of potential alphas by the egali- 
tanan group, leading to equalized power sharing, and 
(3) large-game hunting with compulsory sharin& of meat. 
Tile egalitarian political revolution may well have taken 
place in conjunction with large-game hunting, since 
among simple foragers individual proficiency at other 
types of food acquisition is less likely to lead to domi- 
nation. 
I agree with Erdal and Whiten's implication that be- 
cause the cooperation of foragers is orten so well- 
routinized we may have missed its subtle conflict com- 
ponenr. My suggestion is thit, like large-game meat, 
political power has been indigenously defined as group 
property, and individuals who would challenge an estab- 
lished tradition of power sharing can predict the group's 
hc. stile reaction. That they L-rietheless push such limits 
in simple foraging societies is apparent from my paper, 
and I devoted considerable discussion to the Australian 
Aborigines because riot only are they foragers (some of 
them "simple") but also their historical links to the late 
Paieolithic are exceptionally solid. 
While egalitarian food sharing may be enjoyable in its 
_own right, 
it depends upon a latent political threat just 
as does the sharing of power. An egalitarian way of doing 
ýpolitical business largely redirects individual tendencies 
compete or dominate from individually selfish self- 
assertion to collective vigilance against selfishness. 
These are not very "benign" definitions of cooperative 
behavior or of "primitive dem8cracy, " but they do ex- 
`: )lain why blatant cheating remains well controlled 
ýmong simple foragers, in spite of the rough spots 
1pointed out by Erdal and Whiten, and why serious at- 
: empts at domination remain rare in their political life. 
rýrriong such people there were at least two commodities 
that the group did not wish to see fall into the hands oi 
dominantly selfish individuals: large-game meat and the 
power to abrogate another adult's all-but-sacred personal 
autonomy. The response in both cases was to see to it 
that the commodity was shared, even though certain 
individuals might do so with reluctance. 
Much of what Erdal and Whiten say about the evolu- 
tiori of contradictory tendencies ("competing motiva- 
tions") in human nature makes good sense to me. In- 
deed, in a different political context I have examined 
ambivalence and compromise in some detail (Boehm 
1989J. More generally, I believe that such an approach 
will be neceS3ary if we are to make our analyses of geno- 
typic dispositions and their impact on cultural behavior 
clearly relevant to anthropologists not directly involved 
with what Durharn, (iggi) calls "evolutionary anthro- 
pology. " 
Aside from our partly differing interpretations about 
hierarchies' being reversed and their apparently limited 
definition of evolutionary analysis, I find aspects of Er- 
dal and Whiten's perspective quite useful insofar as mo- 
tives and intentions are not set aside or minimizeldJust 
because they provide unwieldy. By giving greater atten- 
tion to such variables we may eventually be in a better 
position to elaborate the evolutionary branch of anthro- 
pology. The analyses will go beyond the often very 
highly "theoretical" assessments of reproductive conse- 
quences associated with "s ocio biology" to include hard 
data and general considerations about human nature. 
Sanctioning of potential upstarts by the rank and file 
is purposeful and actively shapes the content of culture. 
in fact, it may be considered a form of "cultural selec- 
tion. " After two decades of social /biological analysis in 
anthropology, it seems curious that so much energy has 
been given to speculative inclusive- Fitness scenarios and 
so little to efforts to achieve breakthroughs in the direct 
study of cultural selection mechanics, an area that has 
not yielded readily to empirical analysis (see Durham 
iggi). One way in which cultural content is shaped is 
through decisions and 'their implementation (Boehm 
1978). Th ) mechanism of cultural selection must be 
given serious consideration, for it was sufficiently po- 
tent to tum the usual primate social structure upside 
down until conditions were right for its reemergence. 
In less definitive form, counterdominant forces persist 
today in hierarchical societies, either as latent threats, 
formal checks and balances in government, or revolu- 
tions and popularly based assassination conspiracies. My 
suggestion, and I think that Erdal and Whiten might 
agree, is that anthropology sort out the psychological 
variables that are needed to explain such behavior and 
begin to take human nature into account. To name just 
one benefit, further work in this direction might provide 
all anthropologists with a better conception of how cul- 
ture actually works. ' 
t. I thank Steven J. Lansing for commenting an a draft of this reply. 
The onýpnal research on which the article was based was supported 
by H. F. Cuggenheim. Foundation and the National Endowment 
for the Humanities. 
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Before addressing disagreements, I want to note points 
of convergence in the assessments of Erdal and Whiten, 
Boehm (see also r9891, and me (see also 1987,1988, 
r989, n. d. ): (i ýA stxong tendency toward egalitarian be- 
havior over a significant portion of human evolution is 
likely. (: z) A significant primate tendency toward social 
dominance was not extinguished but effectively con- 
strained by strong counterpressures during much of this 
period. (3) Marked male dominance hierarchies among 
Homo sapiens sapiens arose relatively recently, first in 
complex hunter-gatherer adaptations and then more 
generally in the context of increasing sedentism, the do- 
mestication of plants and animals, the accumulation of 
material property, and increasing sociopolitical com- 
plexity. (4) These more recent dominancq hierarchies 
are, in Erdal and Whiten's felicitous phrasing, "not 
merely reborn ape hierarchies but uniquely human in 
both their behavioural detail and their cultural recogni- 
cion. " Together, these points indicate important move- 
ment beyond evolutionary models that assumed simple 
continuity in structure between pongid dominance hier- 
archies and those of Hon. o. 
Evidence from chimpanzees illustrates patterns of co- 
operation preadapted for the counterdominance found 
among simple human groups. De Waal Jiq8z; r989: chap. 
-, ) describes a coalition involving two apparently unre- lated adult chimpanzees who violently killed a third 
chimpanzee stronger 
! ýi 
either of them and poised to 
assume the alpha position in the group. Though such 
counterdominance may occasionally occur, the gneral 
trend among chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas is to- 
ward prominent male dominance hierarchies. The re- 
verse is true among simple human societies: marked 
male dominance is transitory and counterdominance 
normative. 
The key ape-human diff-ence here may be the apes' 
wiLlingness to demonstrcre subordination. All the so- 
cial great-ape species have pronounced behavioral dis- 
plays of submission that are important if not crucial in 
facilitating social coexistence and, especially, reconcili- 
ation (de Waal 19891. Such public and formal displays of 
deference to a leader or potential strongman are absent 
in simple human societies, and this lack of behaviorally 
formalized submission is elevated to a very strong cul- 
tural norm; informal status leveling through humor, in- 
nuendo, and public social support is deeply entrenched 
(and may be internalized within the individual as a 
check on aspirations to dominance). This reluctance to 
show submission persists in a less publicly valorized and 
more individualized form in the "Don't mess with me" 
ethic of men in the many more complex societies that 
Boehm includes in his sample. 
It is an empirical question whether the benefits of 
normative cooperation in counterdominance can be ex- 
plained in terms of self-interested reciprocal altruism as 
Erdal and Whiten imply (see Aýcelrod and Hamilton 
r98 r, Trivers 198 5). The spatial and sexual dispersal of 
decentralized human foragers-a pattern that makes us 
distinctive as a primate species (Rodseth et al. ig9r)- 
combines with the great social fluidity of band compo- 
sition to undermine self-interested enforcement of re- 
ciprocal altruism in human evolution. Rule-of-chumb 
sociality of the kind experimentally documented by Ca- 
porael et al. (r989) seems a more likely candidate for 
promoter of prosocial behavior. Rule following itself has 
protoforms in chimpanzees and bonobos, as is illus- 
trated by the blindman's-buff behavior that de Waal 
(1989: r95-96) has observed in bonobos. Likewise, em- 
phasis on gift giving in simple human societies has a 
rudimentary protoform in chimpanzees' grudging trans- 
fers of prized food items such as meat. 
Humans are distinctive in their internalization of pro- 
social rules that have diffuse potential benefits to the 
group, including increase of truthful information trans- 
fer and promotion of subsequent reciprocity as well as 
conflict reduction per se. Erdal and Whiten suggest in- 
creasing tension between dominance and counterdomi- 
nance in human evolution; I concur wholeheartedly and 
indeed made a similar argument myself concerning the 
evolutionary arms race between sexual drive and cul- 
tural control in humans (1991: 400 n. zo). I would add 
only that what underlies this Machiavellian escalation 
is the competition between rule-govemed egalitarianism 
and narrow self-interest that could preclude normative 
and potentially quite risky cooperation between unre- 
lated males in leveling coalitions. Such a "psychology 
of balancing, contradictory tendencies, " incidentally, is 
reminiscent of Boehm's (1989) argument, uncited by Er- 
dal and Whiten, that "human nature" is not monolithic 
but should be considered as the Outcome Of COMDeting 
forces that commonly result in behavioral ambivalence. 
The most important and stimulating disagreements 
between Erdal and Whiten, Boehm, and me concern the 
causal mechanism of reverse dominance hierarchies or 
counterdominance in ,h* 
4man. evolution. I concur with 
Erdal aný Whiten that models of prehistoric human so- 
cial evoiution should pay more attentio., to observa- 
tional information from simple human societies, such 
as decentralized foragers, and less to information from 
food-producing societies and complex hunter-gatherers. 
I also agree with them that conscious intention is not 
a sufficient cause of counterdominance, though it may 
certainly remain an important or even a necessary part 
of counterdominance in humans. Boehm emphasizes 
proximate behavioral causes of counterdominance while 
Erdal and Whiten emphasize ultimate evolutionary 
causes, in this restricted sense, their arguments are on 
different levels of analysis and not mutually exclu- 
sive-a point that Boehm (p. 248) himself foreshadows. 
"Conscious intention" was likely not as important in 
the evolutionary origin of human culture as in its persis- 
tence and intensification. Among humans, intentional 
aversion to submission is importantly connected to social 
rules of status leveling; together, these lend more collec- 
tive support and social efficacy to counterdominance 
than either cultural rules or conscious intentions alone. 
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I agree that culture must have developed through 
evolved predispositions (indeed, I do not see how Erdal 
and Whiten could interpret my arguments otherwise). 
The important implication is that human culture fist 
developed through the law of unintended consequences 
whereby traits selected in one context were preadapted 
or "e-capted" in others (Gould and Vrba 198. z). Imitation 
and learning through socialization were likely just such 
features in human evolution. In partial contrast to 
Boehm, I afford a much greater role to imitation than to 
"intention" (a term that he does not define but that I 
take to be the conscious recognition of a desirable end 
point and the use of this end point as a self-recognized 
motive for behavior). Conversely, as Boyd and Richerson 
(1985) suggest, adaptive "learning" may be overrated as 
an originating force in the evolution ofliuman culture, 
though its small incremental effect may have been sig- 
nificant when compounded and transmitted over many 
generations. 
Whiten and Ham (199: L1 have emphasized that imita- 
tion in an experimentally rigorous sense is surprisingly 
rare in nonhuman species other than chimpanzees (and 
probably bonobos). 'fhis strongly suggests that the vastly 
increased cognitive capacities oi human metarepresen- 
cation led to a qualitative increase in human imitation 
(Whiten and Byrne 199 11. This trend is highly consistent 
with the prolonged altnciality of H. sapiens and likely 
evolutionary dependence on culturally constituted com- 
munication in the form of protolanguage and then lan- 
guage (Bickerton : 99: i; Goodenough r9go; Knauft, p. 
398 L Imitation and rapid horizontal transmission of phe- 
notypic variation allow the temporary spread of behav- 
ior that may be nonoptimal or sliýghtly maladaptive from 
an individual point oi view. In the absence oi competing 
pressures, such behavior will be selected against dirough 
standard biogenetic selection. If it also happens to be 
exapEed for group-adapcive results, however, this process 
may be slowed or even reversed. In this event, the sur- 
vival chances of members oi the group may be margin- 
ally increased. The patchy and dispersed resource envi- 
ronments characteristic of human evolution and the 
associated selective pressur-ý for sharing of information 
(Kurland and Beckerman 1985) make some degree of 
group-level adaptation empirically as well as logically 
plausible. 
My r9gr argument stressed that group-adaptive be- 
havior did not eradicate selection for seLf-interested be- 
havior; both pressures persist and remain in tension 
today. One example is the ongoing conflict between seLf- 
interested sexual desires and cultural rules that influ- 
ence sexual behavior. It seems empirically inadequate 
to rely solely on models that assume a self-interested 
arms race of deception to explain cultural rules, altruis- 
tic moral norms, and language itself (e. g., as proposed by 
Erdal and Whiten, Burling Jr9861, and Alexander (19871). 
Such models do not explain how or why such an arms 
race could generate the baseline of linguistic- referential 
trust and social affiliation among unrelated individuals 
upon which complex structures of human social and 
cultural organization depend (Knauft n. d. ). The restric- 
tive criteria for reciprocal altruism (Boyd and Lorber- 
baurn 1987, Boyd 1988, Richerson and Boyd 1989; ci , Rogers iqqoý and the ease of cheating in situations that 
are not carefully monitored (such as the spatial separa- 
tion of prehistoric men and women in a sexual division 
of labor) ground this one-sided paradigm in weak empiri- 
cal assumptions for the study of distinctively human 
evolution (see, more generally, Wilson r989, x99--, Wil- 
son and Sober r989, n. d.; Sober 19ga). 
What is still relatively lacking in the study of social 
evolution is rigorous models that take into account both 
biogenetic selection processes and the cultural channels 
of selection that increase the variability of human be- 
havior and its potential to be adaptive or maladaptive at 
tile group level (e. g., Edgerton xgg: z, Knauft r993: chap. 
8; contrast Durham r9gi). Aversion to submission in 
human evolution, both between males and between 
males and females, is particularly important. The rela- 
tionship between counterdominance and sex, sex roles, 
and the development of gender rules aeeds special atten- 
tion; what role do females play in dominance or counter- 
dominance, and what is the relationship between coun- 
terdomin=ct: and female mate selectiont' Females and 
their male kin in simple human societies often show a 
strong aversion to male suitors who are prone to domes- 
tic violence or fail to respect the rights of women. Even 
in the case of coalitional male-chimpanzee killing noted 
above, de Waal (1989: 68) mentions that a smaller female 
who was a close social ally of the dead male became 
enraged following his death, drove one of the victorious 
males up a tree, and by screaming and charging pre- 
vented him from descending for over ten minutes. As 
Worthman (1991: 384) has noted, our study of domi- 
nance and counterdominance in human evolution re- 
flects a strong male bias; human "egalitahaaism" refers 
almost exclusivzly to political relations among adult 
men. Models also overwhelmingly emphasize the indi- 
vidual as the urut of phenotypic alteration, adaptation, 
and selection despite the unique role of cultural rules 
and the rapid spread of behavior through imitation 
among humans. Given that cultural transmission has 
long exerted a significant influence on the social envi- 
ionment of humans, it is likely that cultural and bioge- 
netic selection pressures on females and males have 
been in complex tension for a significant portion of our 
genus's evolutionary history. 
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Egalitarianism and Machiavellian Intelligence in Human 
Evolution 
David Erdal & Andrew Whiten 
Archaeological evidence for an ancestral human hunting niche means that living hunter- 
gatherers offer important behavioural data for modelling the early human mind. Follow- 
ing the principles of strategic evolutionary modelling, 24 detailed hunter-gatherer 
ethnographies from four continents were examinedfor universal behaviour patterns likely 
to reflect fundamental adaptation to this human niche. Egalitarian behaviour is one of the 
most clearly documented universals, consistent with Knauft"s suggestion that human 
evolution can be described by a U-shaped curve in which non-egalitarian ape societies 
gave way to hunter-gatherer egalitarianism, to be replaced in turn by social inequalities as 
settlement and resource surpluses became more recently established. Over 100 particular 
observations further document the unique nature of human hunter-gatherer egalitarian- 
ism, demonstrating an absence of social hierarchy and sharing of resources which goes 
beyond the explanatory power of either kinship or reciprocation. Individuals do sometimes 
attempt to obtain a disproportionate share of resources or influence for themselves, but 
this is contained through vigilance and counter-dominant behaviour by their group 
members. We propose a model of human social evolution in which ancestral apesMachi- 
avellian tactics spiralled close to, but were intrinsically unable to settle at, a ceiling at 
which egalitarianism becomes the only viable strategy. 
Introduction 
Materials for modelling the early hziman mind 
Modelling the minds of living individuals is hard 
enough: attempting the same for minds long past is 
daunting indeed, when all that remains of those in- 
dividuals is a patchy assemblage of bones and arte- 
facts. By comparison with what we can infer from 
those remains, the chance to board some magicial 
time machine and observe all the richness of the 
actual behaviour of our ancestors would elevate our 
understanding of their minds almost beyond measure. 
Fortunately, direct analysis of living action is 
still possible for two major classes of individuals that 
for different reasons give pointers to what we might 
have observed from our time machine. The two classes 
are hunting-gathenng peoples, whose way of life may 
indicate important features of the late evolutionary 
period of Homo sapiens, and non-human primates, 
whose conduct may reflect aspects of the behaviour 
of the common ancestor they share with us. In both 
cases we need to recognize that any parallels are not 
direct, but are distorted in systematic ways. 
We are doubly fortunate in the substantial na- 
ture of the material available for study, for in recent 
times there have been many different hunter-gath- 
erer societies extant, and close to two hundred spe- 
cies of non-human primate. In both cases these 
numbers appear destined to suffer drastic reduction 
even in our lifetimes, so we stand at a unique point 
in the study of human origins, and we bear a heavy 
responsibility in garnering the insights fleetingly 
within our grasp. Happily, the disappearance of many 
of these subjects was preceded - by the narrow 
squeak of a century - by the insights of Darwin and 
Wallace, rather than the reverse. 
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The value of these sources has been recognized 
for some time now, as exemplified in such classic 
works as Lee & DeVore (1968) and Washburn & 
DeVore (1961). But there has also been plenty of time 
for critical analysis to highlight the shortcomings 
and pitfalls to which the inferences drawn may be 
prone. The rationale for valuing observations on a 
hunting and gathering mentality has been, to quote 
just one of the many appeals to the same statistic, 
that 'basic human social forms, language, and hu- 
man nature itself were forged during the 99 percent 
of human history when people lived in hunting and 
gathering camps' (Lee 1979,1). But do we really 
know that? Certainly there is good evidence for the 
beginnings of settled agriculture from only about 
10-12,000 years BP, and a contrasting dearth of such 
evidence for any periods earlier than this (Hole 1992). 
The 99 per cent figure thus rests on hunting and 
gathering being representative of the last million 
years. On this there is more dispute. Leakey & Lewin, 
having reviewed the evidence and sceptics' doubts 
about it, conclude that 'the earliest Homo were in- 
cipient hunters and gatherers, and that way of life 
would shape the human body and the human mind 
for more than two million years' (1992,141-2). At 
the other extreme, it is possible to argue that what 
some take for archaelogical evidence of early Homo 
hunter-gatherer bases may instead reflect only scav- 
enging and a variety of other natural processes 
(Binford 1981). Impressive evidence of hunting could 
be said to arrive only with the emergence of ana- 
tomically modern Homo sapiens as recently as 100,000 
years ago. Direct archaeological evidence for the other 
side of the foraging pattern - gathering - is hard to 
find: but it is reasonable to assume that it took place. 
Constraints on modelling the past from the present 
The chronology of the history of hunting and gather- 
ing is not clear, but the logic of evolution implies 
that todays' hunter-gatherers offer models likely to 
be misleading the further into the past we attempt to 
cast our inferences. Even if Leakey & Lewin are cor- 
rect in identifying a hunting and gathering way of 
life with the emergence of Homo, we should not ex- 
pect an identity between the mentality of today's 
foraging peoples and that of Homo habilis or Homo 
erectus, with their significantly smaller brains. 
There are additional constraints in the model- 
ling process. Many modern hunter-gatherers have 
been relegated by pressure from agricultural and 
industrial societies to marginal areas, whereas be- 
fore the advent of herding and agriculture foragers 
dominated the land occupied by hominids and could 
choose the most attractive areas. Further, most 
hunter-gatherers for whom there are good ethno- 
graphic records have some degree of symbiotic rela- 
tionship with agricultural peoples, which may have 
influenced their behaviour (e. g. Leacock 1954; 1980; 
Hyde 1959,20; Bailey et al. 1989). 
Strategic inodelling and fainter-gatherer core behaviour 
patterns 
The constraints reviewed above clearly impose meth- 
odological limitations. We concur with Tooby & 
DeVore (1987) that referential modelling - in which 
one particular hunting-gathering society is selected 
as an optimal model for the past - is most likely to 
be misleading and should be avoided in favour of 
strategic modelling. The rationale of the latter is to 
use a much greater diversity of information to build 
general models of behavioural ecology, into which 
the known features of ancestral hominids may be 
fitted in order to produce inferences about yet un- 
known characteristics. A good example is the way in 
which our knowledge of the relationships between 
sexual dimorphism and mating patterns in primates 
and other mammals may be used to deduce the im- 
plications of dimorphism in fossil hominids (e. g. 
Foley 1988,216; Potts 1992). 
A basic methodological rule derived from this 
approach is to identify common patterns in the enor- 
mous diversity of cultures and ecologies associated 
with present-day foragers. If such patterns exist, then 
this suggests that they are inherent functional com- 
ponents of human hunting-gathering society, as likely 
to characterize the history we aim to reconstruct as 
the present we can observe. Such configurations do 
exist, and students of hunter-gatherers have dis- 
cerned a cluster of features which appear to act as 
the functional core of the societies: egalitarianism, 
cooperation, and sharing, on a scale unprecedented 
in primate evolution, and sometimes dubbed 'primi- 
tive communism' (Lee 1979,460). 
Accordingly we focus on this core in the present 
paper. There are additional reasons for doing so. 
First, recent years have seen the accumulation of 
important new data on these behaviours in both 
human and non-human primates, which permit evo- 
lutionary modelling (e. g. Knauft 1991; Harcourt & 
de Waal 1992; Boesch & Boesch 1989). Second, there 
have been exciting developments in the theory of 
altruism, from Trivers (1971) to Frank (1988). And 
finally, insights about the evolution of this core have 
relevance for us today. Associated proximate psy- 
chological mechanisms are likely to be with us in 
modem times, and although they may not have the 
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reproductive consequences which they did in the 
ancestral environments which moulded their evolu- 
tion, they are likely to have material effects on psy- 
chological motivation and well-being. Structures of 
present-day living whose design is shaped by an 
understanding of these predispositions may prove 
much more productive than those which ignore them. 
The egalitariaii puzzle 
The egalitarianism of modern hunter-gatherers is an 
apparent anomaly in evolutionary terms. The puzzle 
is that although dominance hierarchies are likely to 
have characterized the ancestor shared by chimpan- 
zees and humans, and institutional hierarchies are 
characteristic of modem humans, the hunter-gather- 
ers representing the intervening phase are almost 
entirely egalitarian in social structure and behav- 
iour. 
This anomaly was characterized by Knauft 
(1991) as a'U'shaped curve in evolution: moving down 
the left arm from ape hierarchies to hunter-gatherer 
egalitarianism, and then up the right arm with agri- 
cultural and then modern hierarchical societies. 
This curve is a useful way to conceptualize the 
evolution of social behaviour, but it must have been 
a heavily skewed 'U'. We do not know when the 
bottom of the left hand arm was reached - when 
egalitarian behaviour first appeared in evolution - 
but we do know that the left arm and the bottom 
together covered a period of several million years. 
We also know that the process at work involved 
biological evolution, with an enormous increase in 
brain size being a key result. If there are specific 
inherited predispositions for social behaviour, it must 
have been during this period that they were shaped 
by evolutionary processes. 
On the other hand, the right hand arm turned 
upwards, into hierarchical social organizations, only 
about 10,000 years ago, with the advent of agricul- 
tural societies, There were possible precursors in the 
complex hunter-gatherer societies of the northwest 
coast of North America, perhaps five thousand years 
earlier (Kroeber 1939,29; Su ttles 1968,105) and pos- 
sibly earlier still in Europe (Mellars this volume). 
However, until the advent of agriculture this social 
complexity is not characteristic. The evolutionary 
pressures that led to modem levels of encephalization 
took effect in the long preceding period when hu- 
mans and their precursors lived in simple foraging 
societies - associated, we therefore infer, with egali- 
tarian social behaviour. The process that led to hier- 
archy was not an additional period of biologically 
driven evolution - there was not time for that, and 
no further significant biological changes are appar- 
ent. It was rather the result of the already evolved 
human psychology meeting new circumstances. As 
a result, the'U' may look (perhaps appropriately), more 
like a question mark lying on its back (Fig. 12.1). 
In order better to model the mentality underly- 
ing the different parts of the curve and tc: attempt to 
understand the processes which moulded it, we need 
a deeper appreciation of the nature of the egalitari- 
anism in question. This is the task of the next section. 
Hunter-gatherer egalitarianism 
Hunter-gatherers are characterized by food-sharing 
and by a virtually complete absence of hierarchy or 
dominance, We will deal with these two subjects 
separately, and then draw out their common psy- 
chological elements. 
Food-sharing 
Meat is universally shared 
Amongst hunter-gatherers food, and particularly 
meat, is shared. This has been observed by virtually 
all ethnographers and has been tested quite rigor- 
ously by modern anthropologists. There is not space 
here to quote widely from these studies, but the 
similarities are impressive, across all continents (Ta- 
ble 12.1 - column headed 'Meat-Sharing'). 
Of particular interest are the three more recent 
studies which have used techniques developed in 
the discipline of behavioural ecology to quantify 
their observations. These papers are marked with an 
Hierarchical 
A 
B 
c 
Egalitarian 
c. 6m up Time 
2000 AD 
Figure 12.1. Social structure in evolution. 'A' is the 
point at which the hominid line splitfrom the chimpan- 
zee line. 'C' is some 10-15,000 years BP, the beginning of 
complex societies. 'AC'covers several million years of 
biological evolution. It is not clear when 'B' - the 
beginning of egalitarian social behaviour, as shown by 
modern hunter-gatherers - occurred. 'BC'may have 
been millions of years or merely tens of thousands. 
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asterisk in the 'Meat-Sharing' column in Table 12.1. 
Kaplan & Hill, in a rigorous study designed to test 
competing hypotheses about sharing, conclude that: 
'all the data suggest that the Ache are pooling most 
of the food they acquire and are sharing the food 
among families according to the number of depend- 
ents present' (1985,233). Bailey's work among the 
Efe focuses only on the sharing among hunters be- 
fore they return to camp, where further sharing takes 
place, but his conclusion is similar (1991,90). Fi- 
nally, Hawkes et al. (1991,87) find that the Hadza 
hunters choose a sharing strategy even though a 
selfish strategy apparently gives higher returns. 
In all these cases, a psychological model which 
is based on rational self interest as the prime ex- 
planatory variable simply does not fit the data. This 
conclusion is thoroughly reinforced by the more tra- 
ditional ethnographies, based on their observation 
of incidents, without quantification. Among the 
Walbiri, for example, in times of scarcity the mem- 
bers of the band disperse to join neighbouring groups. 
'Even if the hosts' resources were also limited, they 
were shared until all the food was consumed. Then 
hosts and guests alike literally tightened their string- 
belts and scoured the countryside' (Meggitt 1962,52). 
In summary, modern hunter-gatherers, as long 
as they have not been drawn in to trading relation- 
ships or property systems based on other ways of 
life, all share food. They do not share only with kin; 
they do not share only with those who reciprocate; 
they share out what they have according to need, 
even when food is scarce. 
The predispositions behind food-sharing 
The cross-cultural evidence on food-sharing is so 
consistent that it invites the hypothesis that food- 
sharing is influenced by evolved, inherited predis- 
positions. 
The alternative explanation that sharing is pro- 
duced by cultural processes would be better sup- 
ported if there were greater cultural variation, with 
at least some pre-contact cultures generating an op- 
position to sharing. The evidence is that the specific 
ways in which food is shared are influenced in their 
details by the local culture: but the existence of gen- 
eralised sharing is universal. 
The argument that cultural processes explain 
the very existence of food-sharing implies that shar- 
ing is not an evolved predisposition: rather, that 
selfishness is the genetically effective 'strategy', which 
is only overcome by cultural training. Such a model 
implies that there is a tenýion between on the one 
hand inherited, adaptive, selfish tendencies and on 
the other cultural rules favouring sharing. In princi- 
ple, the likelihood of such a tension being always 
and everywhere resolved in favour of sharing, with 
aberrations being minor and rare, is too low to give 
support to the cultural model. 
Shepher's 0 983) work on incest suggests a much 
more plausible model for the relationship between 
predispositions and culture. Shepher showed that 
there is a developmental process which leads to nega- 
tive imprinting among young children brought up 
together, so that the varied and elaborate incest ta- 
boos found in different cultures are built on a basic, 
irreversible psychological process. Generalizing this 
model suggests that cultural elaborations are likely 
to be built on a foundation of evolved predisposi- 
tions: they are not determined in detail by them, and 
the refinements may be very varied and complex 
indeed, but it is only very rarely that cultural 
elaborations systematically contradict the evolved 
predispositions on which they are founded. And 
when they do, as with the celibacy of priests, they 
are much honoured in the breach. 
This model suggests that sharing is likely to be, 
or to be based on, an evolved, psychological predis- 
position. The cross-cultural consistency of sharing, 
in an environment which is in important respects 
likely to be similar to the environment in which we 
evolved, supports this picture of an evolved ten- 
dency. The various cultural elaborations of sharing 
may all be founded on an evolved predisposition to 
share, just as the elaborations of the incest taboo are 
founded on the evolved negative imprinting process 
among children. 
Conflicts over food-sharing 
If there are predispositions at work here, however, 
they are not straightforward. It is not simply that a 
human hunter-gatherer, carrying meat and faced with 
a hungry member of his or her band, is predisposed 
to give some of the meat away. Sometimes there are 
intense arguments and jealousies about the sharing 
of the meat. References are given in Table 12.1, in the 
column headed 'Vigilance/Argument'. 
In Africa, Bailey speaks of the Efe's 'extremely 
heated vociferous arguments' (1991,94). Turnbull 
says the Mbuti arguments 'are frequently long and 
loud' (1965,158). Tanaka speaks similarly of the San 
(1980,95). Among the! Kung, Marshall observes'self 
interest and much jealous watchfulness' (1961,350) 
and Thomas similarly describes tension in food-shar- 
ing (1959,116-19). 
Elsewhere, either hostility and suspicion are 
not reported, or food-sharing takes place with greater 
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Table 12.1. Ethnographic references describing egalitarianism in hunter-gatherers, including vigilant food-sharing, informal leadership without 
authority, and counter-dontinant behaviour. The numbers refer to pages in the texts. *These studies are based oil numerical data. 
Vigilant Sharing Leadership 
Continent and Society Reference Meat- Vigilancel Cheatingl Informal 
Absence of Counter- 
Sharing Argument Stealing Leadership Authority Dominance 
Africa 
Dorobo Huntingford 1955 612 
Efe Bailey 1991 90 83,94 70 59 93 
Hadza Hawkes et at. 1991 4. 
Mbuti Turnbull 1965 158 158 198 126,178,181-2 180-81 178,183 
San - Naron 
San-! Kung 
Bleek 1928 
Lee 1979 
16 
]is 372 
37 
343-8 
37 
xxii, 343 24,244-6,344 
Marshall 1961 357,362 350 358 
San Tanaka1980 89,95,99 95 122 108,123 93,108 113 
Australia 
Pitiandjara Tindale 1972 261-2 261 
Tiwi Goodale 1971 171-2 338 
Walbiri Meggitt 1962 52 252 175 190,245,250 247,249,250 88 
Asia 
Batek Endicott 1988 115-18 124-5 125 112,123 121-3 
Paliyan Gardner 1972 415 415,425-6 1158-91 
426 
Pandararn Morris 1982a 11982b] 18011031 
N. Anierica 
Copper Damas 1972 24-5 32 32 33 
Cree Rogers1972 120 12.2 121 121 
Dogrib Helm 1972 69,78,90 78 79-80 77,79 
Naskapi Leacock 1980 119821 11601 27,29-30 
Netsilik Balikci 1970 117 178-9 7Z 116,149 XV 
Rasmussen 1931 142,147,162 13 
Northern Nomads Riches 1982 70,79,83 71 19,7Z 77 45,74 27 
Utkuhikhalingmiut Briggs 1970 98 112 
S. America 
Ache Kaplan & Hill 1985 233* 
Siriono Holmberg 1950 31 33,36,61 25,46,60 
L- 
equanimity. Balikci speaks of 'laughter and merry- 
making'among the Netsilik (1970,46). Damas'(1972) 
picture of the Copper Eskimo is similar in tone. The 
picture among the Asian and Australian groups is 
similarly lacking in reports of argument and conflict 
over food-sharing. However, the existence of conflict 
in the African groups is sufficient to demonstrate 
that there is no simple predisposition to share food. 
Cheating and stealing in food-sharing 
A second indication that there is no simple predis- 
position to share is that cheating and stealing some- 
times occur. References are listed in Table 12.1, in 
the column headed 'Cheating/ Stealing'. 
Tanaka says of the San, for example, that 'the 
individual has a strong sense of possessiveness and 
usually tends to think egocentrically ... A man may 
sneak a small catch of game into his hut to share 
only with his family, or otherwise fail to share food 
as he should' (1980,122). Turnbull remarks that 'It 
would be a rare Mbuti woman who did not conceal a 
portion of the catch in case she was forced to share 
with others' (1965,198). On the same page Turnbull 
tells the interesting story of how Pepei the thief was 
humiliated into changing his ways by massive gifts 
of meat, delivered with contempt (see also 1965,120). 
In the American groups, Balikci observes theft 
among the Netsilik, 'cheerfully practised in relation 
to strangers' (1970,178), and the destruction of food 
belonging to someone out of favour (1970,179). 
Holmberg (1950,36) describes hoarding and unwill- 
ingness to share among the Siriono, although their 
history as agriculturalists who reverted to foraging 
makes them a poor candidate for inclusion in a stra- 
tegic model (Stearman 1984). 
In Australia, Meggitt mentions a case of a 
woman being thrashed for stealing food from an- 
other camp (1962,175). 
The ftinction of food-sharing 
These instances of conflict over sharing and of steal- 
ing or hoarding suggest that universal as it is among 
hunter-gatherers, food-sharing must be the outcome 
not of a simple predisposition to share, but of a 
complex set of behavioural predispositions, in inter- 
action with key features of the hunting-gathering 
environment. The puzzle from an evolutionary view 
is not that there is conflict and stealing, which can 
easily be incorporated into a 'selfish gene, selfish 
person' model, but that these instances are rare, and 
that sharing itself is ubiquitous and normal. 
At the functional level, the main argument is 
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that food-sharing reduces risk for all individuals, 
including the hunters (Damas 1972,25; Lovejoy 1931; 
Wiessner 1982; Cashdan 1985; Smith 1988), with an 
additional suggestion that the successful hunters' 
largesse with meat helps them as individuals obtain 
the most capable women as wives (Riches 1984,240) 
and more frequent adulterous mating opportunites 
(Kaplan & Hill 1985,237; Hawkes 1993). 
The risk-reduction model depends on two es- 
tablished facts. Firstly, there is a high variance in 
hunting returns, because game is distributed unpre- 
dictably and is hard to kill when it is found. And 
secondly, many game animals have much more meat 
than any single human can consume before it rots. 
So the marginal cost to a successful hunter of giving 
meat away is low, and the benefit to the hungry 
members of his band is high. Moreover, if he can 
count on receiving meat when he fails but others 
succeed, then the risk profile over time for each indi- 
vidual is significantly improved by sharing: each 
successful hunter is giving away meat which he can- 
not use, and receiving at a different time meat of 
great value to him. A similar balance of costs and 
benefits has led to blood sharing in vampire bats, purely 
through the evolution of behavioural dispositions, 
apparently without any cultural influence (Wilkinson 
1984). The main difference is that the bats tend to 
reciprocate with particular individuals, whereas hu- 
mans consistently share with all in the band. 
The psychology of food-sharing 
Moving from the functional to the proximate psy- 
chological level, it is still unclear what is going on. A 
'rational self-interest' model would suggest that pos- 
sibly each individual is making calculations, recog- 
nizing the improvement in his personal situation 
created by sharing, and so deciding to take part. A 
'reciprocity' model would explain sharing as being 
in effect an exchange, which evens out returns over 
time (Trivers 1971). Neither of these models is sup- 
ported, however, by the fact that consistently over 
time some hunters continue to contribute more meat 
than they and their families consume (Kaplan & Hill 
1985,234; Bailey 1991,89). This is neither 'rationally 
self-interested' nor 'reciprocal'. It is perhaps possi- 
ble that over the very long term there is rough reci- 
procity: a family with several productive adults 
makes significant net contributions for years, but 
then becomes a family of old and young, making 
significant net demands of the band. However, if 
this is the case, it does not occur through rational 
calculations, which tAke as their horizon timespans 
far shorter than generations. 
The fact that food-sharing is sustained even 
when there is nothing like a full return of what is 
given away suggests that at the proximate, psycho- 
logical level there is one or more evolved predisposi- 
tion at work. 
Leadership 
The second area which demonstrates egalitarianism 
in hunter-gatherers, and so adds to the evolutionary 
anomaly, is the process of leadership. 
Leaders with arithority are iiot created by hitnter- 
gatherers 
There is no dominance hierarchy among hunter-gath- 
erers. No individual has priority of access to food, 
which, as we have seen, is shared. In spite of the 
marginal female preference for the more successful 
hunters as lovers, access to sexual partners is not a 
right which correlates with rank - there is no droit 
de seignetir. In fact rank in that sense is simply not 
discernible among hunter-gatherers. This is a cross- 
cultural universal, which rings out unmistakably 
from the ethnographic literature, sometimes in the 
strongest terms: 'Individual authority is unthinkable' 
(Turnbull 1965,181). References to some of the many 
studies which fill out this picture across all conti- 
nents are given in Table 12.1, in the column headed 
'Absence of Authority'. 
Contact with agricultural or colonial societies 
frequently leads to the creation of leaders - or at 
least to the adoption of leadership titles. The titles 
remain empty in some cases, like the Hill Pandararn 
(Morris 1982b, 158-9), the Paliyan (Gardner 1972, 
425-6), the Mbuti (Turnbull 1965,27,42,45,103) and 
the San (Lee 1979,346,348-9); in others real leader- 
ship positions develop in response to the pressures 
from invading peoples, as amongst some San (Lee 
1979,32) and the Plains Indians (Hyde 1959,20; 
Pi,, vinse 1955,344); and in others real authority is to 
some extent created by external government authori- 
ties, as among the Walbiri (Meggitt 1962,250). In 
1921 Bleek noted an example of the contact effect 
among the Naron: 'whenever (he) is speaking Dutch, 
which the others do not understand, he asserts that 
he is now chief, but when speaking Bushman he 
never ventures to claim this, but chimes in with the 
rest, that there are no chiefs ... Certainly he had no 
authority now save among his own family' (1928, 
36). And the early seventeenth-century Jesuit, Father 
Lejeune, reported to his superiors the reproaches of 
the Montagnais Naskapi at the uncivilized behaviour 
of the French, who 'fear our captains, while they 
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laugh at and make sport of theirs ... (and) ... only 
obey their chief through goodwill towards him' 
(Leacock 1980,29). 
The consistent picture is that there is no perma- 
nent role of 'leader-with-authority' created by hunter- 
gatherers for themselves. 
Leadership is others listening with respect 
Without authoritative leaders, the process of group 
decision-making is universally consensual. Discussions 
develop naturally and informally. Everyone generally 
has the right to speak, and it is characteristic that 
people are always ready to make suggestions and to 
listen to others. So these conferences can be lengthy. 
There is a pattern to the outcome of these dis- 
cussions: effective individuals - the best hunters 
when hunting is the subject, the most knowledge- 
able person in a conference about ritual - are gener- 
ally paid more attention than others who are seen to 
be less skilled. And frequently these experts gain 
agreement from the others to what they propose. 
However, this is not always the case. Great hunt- 
ers can be over-ruled even in hunting matters. And 
when a consensus has been reached, no-one has to 
follow it against their will - there is no enforcement 
mechanism. 
In some cases there are named leadership roles - 
e. g. the Netsilik 'inhumataq' or 'thinker' - but even 
where there are named roles, the leaders are not 
'obeyed', but rather 'listened to' (Riches 1982,74) - 
and sometimes not listened to. References filling out 
this picture are also given in Table 12.1, in the col- 
umn headed 'Informal Leadership'. 
In general, expertise and personal characteris- 
tics lead to the granting of respect in particular cir- 
cumstances. There is nothing permanent about that 
respect: in a different situation a different person 
will be given respect, and even in an identical situa- 
tionthenextdayth( -ame expert may not be heeded. 
Leadership is ultimately created by others' listening. 
Even combining expertise with a forceful personal- 
ity is not enough to raise anyone into a permanently 
dominant position, however much individuals may 
try to achieve that. 
Leaders are prevented from achieving dominance 
It is characteristic of hunter-gatherers that they bring 
back to earth, often with a bump, anyone who tries 
to achieve dominance - no matter how well re- 
spected they may be for particular skills. Ambitions 
for status and domination are simply not tolerated. 
The various manoeuvres used to bring leaders back 
into line have been catalogued by Boehm (1993), 
across a broad range of societies. He calls this phe- 
nomenon a 'reverse dominance hierarchy'. However, 
since respect is still given to leaders in particular 
situations, the incipient hierarchy is not really re- 
versed but rather prevented from developing be- 
yond those particular situations where leadership is 
required. We feel the term 'counter-dominance' is 
more appropriate (see Erdal & Whiten 1994; Boehm 
1994 for discussion). References to studies document- 
ing counter-dominance are included in Table 12.1, in 
the column with that heading. 
In Africa, among the Mbuti, Turnbull reported 
that 'Some men, because of exceptional hunting skill, 
may come to resent it when their views are disre- 
garded, but if they try to force these views they are 
very promptly subjected to ridicule' (1965,183, see 
also 178). This is a particularly important observa- 
tion, making clear that the skilled habitually are 
heeded, and that this gives them pleasure. The tak- 
ing of pleasure in gaining the respect of others in the 
group implies a psychological predisposition at work. 
The others seem to be aware of the pleasure, and 
beyond a certain point resist. 
Lee summarizes: 'The Mung are a fiercely egali- 
tarian people ... cutting down to size the arrogant 
and the boastful' (1979,244. See also pp. 24 and 246 
for surprising examples, and the beautiful ! Kung 
explanation that if someone is too proud they want 
to 'cool his heart and make him gentle'). Bailey gives 
an interesting picture of how, when a powerful Efe 
hunter took a second wife, the group supported his 
first wife against his attempted self-aggrandizement, 
and reduced his share of meat dramatically. In re- 
sponse, he went through a transformation in his be- 
haviour, changing from being highly assertive to 
being positively retiring, giving up any semblance 
of dominance (1991,93). 
In America, Balikci described how the recog- 
ni; -ed Netsilik 'thinkers', were respectful of others 
(1970,116). This appears to be partly for fear of 
jealousy and hostility, which can be intense and dan- 
gerous (1970,130,137,170,173-5). 
In Asia, Gardner describes among the gentle, 
anti-competitive Paliyans the resentful 'criticism of 
his assertiveness and ... questioning of his stature' 
against polygynous'headmen' (1972,426). 
Among the Australians, Boehm found only two 
categories of counter-dominance - ridicule and ex- 
ecution (1993,232, table 1). Reports are hard to find. 
One reason may be that there are automatic social 
mechanisms at work. Meggitt describes how among 
the Walbiri, kin relationships mean that an individual 
with a considerable role to play one day might only 
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have a minor role the next, and adds: 'this frequent 
variation in the extent of authority that an individual 
exercised from one situation to another militated 
against the emergence of a class of permanent lead- 
ers' (1962,249). Because this is a feature of the kin 
system, egalitarianism does not depend on reactions 
by individuals, as it does elsewhere. 
In summary, if individuals attempt to build on 
the respect that they are granted in situations where 
they have expertise, so as to become more perma- 
nent leaders, then in various ways the others around 
them put them back in their place - as respected 
equals, but nothing more. 
The predisposition towards cotinter-doininance 
Those who attempt dominance can be ignored, criti- 
cized, ridiculed, overruled, abandoned, ostracized 
or killed. Boehm (1993) explains this as a conscious, 
intentional, joint response by followers operating as 
a group, emphasizing the role of conscious decision- 
making in the process. 
We have put the argument that food-sharing is 
better explained as a culturally influenced activity 
founded on an evolved disposition to share, rather 
than being a culturally created process in contradic- 
tion with purely selfish evolved predispositions. Ex- 
actly the same argument applies to counter-dominance. 
Counter-dominance and egalitarian behaviour de- 
pend on psychological dispositions which create and 
support them. If the don-dnance hierarchy had remained 
functionally effective in evolution, then the possibil- 
ity of creating egalitarianism in hunter-gatherer 
bands simply would not have arisen. The psycho- 
logical predispositions which underlie counter-domi- 
nance - for example, resentment at aggressive 
behaviour, discomfort or anger at being dominated, 
satisfaction when consensus is reached, respect for 
others' feelings - form part of our psychology be- 
cause they were more effective functionally than the 
dominance/ submission psychology out of which 
they must have evolved. There would be no ability 
to take conscious decisions to counteract dominant 
individuals - certainly not as a characteristic be- 
haviour - if we did not have the underlying psy- 
chological disposition to do so. 
The evolution of counter-dominance 
How could the evolutionary change represented by 
the first part of the 'U' curve in Figure 12.1 have 
come about? We have argued that human egalitari- 
anism represents a radical innovation when compared 
with the dominance structures of non-human primates. 
However, anthropoid primates do exhibit so- 
cial characteristics which make the evolutionary in- 
novation less miraculous that it may seem at first 
sight. First, a substantial new literature shows that 
competition amongst monkeys and apes is mediated 
to a significant degree by brain as well as brawn. The 
social and cognitive expertise concerned has been 
called 'Machiavellian Intelligence' (Byrne & Whiten 
1988). Skills such as tactical deception (Whiten & 
Byrne 1988; Byrne & Whiten 1992; Byrne this vol- 
ume) permit the physical superiority of dominant 
individuals to be undermined, even if only to a lim- 
ited extent. 
Second, the formation of alliances, in which two 
or more individuals cooperate to displace a third who 
is capable of dominating each of them in a dyadic 
contest, has now been well documented in anthrbpoid 
primates (Harcourt 1988; Harcourt & de Waal 1992). 
These characteristics appear to be special to an- 
thropoids (Harcourt 1988; 1992). They are sufficiently 
widespread that it is uncontroversial to suggest that 
counter-dominance has been built on such founda- 
tions. That these foundations are limited in non- 
human primates, however, is emphasized by the fact 
that dominance relations continue to permit gross 
variations in access to resources. 
In our closest relatives, chimpanzees, detailed 
studies of captive groups have revealed these politi- 
cal abilities to be particularly refined (de Waal 1982; 
1992a). The operation of alliances incorporates a 
number of specific communicative abilities which 
function to recruit and reassure potential allies, in 
what are often protracted sequences of negotiation. 
Other political acts are deployed at times remote 
from the operation of alliances themselves, These 
include affiliative acts directed at potential allies be- 
fore an attack on an adversary is launched; reward 
of supporters (through grooming, for example) in 
the aftermath of a conflict; interference in the forma- 
tion of competing alliances; and reve-ge against those 
who switch allegiance. In addition, powers of decep- 
tion and counter-deception reach new heights (Byrne 
& Whiten 1992; de Waal 1992b). Observational and 
experimental data converge in support of chimpan- 
zees' abilities to read states of mind in others and 
exploit this ability in sophisticated social manipula- 
tion (Whiten 1991; 1993). As a result of this cognitive 
repertoire, chimpanzee dominance relations can be 
highly dynamic. De Waal (1982) charted the way in 
which each of three adult males succeeded in gain- 
ing alpha status, only to be ousted by a coalition of 
the other two: 'the strongest of the three competing 
parties almost automatically elicits cooperation 
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against himself, because the weaker parties gain more 
by joining together and sharing the payoffs than by 
joining the strongest party, who will monopolize the 
payoffs' (de Waal cited in Leakey & Lewin 1992,290). 
Such instability and political skill suggest the 
sort of social preadaptations from which human 
counter-dominance is likely to have evolved. Chim- 
panzees are not our ancestors, of course, and to treat 
them as such would court the dangers of referential 
modelling. In the spirit of the more robust approach 
of strategic modelling referred to earlier, it is impor- 
tant to acknowledge those features of Machiavellian 
behaviour outlined above, especially alliance forma- 
tion, which are widespread in anthropoid primates 
and therefore reliably inferred attributes of our last 
non-human ancestor. In conjunction with this pic- 
ture, chimpanzees demonstrate how far an ape 
encephalized to an extent similar to Australopitizectis 
can push the manipulation of dominants. 
Clearly, such temporary and partial counter- 
dominance could have formed the evolutionary 
precursor to the more comprehensive counter-domi- 
nance we have described for hunter-gatherers. An- 
swers to how and why the shift occurred must at 
present be speculative. Erdal & Whiten (1994) have 
suggested that a small increase in encephalization 
would permit a refinement in counter-dominance, 
which could set in train a spiralling selection pres- 
sure for further political skills. Robert Frank has sug- 
gested to us that among the new skills a greater 
emphasis on attractive as against coercive tactics 
would be predicted -a strategy of 'dominance 
through charm'. We envisage the evolutionary spi- 
ral eventually reaching a ceiling where the Machi- 
avellian skills of the population at large were so 
refined that it would no longer have been strategi- 
cally practicable to expend energy in an effort to 
dominate other individuals physically. This logic is 
parallel to that of Trivers (1971), who proposed that 
an arms race of subtle cheating in a population of 
reciprocal altruists could escalate to a ceiling where 
the only viable strategy is generalized altruism. 
At this point different behaviour would have 
become functionally viable - more viable than at- 
tempted dominance. Instead of wasting time and 
energy in a futile effort to dominate others, indi- 
viduals who devoted enough of their personal re- 
sources to counteracting others' dominance, but did 
not waste time and energy by themselves trying 
to achieve dominance, would be able to devote 
much more energy to, productive foraging and social 
behaviour. Those who remained trapped in the old 
dominance/ submission patterns would be wasting 
their time by comparison. In particular, the ability of 
a group of individuals arranged in a dominance hi- 
erarchy to exploit resources with the unpredictably 
scattered, large-package characteristics of the hunter- 
gatherer ecological niche is severely limited. The suc- 
cessful strategy in that niche includes the daily 
dispersion of the hunters and gatherers, the return 
to a home base and the sharing of food (Isaac 1978, 
92). This implies a complex set of social skills in- 
volved in making trustworthy commitments. The 
underlying psychological predispositions are quite 
different from those of the old dominance/submis- 
sion spectrum. In particular, a switch is required 
from an individual 'scare off the others and get what 
I can' strategy, to one of fair play, of identification 
with the others in the group, of pleasure in relation- 
ships of equality rather than dominance, of emo- 
tional commitment to share and to help others in 
need, of confidence that others will help. These posi- 
tive feelings are seen, for example, in Rasmussen's 
observation among the Netsilik that 'People living 
together in a hunting camp feel closely attached to 
one another in many ways' (1931,147), and in 
Tanaka's report that after a night of dancing 'Feelings 
of peace and security flood the San camp' (1980,115). 
An important element in this fair-play complex 
is the inclination in each individual to resist being 
dominated or taken advantage of, either in food- 
sharing or in leadership: hence the vigilance seen 
among hunter-gatherers in sharing, and in bringing 
leaders to heel when they step out of line. 
The psychology of egalitarianism 
If something like this evolutionary process occurred, 
then the resulting psychology would be expected to 
be very complex. Each individual must still retain 
the disposition to 'look out for number one', at least 
on an opportunistic basis. In the case of sharing, this 
will include the inclination to hoard and perhaps 
even to steal, as well as supporting the vigilance 
noted above. But it must not be strong enough to 
make sharing break down. And it must be combined 
with a willingness to punish cheating in others - 
something which no 'rational self-interest' model can 
predict or explain, because the process of punishing 
others is costly to the one who punishes (Frank 1988). 
In the case of leadership, presumably the earlier pre- 
disposition to 'dominate if possible' has not been 
eradicated; but it has been coupled with the desire 
and commitment to resist domination too, and to 
accept an equal relationship as a good outcome. In 
addition, there must be a willingness to take the 
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initiative, particularly where one is confident of one's 
knowledge or expertise - but one must also be pre- 
pared to listen, and to follow a different line if the 
group goes that way, or to defer if someone else 
clearly has superior skill or knowledge. Boehm (1989) 
similarly models a complex psychology with self- 
contradictory elements. 
An important psychological element underpin- 
ning both food-sharing and egalitarian leadership is 
the process of weighing up one's own position vis-A- 
vis that of others. If a carcass is being divided up, 
each individual is extremely sensitive to anything 
which suggests that he or she is not getting a fair 
share relative to each other participant. And if one is 
listening to an expert hunter's proposal on how to 
get hold of the next carcass, each person is very 
aware of his own position relative to that of the 
would-be leader. 
It is interesting that apparently the predisposi- 
tion is not to achieve superiority: not to get more 
meat than anyone else, nor to dominate the expert. 
But if anyone else seems to be getting more meat, or 
becoming too self-assertive, then a trigger is pulled, 
and someone steps in, to ensure a fair distribution, 
or to bring the leader back into line. This is not so 
much keeping up with the Joneses, as making sure 
that none of the joneses gets ahead in the first 
place. Frank (1985) examines a multitude of eco- 
nomic and political effects of this predisposition to 
measure ourselves against those with whom we feel 
some affinity. 
This tendency could be the outcome of combi- 
nations of contradictory dispositions: to get more 
and at the same time to stop others from getting 
more; to dominate, and to stop others from dominat- 
ing. As these contradictory predispositions evolved, 
one result must have been that behaviour became 
more and more flexible: there are a host of different 
possible responses to any social situation. And here 
there is a likely role for the ability to pass on and 
absorb a culture - by what is virtually an imprint- 
ing process. Culturally defined ways to behave limit 
the choices that have to be made, helping to resolve 
what would otherwise be constant psychological di- 
lemmas. 
Additionally, with this varied psychology, there 
is an important role for the ability to think. With 
so many self-contradictory options there would be 
a clear adaptive advantage in the ability to hold 
in mind important features of the environment, 
particularly the social environment, for long enough 
so that one's reactions could be resolved into a 
decision. 
Other evidence 
The model presented here has not yet been tested on 
humans in psychological experiments or surveys, 
although the studies by Cosmides & Tooby on 
cheater-detection (1992) and by Frank (1988) and 
Caporael et al. (1989) on cooperation, among others, 
seem to support the model. 
One key question which this analysis raises is 
why, given this evolved psychology, the develop- 
ment of herding and agriculture about 10,000 years 
ago triggered the creation of big-men, of chiefs, of 
classes and ultimately of multi-level institutional- 
ized hierarchies. As we have said, there was not time 
for significant biological evolution to take place: these 
developments must depend on the same psychology 
as hunter-gatherer egalitarianism. The answer must 
lie in the fit between the evolved psychological pre- 
dispositions and the new environment. Since this is 
no longer the environment in which humans evolved, 
the evolved predispositions need not in principle 
lead to behaviour which is functionally effective. 
The correlation between the proximate cause of the 
behaviour and the genetic function of the behaviour 
may be broken in a radically different environment 
(Symons 1979,306-7; Tooby & DeVore 1987,198). 
Key aspects of the environment which are different 
include the availability of stored surpluses; the exist- 
ence of highly productive assets; the population den- 
sity; the ability of individuals or small groups to 
control the surpluses and the assets; and the plan- 
ning time horizon (Johnson & Earle 1987). Some- 
how, the counter-dominant tendency became 
ineffective, although it recurs consistently (Boehm 
1993). How that happened would take us far from 
modelling the early human mind. 
Conclusion 
The early human mind is likely to have been charac- 
terized by psychological dispositions supporting 
egalitarianism: vigilant food-sharing, informal lead- 
ership and counter-dominant behaviour. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Questionnaire used in the study reported in Chapter 4 
QUESTIONARTO 
Le mie risposte possono essere utilizzate per questa ricerca. S1 El 
PRIMA SEZIONE: CRIMINALITA NELLA SUA CITrk 
Questa sezione si riferisce alla Sua esperienza 12ersonale riguardo alla criminalith. 
Dall'inizio dell'anno, it 1 gennaio 1998, nella Sua cittý, qualcuno: 0 
L'ha assalito/a .................................................................................. 
B6 
L'ha derubato/a ................................................................................. 
El El 
ha compiuto atti di libidine violenta contro di Lei? ............................. 
13 1: 1 
ha fatto irruzione in casa Sua? ............................................................. 
El 1-: 1 
ha rubato una bicidetta a qualcuno delta Sua casa? .............................. 
13 13 
ha fatto irruzione in una macchina di qualcuno delta Sua casa? ............ 
El 11 
ha rubato una macchina a qualcuno delta Sua casa? .............................. 
El 1: 1 
Dall'inizio di quest! anno, it 1 gennaio 1998, 
6 stato/a fermato/a dalla polizia o dai carabinieri? .......................... ha visto qualcuno commettere un delitto (i danni materiali inclusi)? ..... Questa sezione non si riferisce alla Sua esperienza, ma alle-Sue opinioni e ai Suoi sentimenti 
Quanto si preoccupa delta criminalith? ..................... motto 1-: 1 poco[: ] per niente[: ] Quando esce da solo/a di sera nella Sua citt, ý, quanto si sente sicuro/a? 
Non sicuro/ a El Abbastanza sicuro /a [3 Completamente sicuro /a El 
All'interno delta famiglia, pensa che i mariti agiscono in modo violento verso le mogli: 
maiE3 raramenteD a volte El frequentementeEl 
La polizia ed i carabinieri nella Sua zona lavorono: bene[: ] ndbene nd maleE] male El 
Nella Sua cittA la quantith di delitti: b in aumento[: ] rimane allo stesso livello[: ] b in diminuzione [I 
SECONDA SEZIONE: SALUTE. 
Risponda a ciascuna domanda indicando la Sua risposta come mostrato prima. Se non si sente certo delta risposta, 
effettui la scelta che comunque Le sembra mighore. Faccia solo un segno per ogni domanda. 
In generate, direbbe che la Sua salute ý: 
Eccellente El Motto buonaE1 Buona El PassabileD Scadente El 
Le seguenti domande riguardano alcune attivita' che potrebbero svolgere nel corso di una qualsiasi giornata. La 0 Sua salute La limita attualmente nello svolgimento di queste attivith? Se S1, fino a che punto? 
Si Si No 
Attivita' di moderato impegno fisico, come mi limita mi limita non mi limita 
spostare un tavolo, usare I'aspirapolvere, parecchio parzialmente per nulla 
giocare a bocce o fare un giretto in bicicletta .................. ED Safire qualche piano di scale .......................................... 1-: 1 
Nelle ultime 4 settimane ha riscontrato i seguenti problemi sul lavoro o nelle altre attivith quotidiane, 
a causa delta Sua salute fisica? Si No 
Ha reso meno di quanto avrebbe voluto .................................................. Ha dovuto limitare alcuni tipi di lavoro o di altre attivith ................... 
Nelle ultime 4 settimane ha riscontrato i seguenti problemi sul lavoro o nelle attivita' quotidiane, 
a causa del Suo stato emotivo (quale it sentirsi depresso o ansioso) Si No 
Ha reso meno di quanto avrebbe voluto ................................................. 
Q El 
Ha avuto un calo di concentrazione sul lavoro o in altre attivith ........... 
1: 1 El 
Nelle ultime 4 settimane, in che misura il dolore Vha ostacolata nel lavoro che svolge abitualmente 
(sia in casa sia fuori casa)? 
Per Null;: ] Molto POCOD Un po'13 Molto 1: 1 Moltissimoll 
Le seguenti domande si riferiscono a come si b sentito/ a nelle ultime 4 settimane. 
Risponda a ciascuna domanda scegliendo la riposta che piu' si avvicina al Suo caso. 
Per quanto tempo nelleultime 4 settimane sib sentito/ a... 
Quasi Molto Una parte 
Sempre sempre 
calmo/a esereno/a? ................... 
tempo del tempo 
R 
Quasi mai Mai 
pieno/a. di energia? ................... 
scoraggiato/a e triste? ................ 
1: 1 
Nelle ultime 4 settimane, per quanto tempo ]a Sua salute fisica o il Suo stato emotivo hanno interferito nelle Sue 
attivita sociali, in famiglia, con gli amici? 
Sempre E] Quasi sempre E] Molto tempo E] Una parte del tempo[: ] Quasimain Mai[] 
TERZA SEZIONE: ISTRUZIONE 
Le seguenti domande si riferiscono alla Sua esl2erienza personale 
Quanti anni aveva quando ha terminato gli studi? (Inserisca YetA o faccia un segno nella casella) 
Eth ...... Ancora studente/ essaE] 
Quale ý il titolo di studi pRi elevato che ha mai ottenuto? 
Scuola elementare D Scuola media 0 Scuola superiore 0 Professionale El 
Prima laurea E3 Qualifiche successive alla laurea E3 Scuola per adulti 
Altro (inserisca) ............... 
Quando era a scuola, ha marinato la scuola 
maif: ] molto raramente [: ] ogni tanto spesso 
Ha fatto un corso di formazione da quando ha terminato gli studi? ..................... SIE3 No 
E] 
Le seguenti domande riguardano le Sue ol2inioni. 
Oggi nella Sua citth i giovani marinano fa scuola 0 
main molto raramente ooni tanto spesso[-: ] 0 El 
Se si vuole essere felice, quanto importante ý l'istruzione? 
Molto importante [: ] Abbastanza importante [: ] Non molto importante Non importante 
QUARTA SEZIONE: LE ORGANIZZAZIONI VOLONTARTE 
Fa parte di un'organizzazione volontaria (societý, circoli, associazioni sportive, associazioni benefiche, 
ed altre organizzazioni simili compresi)? sin No [-: 1 
Se No, continui con la sezione seguente. Se SI, risponda alle altre domande di questa sezione. 
Inserisca il numero di organizzazioni delle quali fa parte ......... 
Nelle ultime 4 settimane, quante ore ha passato facendo attivita organizzate da associazioni volontarie? 
Nessuna F1 Meno di uWora [3 1-3 ore[: ] 4-8 ore [] 9 ore o pifi [] 
Fa parte di un comitato di una queste organizzazioni delle quali ý membro? SI El No El 
Se SI, inserisca. il numero di organizzazioni nelle quali fa parte del comitato amministrativo ....... Per quale motivo fa parte di almeno un'organizzazione volontaria? (Si pub segnare piii di una risposta) 
Per fare il mio dovere 1: 1 Per aiutare gli altriEl Per mantenere amicizie[3 
Per piacere E] Per imparare[] Altro n (inserisca il motivo): ........................... 
OUINTA SEZIONE: INFORMAZIONI GENERALL 
Quanti anni ha? ...... anni Sesso: MaschileE] 
FemminileE] 
Stato civile: 
Sposato/a ecoabitanteconlosposo/lasposa[: ] Celibe, ma coabitante conun/ a compagno/ a 
Separato/a odivorziato/a F1 Celibe 
Altro tl (inserisca): ...... 
Vedovo/a 
In quale citth abita? Imola SassuoloE] Faenza[] AltroE] (scriva il nome) .................. 
Da quanto tempo vive in questa cittA? 
Meno di un anncE] 1-5 anni [] 6-10 anni[: ] 11-20 anni [: ] PHt di 20 anni(] 
Lei incluso/ a, quante persone ci sono in casa Sua? ....... persone 
In casa Sua, quante persone fanno parte delle seguenti generazioni? 
Meno di 16 anni: ...... persone Da 16 a 60 anni: ....... persone 
61 anni o piii: ........... persone 
Ha un lavoro remunerato? 
Si, a tempo pieno El Si, part-time 13 
No, cerco un lavoro [] No, e non cerco un lavoro[] No, sono in pensione[] 
In casa Sua, quante persone hanno un lavoro remunerato? ....... persone 
Lavora in una cooperativa? S, E] No F1 
Lei incluso/ a, quante persone in casa Sua lavorano in una cooperativa? ...... persone 
Negli ultimi 7 giorni quante volte ha consumato insaccati? ........ volte 
Infine, alcune opinioni sulla vita nella Sua cittA: 
Se ha qualche difficoM ersonale ci sono persone a cui pub chiedere aiuto? 
Ceneson- -B 
Ce ne sono pocheE] C6 solo una personaEl Nonc'ý! nessuno(: ] 
t grande ]a differenza tra i ricchi ei poveri nella Sua cittA? 
S1, L% molto grande 1: 1 Si, 6 grande Non c'ý una grande differenza 
Nella Sua citth, le autorM sono di aiuto? 
gi, sempre El Si, spesso El Nononspesso[I No, mai [I 
TANTE GRAZIE PER LA SUA COLLABORAZIONE. 
PER FAVORE SPEDISCA IL QUESTIONARIO NELLA BUSTA ALLEGATA A: 
Dott. David Erdal, c/ o Ass. Culturale Erasmo, Viale Zappi 56b, 40026 Imola (B0) 
